JUDGMENT 1. This suit was brought by the Plaintiff (Respondent) to set aside the sale of a share in certain property which the Defendant No. 2 had sold to Defendant No. 1 in Aswin 1301. The Plaintiff's allegation was that the property sold was a share in debuttar property which was inalienable, and that therefore the sale was invalid and conveyed no rights to the purchaser. He accordingly prayed for a decree declaring the land to be debuttar and inalienable, that the deed of sale was invalid and of no effect, and that the Plaintiff was entitled as shebait to recover possession of the property in suit. There was a further prayer that an order which had been passed for the registration of the name of Defendant No. 1 as the owner of the properties should be set aside. The Defendant No. 1, who contested the suit, denied that the property sold was debuttar property or that there had ever been a valid dedication of the property as such. Other minor points in defence were taken, but the main question for decision in the case has all along been whether the property in suit was a share in debuttar property, and whether there had ever been a valid dedication of the property, 2. The Plaintiff's case was that in 1246 Krishna Mohan Sarma Roy executed a danarpan-patra or deed of gift and dedication by which he dedicated various properties set out therein, including lands held under various titles as well as a lakhiraj bari and jote, to the worship of the family idol Lakshmi Narayana. The deed was executed in favour of his mother Siddessuree Debya Thakurain, and after reciting that the properties had been dedicated to the idol it proceeds to state " From to-day's date you do own and hold all the properties mentioned in the danpatra and do continue to perform the worship of the idol from the proceeds thereof after paying the sadar malgujari. The right and power of gift and sale are yours. I and my heirs shall have no liability, claim and right." (This, it is to be observed, is the translation of the document by the translator of this Court). 3. The right and power of gift and sale are yours. I and my heirs shall have no liability, claim and right." (This, it is to be observed, is the translation of the document by the translator of this Court). 3. In the year 1255 B. S., Siddessuree Debya executed a Will in which after reciting that she had been in possession of certain properties in her own right as well as of the properties dedicated to the idol by her son Krishna Mohan Roy, she goes on to say : " I have endowed all the properties as debuttar for the services of the said deity and with the proceeds thereof I have been performing the services." She then appoints her three daughters as shebaits of the idol for the performance of the services of the idol in proportion to the shares of all the properties divided among you," and directs that they will get their names registered in the Collectorate, pay the rent, perform the services, and continue to enjoy the properties according to those shares." ln paragraph 2 she fixes the shares of her daughters as follows: To Annapurna Debi 6 annas share, to Bha-girathi Debi 5 annas share, and to Alokhmoni Debi 5 annas share. The document then provides : " You shall be competent for the services of the deity to grant settlement of any of all these properties, otherwise you shall have no right of alienation by gift, or sale. You shall not be competent to appoint any one as shebait except your own heirs." And in the 4th paragraph the following passage occurs : "If it becomes necessary to have recourse to a loan for the purpose of the shebu (services) of the deity or for defraying the daily and occasional expenses JOB shall do so in proportion to the aforesaid shares and manage the same." A list of the miscellaneous properties is attached to the Will. This includes a large 'huka' and a napa (boat) with appurtenances. These are strange articles with which to endow the shebaits of an idol. As regards these articles in this list too there is the proviso, "If God forbid, any of these articles are required to be sold they shall be taken in proportion to the above shares." 4. This includes a large 'huka' and a napa (boat) with appurtenances. These are strange articles with which to endow the shebaits of an idol. As regards these articles in this list too there is the proviso, "If God forbid, any of these articles are required to be sold they shall be taken in proportion to the above shares." 4. The three daughters of Siddessuree afterwards by different wills left their shares, in defiance of the provisions of Siddessuree's Will, to various persons, none of whom were in fact their heirs-at-law. The final result of the various transfers is however that an eight annas share of the properties has come to Plaintiff and his two brothers (Defendants Nos. 2 and 3) the male descendants of Alokhmoni, one of the daughters, and the other eight annas share has passed to Defendants Nos. 4 and 5, the male descendants of Bhagirathi, another daughter. This, it is to be remarked, is the way in which the properties would have passed by inheritance, supposing them to have remained purely secular. It is not the way iu which they would have passed if the povisions of the Will of Siddessurree had been followed. 