JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - The facts which have given rise to the litigation out of which the present appeal arises are in a great measure undisputed. One Ram Jagannath Mozumder died many years ago possessed of considerable immoveable properties leaving behind him two sons Durga Prosad and Ramgati and a widow Tara Sundari Ramgati died in 1868 leaving a widow Radha Sundari. Durga Prosad died in 1885 leaving three sons who are Plaintiffs in the present suit. Tara Sundari is still alive and is Defendant No. 7. It appears that on the 23rd December 1878, Radha Sundari conveyed a share in certain immoveable properties which had been inherited by her from her husband to some of the principal Defendants in this case, and subsequently, on the 5th April 1886, the Defendants purchased other shares of the same properties at a sale held in execution of a decree obtained against Radha Sundari. The Plaintiffs alleged that there was no legal necessity for either of these alienations and pray for a decree declaring under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, that the alienations were without legal necessity and consequently cannot stand good and be in force beyond the lifetime of Radha Sundari, Defendant No. 6, to the suit. The purchaser Defendants resisted the Plaintiffs' claim upon various grounds which, having regard to the course the trial took in the Court below, it is not necessary to set out in detail; but it is sufficient to mention that they raised the plea in bar, that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the action, inasmuch as they were not the nearest reversionary heirs of their uncle Ramgati and had no cause of action so long as Tara Sundari, the mother of Ramgati, was alive. The first issue raised in the case related to this point and was in these terms : "Whether this suit for a declaration that the transfer of this property in dispute in this case, partly by private sale and partly by sale in execution of a decree was not binding upon the Plaintiffs, who call themselves reversionary heirs to it, is at all maintainable at the instance of these Plaintiffs who on their own showing are not the immediate reversioners." The learned Subordinate Judge has decided this issue in favor of the purchaser Defendants and has thrown out the suit on the preliminary ground that it is not maintainable at the instance of the present Plaintiffs, inasmuch as they have not shown that their grandmother who is a nearer reversionary heir to their uncle's estate has refused without sufficient cause to institute proceedings or has precluded herself by her own act and conduct from suing or has colluded with the widow or concurred in the acts alleged to be wrongful. There are observations in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge which lend some support to the suggestion that he was not satisfied that the alienations were not without legal necessity, but it is quite clear from the proceedings in the suit as they appear in the order-sheet that the issues on the merits were not tried in the Court below. We must take it therefore that the suit has been dismissed on the preliminary ground alone. Against this decree the Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court and on their behalf the decision of the Court below has been challenged on the ground that although it is well settled that ordinarily only the immediate reversioners can bring a declaratory suit of the present description, that rule has no application here because the immediate reversioner is herself only the holder of a life-estate. We are of opinion that this contention ought to prevail as it is well founded on principle and is amply supported by authority. We are of opinion that this contention ought to prevail as it is well founded on principle and is amply supported by authority. It is now settled beyond the possibility of dispute by the decisions of the judicial committee in the cases of Rajlukhee v. Gokool Chunder 13 Moores I.A. 209 (1869), Goolab Sing v. Rao Kurun Singh 14 Moores I.A. 176 (1871) and Jumoona v. Bama Soondari L.R. 3 IndAp 72 (1876) that the nearest reversioner who is the presumptive heir in succession, though such reversioner has merely a contingent interest, may maintain an action for a declaration that the acts of a female heir in possession of the property of the last full owner does not bind the estate. It is equally well settled that a remote reversioner cannot maintain such a suit unless the immediate reversioner has fraudulently colluded with the female heir or by some reason or other has made it impossible for him successfully to challenge the acts of the female heir : Rani Anund Koer v. Court of Wards L.R. 8 IndAp 14 (1880). But the question arises whether this latter qualification is necessary or justifiable on principle when the immediate reversioner happens to be another female who has a qualified interest of the same description as the heir whose acts are sought to be challenged. It appears to us to be clear that in the case in which upon the death of a full owner, the estate successively passes through the hands of a series of female heirs who take only a qualified estate, before the property vests in another full owner, they may rightly be regarded in the aggregate as the holder of a limited interest which intervenes between the full ownership of the original owner and the ultimate taker. Each of these recipients of the limited interest has three common characteristics, namely, first, each possesses only a qualified