JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by certain raiyats against their landlords, and certain other persons to whom the landlords had granted a settlement of certain lands, on the ground of unlawful dispossession. According to the case as set up in the plaint, it would appear that the act of dispossession complained of is really an act on the part of the landlord Defendants; for, it stated therein that the landlord Defendants collusively set up the Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 as tenants of the disputed lands and caused the Plaintiffs to be dispossessed from the same, through them, the Defendants Nos. 1 to 5. It was pleaded by the Defendants that the suit was barred by the two years' law of limitation as prescribed by the Bengal Tenancy Act, and upon the merits, they denied the title of the Plaintiffs. 2. The Court of first instance held that the claim was barred by the two years' law of limitation; and, upon the merits, it was of opinion that the Plaintiffs bad made out no title to the land in dispute. 3. The lower Appellate Court, on appeal by the Plaintiffs, has reversed the decree of the Court of first instance and has remanded the case to that Court for a fresh trial on the merits. 4. Referring, in the first instance, to the question of limitation raised between the parties, the Subordinate Judge was of opinion, relying upon the case of Ranijulla v. Ishab Dhali 6 C.W.N. 702: s.c. ILR 29 Cal. 610 (1902), decided by a Full Bench of this Court, that the two years' law of limitation was not applicable to the case. That officer, while dealing with the evidence as it bore upon the question of limitation, made the following observations:--"It is clear that the Defendants do not suggest in their written statement that the landlord had a hand in the actual dispossession. The Plaintiff also, although he pleads dispossession by the landlord, states that the Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 actually dispossessed him on the basis of a settlement by the landlord. The evidence adduced on both sides goes to show that the tenant Defendants made the dispossession. The Plaintiff also, although he pleads dispossession by the landlord, states that the Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 actually dispossessed him on the basis of a settlement by the landlord. The evidence adduced on both sides goes to show that the tenant Defendants made the dispossession. So, under the circumstances, the case falls within the scope of the Full Bench case and it is not barred, even assuming that the dispossession took place in Falgoon 1300 when a lease was granted to the Defendants Nos. 1 to 5." 5. The first observation that we have to make upon this judgment of the Subordinate Judge is that he has misconceived the ruling in the case of Rani julla v. Ishab Dhali 6 C.W.N. 702: s.c. ILR 29 Cal. 610 (1902) to which he has referred. That was a case where, after the dispossession had been effected by the tenant Defendants, they obtained a recognition of their title by the landlord; and it was held that, when an occupancy raiyat is dispossessed, and the landlord has had no hand in the ouster, the period of limitation applicable is 12 years, and not two years under Art. 3, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. But that is not the case which we have to deal with on the present occasion. Here, as we have already mentioned, the plaint distinctly alleged that it was the Defendant landlords who had set up the raiyat Defendants and had caused the dispossession of the Plaintiffs through those raiyats. The learned vakil for the Respondents has, however, contended that the finding of the Subordinate Judge upon the matter of dispossession is to the effect that the landlord Defendants had no hand in the dispossession of the Plaintiffs. But we are unable to take that view of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. That officer, as it seems to us, directed his mind rather to the question as to who actually dispossessed the Plaintiff than to the question who it was that was really instrumental in the dispossession. If the statement as made in the plaint be altogether accepted, it would appear that the act of dispossession was really that of the landlord Defendants, although they did not themselves go to the land and put the Plaintiffs out of possession. If the statement as made in the plaint be altogether accepted, it would appear that the act of dispossession was really that of the landlord Defendants, although they did not themselves go to the land and put the Plaintiffs out of possession. We are, therefore, unable to affirm the decision of the Subordinate Judge, as it is, upon the question of limitation. We are, therefore, constrained to remand the case to him for re-consideration of the matter, having regard to the observations that we have just made. There is, however, one other matter in respect to which the Subordinate Judge seems to have fallen into error, and that is this: he has remanded the case apparently under sec. 562, C.C.P. Now, it seems to be perfectly plain that that section has no application in the circumstances of the case, for, the Court of first instance did not decide the case upon any preliminary point. The questions arising on the merits were dealt with by that Court, and, if the Subordinate Judge was of opinion that there should be any finding upon any particular issue or further evidence should be taken upon any such issue, it was perfectly open to him to make an order of remand under sec. 566 of the Code. That, however, was not done in the present case. We, therefore, set aside his order of remand. It will be the duty of the Subordinate Judge to apply himself in the first instance to the question of limitation as arising under Art. 3, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and, if he be of opinion that the Plaintiffs' claim is not barred by limitation, he will make such order under sec. 566 of the Code as he may be advised. Costs will abide the result. We assess the hearing fee at 2 gold mohurs.