5. The Subordinate Judge before whom the case was tried held that there was no absolute dedication of the property to the idol in the danpatra executed by Krishna Mohan, or in the Will executed by Siddessuree. The former document gave to Siddessuree power to sell or make a gift of the property. The Will divided the properties into three shares and distributed them among the three daughters of the testatrix as shebaits. He further found that in the receipts given to the tenants the properties were never described as debuttar till 1290 (1887) and the names of Gourhari (to whom the eight annas share now in possession of Plaintiff and Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 originally passed under the Wills of Alokhmoni and Annapurna) and afterwards the names of Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were registered as " proprietors " and not as shebaits. In the Revenue Challans and the Road-cess returns the alleged shebaits are described as proprietors. 2 and 3 originally passed under the Wills of Alokhmoni and Annapurna) and afterwards the names of Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were registered as " proprietors " and not as shebaits. In the Revenue Challans and the Road-cess returns the alleged shebaits are described as proprietors. He further held that "there was no reliable evidence that the whole of the profits were devoted to the worship of (the idol) 'Lakhi Narayan.'" He accordingly came to the conclusion that the property in suit was not debuttar property at all, and that the dedication was a mere pretence, and has had recourse to as the family was in debt and engaged in litigation at the time of the execution of the danpatra. 6. He further was of opinion that as the widow of Defendant No. 2 was alive the Plaintiff had not sufficiently proved his title to bring the suit. 7. He accordingly dismissed the suit with costs. 8. The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge has been set aside by the District Judge on appeal and the suit of the Plaintiff has been decreed. Defendant No. 1 has appealed to this Court The judgment of the District Judge is not easy to understand. The commencement certainly conveys the impression that the inclination of the Judge was at first to support the decision of the Sub-Judge, for he arrives at the conclusion that Krishna Mohan " was not free from pecuniary embarrassment at the time of executing the danpatra." He seems however on a further examination of the danpatra to have discovered the names of the idols (sic) Lakhi Narayan on the margin of the document which he had not noticed at first and then to have entirely changed his view of the case. Later on in his judgment he arrives at a conclusion contrary to that previously stated, and remarks : " I do not find any evidence to warrant the statement that the family was involved in debt and litigation at the time of the danpatra." 9. He next proceeds to interpret the meaning of the danpatra and the Will executed by Siddessuree and adopting a translation of the Bengali words used directly contrary to that of the Subordinate Judge he arrived at the conclusion that there was an absolute dedication of the property to the service of the idol. He next proceeds to interpret the meaning of the danpatra and the Will executed by Siddessuree and adopting a translation of the Bengali words used directly contrary to that of the Subordinate Judge he arrived at the conclusion that there was an absolute dedication of the property to the service of the idol. He has however wrongly interpreted Lakhi Narayan to mean two idols whereas it, clearly means one only. He accordingly held that the property in dispute was debuttar and as such inalienable, and that the sale by Defendant No, 2 to Defendaut No. 1 transferred do right in the property to the latter. He therefore gave the Plaintiff a decree for the full relief claimed. 10. For the Appellant it has been urged that the learned District Judge has mistranslated and misunderstood the passages in the danarpan-patra executed by Krishna Mohan Sarma and the Will executed by Siddessuree Debya, that the Subordinate Judge translated them aright, that there was not an absolute dedication of the property to the idol, that the dedication was a mere pretence to save the property from being sold in satisfaction of the family debts, and that the subsequent conduct of the parties and the dispositions under the Wills executed by the three daughters of Siddessuree leave no doubt that the property was in fact to pass to the descendants of Krishna Mohan and Siddessuree in the manner in which it would have passed under the Hindu law if there had been no dedication. 