right of alienation; secondly, not one of them can transmit the property to her own heirs, which passes upon her death to the heir for the time being of the last full owner, and, thirdly, not one of them can alienate the estate absolutely even with the consent of the next female reversionary heir, for where the next reversioner is herself a female who only takes a life-estate, her consent will not bind the next reversioner who takes an absolute estate; in other words, the assent of a female reversionary heir to an alienation made by a female heir cannot confer upon it, a character of greater validity than it would have possessed if it had been made by herself : Goolab Sing v. Rao Kurun Singh 14 Moores I.A. 176 (1871), Bhupal Ram v. Lachma Kuer ILR 11 All. 253 (1888). We think, therefore, that there is a substantial distinction between the case in which a remote reversioner who would take an absolute interest sues for a declaratory decree in the presence of a nearer male reversionary heir and the case in which such a suit is brought in the presence of a nearer female reversionary heir. It follows, consequently, that a male reversionary heir who would be entitled to the property absolutely, if he succeeded to it, ought to be allowed to challenge an unauthorized alienation, by the holder of a qualified estate, whether or not such female heir is his immediate predecessor or is separated from him by the interposition of other possible female heirs. The principle upon which a reversionary heir is allowed to maintain a declaratory suit, although it may turn out in the end that he is not the person who actually gets the property, is that otherwise evidence regarding the true character of the alienation might disappear and be not available when required; obviously, this principle has a much stronger application in the case in which several successive life-estates intervene between the original proprietor and the ultimate full owner, than in the case in which only one such life-estate is interposed. We must hold accordingly that the view that a remote reversioner can bring a declaratory suit when the immediate reversioner is herself only the holder of a life-estate, is well founded on principle. We must hold accordingly that the view that a remote reversioner can bring a declaratory suit when the immediate reversioner is herself only the holder of a life-estate, is well founded on principle. 2. As regards the decided cases in which the question now raised before us, has been discussed, one of the earliest in these provinces appears to be that of Chunder Koomar Hazaree v. Dwarkanath Purdhan Beng. S.D.A. Rep. 1859, p. 1623, in which three learned Judges of the Sudder Court observed as follows:-- "A preliminary objection was taken to the plaint by the Defendants' vakil on the ground of the interest of the minor on whose behalf it is brought, being too remote. We see however no force in the objection. The minor is the first reversioner after the death of the two intervening life-tenants, the widow and daughter of Bissessur Purdhan. His right is undoubtedly only contingent and has not vested, and it is possible that he may never succeed; nevertheless we think, in accordance with the precedents of this Court, that a suit like the present to remove obstructions out of the way of the first reversioner and so to enable him on the death of the tenants for life, if he survives them, immediately to enter on possession, is maintainable in our Courts." It will be observed that the learned Judges base their decision upon earlier precedents and with reference to this passage, Mr. Justice Mahmud observed in Balgobind v. Ram Kumar ILR 6 All. 431 (137) (1884) that he had not been able to discover the older rulings upon which the learned Judges placed reliance. An examination however of the earlier volumes of the Sudder Court Reports shows that there are several cases which fully support the view taken in 1859; see for instance (sic)Gourmunnee v. Parbuttee Beng. S.D.A. Rep. 1846, p. 411, (sic)Bhyub Chandur v. Kalee Kishwar Beng. S.D.A. Rep. 1850, p. 369 confirming on review the original decision reported in Beng S.D. A. Rep. 1849, p. 170, and Ramdhun Sein v. Kishen Kanth Sein Macnaghten Sel. Rep., Vol. III, p.100 (2nd edition, p.133) (1821) where substantially the same view was taken as early as 1821. S.D.A. Rep. 1846, p. 411, (sic)Bhyub Chandur v. Kalee Kishwar Beng. S.D.A. Rep. 1850, p. 369 confirming on review the original decision reported in Beng S.D. A. Rep. 1849, p. 170, and Ramdhun Sein v. Kishen Kanth Sein Macnaghten Sel. Rep., Vol. III, p.100 (2nd edition, p.133) (1821) where substantially the same view was taken as early as 1821. In the first of these cases where a lady sued on behalf of her infant son to set aside an adoption by her late brother's widow, the Sudder Court held that she was entitled to maintain the action, though the widow and her own mother were alive. The case of Chunder Koomar v. (sic)Dwarkanath Beng. S.D.A. Rep. 1859, p. 1623 which thus followed what had been at that time the law for forty years was accepted as embodying a correct view of the law in this Court in the case of (sic)Balgobind Ram v. Hirusranee 2 W.R. 255 (1865) in which Morgan and Shumbhoonath Pandit, JJ., laid down that "where the immediate reversioner is a woman having qualified and limited rights similar to the rights of the widow, whose acts of waste are complained of, the next reversioner, who has full and unlimited rights may intervene in order to protect his own future rights." The principle