JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by certain reversioners for the recovery of immoveable properties on the death of a Hindu widow. It involves the question of the validity of an anumatipatra alleged to have been executed in her favour by her husband on the 11th January 1835, and of an adoption made under it in 1888. The District Judge has held that the suit is not barred by limitation, that the anumatipatra is not genuine, that the adoption made under it is invalid and has dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit. 2. The Plaintiffs appeal. The ground of appeal urged are (1) that the suit is barred by limitation, (2) that the District Judge is wrong in holding that Ex. J is inadmissible in evidence, and (3) that the certified copy of the firist, that he has admitted in evidence and relied on, is not admissible. 3. It appears that on the question of limitation, there is a serious conflict of rulings. The following decisions have been relied on as showing that the article of limitation applicable to a suit of this nature is Art. 118 of the schedule to the Limitation Act : Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dhakina Mohan ILR 13 Cal. 308 (1886), Mohesh Narain v. Taruknath Moitra ILR 20 Cal. 487 (1892), Shrinivas v. Hanmant ILR 24 Bom. 260 (1899), Barot Narain v. Barot Jesang ILR 25 Bom. 26 (1900), Parvathi Ammal v. Sami Natha Gurukal ILR 20 Mad. 40 (1896), Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal ILR 26 Mad. 291 (1902) and Bejoy Gopal Mukerji v. Nil Ratan Mukerji ILR 30 Cal. 990 (1903). On the other hand the following cases have been cited as authorities for the view that the article of the Limitation Act applicable is Art. 141: Jaggunnath Proshad v. Ranjit Singh ILR 26 Cal. 354 (1897), Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh 4 C.W.N. 405 : s.c. ILR 27 Cal. 242 (1899), Nathu Singh v. Gulab Singh ILR 17 All. 167 (1895), Lali v. Murlidhar ILR 24 All. 195 (1901). 4. It is clear that if the article held to apply is Art. 118, the suit is barred. If Art. 141, the suit is in time. 5. The Privy Council cases reported at Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dhakina Mohan ILR 13 Cal. 308 (1886), and Mohesh Narain v. Taruknath Moitra ILR 20 Cal. 195 (1901). 4. It is clear that if the article held to apply is Art. 118, the suit is barred. If Art. 141, the suit is in time. 5. The Privy Council cases reported at Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dhakina Mohan ILR 13 Cal. 308 (1886), and Mohesh Narain v. Taruknath Moitra ILR 20 Cal. 487 (1892), the Bombay and the Madras cases are in favour of the Appellant in this appeal. The cases decided by the Allahabad and this Court are against him. The case decided by this Court and reported at Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh 4 C.W.N. 405 : s.c. ILR 27 Cal. 242 (1899), is directly in point; while the case of Bejoy Gopal Mukerji v. Nil Ratan Mukerji ILR 30 Cal. 990 (1903), is not so. In the former of these cases the decisions of the Privy Council in the cases, Jagadamba Chowdhrani v. Dhakina Mohan ILR 13 Cal. 308 (1886), and Mohesh Narain v. Taruknath Moitra ILR 20 Cal. 487 (1892), have been considered and distinguished. It is pointed out that they were decisions under Act IX of 1871, and that the terms of the Limitation Act have now been changed. It is obvious that we must either follow the rule laid down in this case or refer the matter to a Full Bench. We do not consider it necessary to dissent from this ruling--more specially as there is no finding by the lower Appellate Court that the Plaintiff was aware of the adoption relied on by the Defendant. We must therefore agree with the lower Appellate Court in holding that the suit is not barred by limitation. 6. The second and third pleas taken by the Appellant relate to the finding of the District Judge on the question of the validity of the anumatipatra. They have not been seriously pressed before us. It is sufficient, we think, to say that the District Judge in our opinion did not mean to hold that Ex. J was absolutely inadmissible in evidence, but only that without the plaint it was of little or no weight. The matter of the firist is unimportant. A copy only apparently was produced in the Court of first instance, but the original was produced in the Appellate Court, and the Judge came to the conclusion he did with the original firist before him. The matter of the firist is unimportant. A copy only apparently was produced in the Court of first instance, but the original was produced in the Appellate Court, and the Judge came to the conclusion he did with the original firist before him. There are no reasons for disturbing the finding of the Judge on the question of the validity of the anumatipatra. We dismiss this appeal with costs.