11. On behalf of the Respondent it has been urged on the authority of the case of Nowbut Singh v, Chutter Dharee Singh 19 W. R. 222(1873), that as the District Judge has interpreted the meaning of passages in the document, none of which contain technical words or phrases as to the meaning of which there could be any doubt, it is not open to this Court, in second appeal to interfere with his finding so on the point. We are of opinion that the contention is unsound and that there is nothing in the ruling referred to which supports it. In that case it was held that this Court would not interfere in second appeal because of a mistake as to the meaning of some portion of the evidence which was in writing if it was connected with other evidence affecting its construction. In that case it was held that this Court would not interfere in second appeal because of a mistake as to the meaning of some portion of the evidence which was in writing if it was connected with other evidence affecting its construction. The Judges, it may be observed, in their judgment in that suit are careful to say, " The misconstruction of a document winch is the foundation of a suit which is in the nature of a contract or a document of title is allowed to be a ground for special appeal." The documents, which it is alleged on behalf of the Appellants that the District Judge has misconstrued, are documents of title and are the foundation of the whole of the Plaintiff's claim in the suit. The passages as to which there is dispute are the most important for the construction of the documents. The objection cannot therefore be entertained. 12. Now the passage as to which there is dispute in the danarpan-patra is as follows : " Danbikrir shatyadhikar apanar amar o amar worisoner kono dai dawa o shatya thakilo na." The learned Subordinate Judge and the translator of this Court have translated it as follows:-- "The right and power of gift are yours. I and my heirs shall have no liability, claim or right." There is as usual no punctuation in the passage in Bengali nor in fact in any part of the document. The District Judge, owing apparently to the absence of any punctuation, appears to have translated it as follows: --"In the right and power of gift, you, I and my heirs shall have no liability, claim or right." The learned pleader for the Respondent does nor go so far as to say that the translation of the District Judge is right but contends that this Court is bound by it. We have no hesitation in holding that the translation is wrong and that we are not bound by it. 13. The juxtaposition of the words supports the meaning given to them by the Subordinate Judge, and the passage as tanslated by the District Judge is hardly intelligible. We have no doubt then that under the danarpan-patra, power of alienation was expressly given to Sid dessuree Debya. 13. The juxtaposition of the words supports the meaning given to them by the Subordinate Judge, and the passage as tanslated by the District Judge is hardly intelligible. We have no doubt then that under the danarpan-patra, power of alienation was expressly given to Sid dessuree Debya. There was not therefore an absolute dedication of the property to the idol, so as to constitute the property covered by the same debuttar and inalienable, 14. The District Judge has held that the Subordinate Judge has erred in translating "Nitya Noimittik " In contradistinction to " Ishwar Sheba" in the Will of Siddessure as referring to family expenses and has held that It must be taken to mean the daily expenses of the idol as opposed to the expenses at the time of the great festivals. The Subordinate Judge's construction appears however to have been based not on one isolated passage in which the two expressions occur, but on the Will as a whole. In that document the testator first divides all the properties into 3 shares, which, we may observe, is inconsistent with their nature as debuttar property, and then provides that after paying the rent and the expenses of the idol the daughters are to enjoy the properties according to their shares. This provision for enjoyment supports the view that the occasional expenses referred to in the later passages were family expenses. We are unable therefore to agree with the District Judge that the Subordinate Judge was in error in his translation of the words referred to in the document. Further we may add that in our opinion the whole terms of the Will, which bequeathed in different shares to the daughters of the testator all the property, immoveable and moveable, of which she died possessed, and the subsequent dispositions of the properties by Will by her daughters, are entirely inconsistent with the view that there was an absolute dedication of the properties as debuttar. As we hold that the findings of the District Judge cannot be supported as regards the foundation of the title on which the Plaintiff has based his suit we are unable to confirm his judgment and decree. We accordingly set aside the judgment and decree of the District Judge and restore those of the Subordinate Judge, and decree the appeal with costs..