so firmly established appears to have been lost sight of in the ease of Bama Soonduree v. Bama Soonduree 10 W.R. 301 (1868) in which the learned Judges observed that "there is no doubt that if the minor is not the immediate reversioner but is only entitled in reversion, after the life-estate of his mother and her sister, in the event of their surviving their mother, whose alienations this suit has been brought to set aside, the suit will not lie for the interest of the minor is too remote." The earlier cases however to which we have referred were not brought to the notice of the Court and although the learned Judges made the observations we have quoted, they did not throw out the suit on that ground, but remanded the case to ascertain precisely what position the minor occupied with reference to the estate alienated by the grandmother and then to determine whether or not his legal status was such as enabled him to institute the suit. These observations, therefore, really amount to an obiter dictum and do not constitute a decision contrary to that contained in the case of Balgobind v. Hirusranee 2 W.R. 255 (1865) so as to render necessary a reference to a Full Bench. 3. The High Court of Allahabad is divided against itself upon the question raised before us. In the case of Madari v. Malki ILR 6 All. 428 (1884) two learned Judges held that in the absence of any proof of collusion or connivance between a widow and her daughters, the Plaintiffs who were remote reversioners were not competent to maintain a suit for a declaration that an alienation by the widow was not justified by legal necessity. This conclusion was based upon the decision of the judicial committee in the case of Rani Anund Koer v. Court of Wards L.R. 8 IndAp 14 (1880), which, however, is obviously distinguishable inasmuch as the nearer reversioner in whose presence the remote reversioner asked for a declaration would himself have been entitled to an absolute estate, in the event of the succession opening out to him. A few days later, Oldfield and Mahmud, JJ., in the case of Balgobind v. Ram Kumar ILR 6 All. 431 (1884), held that the existence of female heirs whose right of succession cannot surpass a widow's estate, does not affect the status of the nearest presumptive reversionary heir to the full ownership of the estate, and that such presumptive heir can maintain a suit for declaratory relief, irrespective of the question of collusion or concurrence by such female heirs, in the alienation by a childless Hindu widow or other female heir holding a similar estate. This conclusion was supported by an elaborate examination by Mr. Justice Mahmud of the earlier authorities and the principle on which they are based, and we entirely agree in the judgment of that learned Judge, which appears to have been delivered in ignorance of the contrary view taken in the case of Madari v. Malki ILR 6 All. 428 (1884) which had not at that time been reported. The question appears to have been raised again in the case of Ishwar Narain v. Janki ILR 15 All. 132 (1893) where Tyrrell and Blair, JJ., refused to follow the case of Balgobind v. Ram Kumar ILR 6 All. 481 (1884) and adopted the view taken in Madari v. Malki ILR 6 All. The question appears to have been raised again in the case of Ishwar Narain v. Janki ILR 15 All. 132 (1893) where Tyrrell and Blair, JJ., refused to follow the case of Balgobind v. Ram Kumar ILR 6 All. 481 (1884) and adopted the view taken in Madari v. Malki ILR 6 All. 428 (1884). No reasons are assigned to meet the arguments embodied in the judgment of Mr. Justice Mahmud and we are unable to follow the rule laid down in the case of Ishwar Narain v. Janki ILR 15 All. 132 (1893). 4. The High Court of Madras has been called upon more than once to consider the question now under discussion. In the case of Kundasami v. Akkammal ILR 13 Mad. 195 (1889) it was held that the intervention of two life-estates does not alter the nature of the reversionary interest which sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act was intended to protect and that consequently such intervention does not preclude the reversioner from suing for a declaratory decree. The learned Judges (Muttusami Ayyar and Handley, JJ.), pointed out that this conclusion was in accordance with the observations made in the case of Narayana v. Chengalamma ILR 10 Mad. 1 (1885) and was also supported by the decision of the judicial committee in Anant Bahadur Singh v. Thakurain Raghunath Kuar L.R. 9 IndAp 53 (1882). This decision was arrived at independently of the case of Balgobind v. Ram Kumar ILR 6 All. 431 (1884), which was apparently not brought to the notice of the Court. But in a later case Raghupati v. Tirumalai ILR 15 Mad. 422 (1892), Muttusami Ayyar and Best, JJ., reached the same conclusion and referred to the case of Balgobind v. Ram Kumar ILR 6 All. 431 (1884) with approval. 5. This review of the decisions of the various Courts shows conclusively that the balance of authority is clearly in favor of the view we take. 6. There is another aspect of the case which shows that the Plaintiffs are entitled to maintain the action as framed. The alienations which the Plaintiffs impeach in this suit took place in 1878 and 1886, that is, more than twelve years before the date of the institution of this suit. 6. There is another aspect of the case which shows that the Plaintiffs are entitled to maintain the action as framed. The alienations which the Plaintiffs impeach in this suit took place in 1878 and 1886, that is, more than twelve years before the date of the institution of this suit. It follows, therefore, that under Art. 125 of the 2nd schedule of the Limitation Act, which provides that "a suit during the life of a Hindu female by a Hindu who, if the female died at the date of instituting the suit, would be entitled to the possession of land, to have an alienation of such land made by the female declared to be void except for her life, must be brought within twelve years from the date of the alienation," the right of the grandmother of the Plaintiffs to institute a declaratory suit had already become barred by limitation. We must hold therefore upon the authority of Govinda Pillai v. Thayammal 14 Mad. L.J. Rep. 209 (1904), that the nearest reversioner having precluded herself from maintaining a declaratory action by omission to sue within the statutory period and having thus practically concurred in the alleged improper alienation, the Plaintiffs are entitled to maintain the suit. We are aware that in the case of Pershad Singh v. Chedee Lall 15 W.R. 1 (1890), which was decided under the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1859, it was held by this Court that upon an improper alienation made by a Hindu widow, one cause of action arises in favor of all the reversioners, near and remote, entitling each of them to maintain a declaratory action and that consequently, if the nearest reversioner allowed the statutory period to elapse, the cause of action would be extinguished and would not be revived in favor of other reversioners who might subsequently come into existence and attain majority. This view appears to have been followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Chhaganram v. Bai Motigauri ILR 14 Bom. 512 (1890), in which the alienation was made and consequently the cause of action arose, in 1869, when the Limitation Act of 1859 was in force, although the suit was instituted after the Act of 1877 had come into operation. 512 (1890), in which the alienation was made and consequently the cause of action arose, in 1869, when the Limitation Act of 1859 was in force, although the suit was instituted after the Act of 1877 had come into operation. It appears to have been overlooked that the Acts of 1871 and 1877 had made substantial changes in the law, by the introduction of Art. 124 in the one Act and Art. 125 in the other. It does not also appear to have been noticed that under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act of 1877, the question is not when the cause of action arises but when the Plaintiffs' right to sue accrues. We must hold accordingly, as was held by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Bhagwanta v. Sukhi ILR 22 All. 33 (1899), that where there are several reversioners entitled successively under the Hindu Law to an estate held by a Hindu widow, no one such reversioner can rightly be held to claim through or derive his title from another, but he derives his title from the last full owner; consequently, although the right of the nearest reversioner, for the time being, to contest an alienation or an adoption by the widow may have become barred by limitation against him, this will not bar the similar rights of the subsequent reversioners. It follows necessarily that a reversioner who is an infant at the date of the alienation or who is born subsequently is entitled to the benefit of sec. 7 of the Limitation Act, for it is only reasonable to hold that the right of any reversioner to sue for a declaration cannot accrue before he is born. This view is in accord with that taken in the case of Govinda Pillai v. Thayammal 14 Mad. L.J. Rep. 209 (1904). 7. The result therefore is that this appeal must be allowed, the decree of the Court below reversed and the case remitted to the Subordinate Judge, in order that he may try it on the merits and determine the validity of the alienations which are sought to he impeached. L.J. Rep. 209 (1904). 7. The result therefore is that this appeal must be allowed, the decree of the Court below reversed and the case remitted to the Subordinate Judge, in order that he may try it on the merits and determine the validity of the alienations which are sought to he impeached. The parties will be at liberty to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases, and the burden of establishing that the alienations were prim facie for a legitimate purpose must, upon the authority of the judicial committee in the cases of Rao Kurun Sing v. Nawab Mahomed Fyzali 14 Moores I.A. 187 (1871) and Rajlukhee v. Gokool Chandra 13 Moores I.A. 209 (1869) lie on the purchaser Defendants. 8. We are of opinion that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the costs of this appeal. It was suggested by the learned vakil for the Respondents that his clients ought not to be held responsible for the course which the trial took in the Court below and that there is nothing to show that they insisted upon the dismissal of the suit on the preliminary ground. But it is clear from the written statement, that this preliminary objection was placed in the forefront and if the Defendants succeeded in securing the dismissal of the suit upon a ground which has now proved to be untenable, they cannot justly evade the liability to indemnify the Appellants by payment of costs which they have incurred. As the Suit was dismissed by the Court below upon a preliminary ground, we direct under sec. 13 of the Court Fees Act that the institution fee paid upon the memorandum of appeal presented to this Court, be refunded to the Appellants.