JUDGMENT 1. In this case the Appellant, a man named Cassem Kurrim, has been convicted under sec. 500 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500 and in default thereof to suffer three months' simple imprisonment. The libel, which the Appellant was charged with publishing, was contained in a letter written by his attorney on the 21st of March last, by the instructions of the Appellant. The letter contained a notice to the recipients of the letter not to make any payments to the firm of Seedick & Co., on account of brokerage or difference in gunny transactions or on any other account. It secondly contained an allegation that one member of that firm, a man named Virchand, had filed his petition under the Insolvency Act; and, it contained a statement that the other members of the firm were not entitled to collect the outstandings and were not in a position to give an effectual discharge to persons making payments. It also states that the writer was taking steps on behalf of his client to have all the other members of the firm declared insolvent. This letter was circulated amongst persons who dealt with the firm of Seedick & Co., and the result was to damage the business of Seedick & Co. 2. The Appellant says that this letter was written bond fide, for the purpose of protecting his interests, and that therefore he is protected within the exceptions to sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The prosecutor, on the other band, says that the letter goes beyond what was fairly and reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the Appellant, even assuming that any such letter was necessary at, all, because it imputes to a member of Seediek's firm that he has filed his petition in insolvency, the object. being to collect the outstandings and to defeat the creditors; and, he relies on that to show that the letter, even if otherwise privileged, exceeds the bounds of privilege allowed by the law. 4. being to collect the outstandings and to defeat the creditors; and, he relies on that to show that the letter, even if otherwise privileged, exceeds the bounds of privilege allowed by the law. 4. Now, the question for us is whether on the evidence which has been placed before us and on all the circumstances of the case, the Appellant ought to have been convicted, or whether it does not appear from the evidence that he acted with the intention of protecting his own interests and in a manner which was honest and bona fide. 5. To begin with, we may observe that the particular class of libel under which this case falls can be far more properly dealt with in the Civil than in the Criminal Court, because it is a specific allegation with respect to the complainant's business, which, it is said, has caused special damage by reason of the injury inflicted on that business. In our opinion, a libel of this kind which is analogous to au action on a case for special damage is far more properly dealt with in the Civil Courts than in a criminal prosecution. 6. We now proceed to examine the letter which the prosecutor complains of. The first paragraph contains a notice not to pay. The second paragraph contains an allegation that Virchand has filed a petition under the provisions of the Insolvency Code. 7. Now, Virchand had been a member of the firm of Seedick & Co. To the knowledge of the Appellant, Virchand did file this petition in insolvency on the 18th of March, three days before the letter in question was written. It is said that the allegation that he was a member of the firm on the 21st of March, is untrue, and, that he had dissolved partnership as far back as the 12th of February. It is argued that the Appellant must have known that Virchand had ceased to be a member of the firm, because in the petition of insolvency be describes the firm as his "late firm." In our opinion, that is not sufficient to affect the Appellant with the knowledge of the dissolution of partnership. It is argued that the Appellant must have known that Virchand had ceased to be a member of the firm, because in the petition of insolvency be describes the firm as his "late firm." In our opinion, that is not sufficient to affect the Appellant with the knowledge of the dissolution of partnership. We think that one partner of a firm, on presenting his petition in insolvency, might with perfect propriety describe the firm as his late firm because of the change which the filing of the petition in insolvency would make in his relation to the other insolvent members of the firm; and we think that it would be straining the evidence to say that that statement in the petition was sufficient to affect the Appellant with the knowledge so as to make it an untrue statement that the Appellant makes, when he describes Virchand as a member of the firm. 8. The other allegation of fact is that the writer is taking steps to have the other members of the firm declared insolvent. It appears that Seedick and Ibrahim Rasool were the other members of the firm at the time, and it appears that a petition of insolvency was unsuccessfully presented against them. That allegation of fact, therefore, as far as it goes, is true. 9. Then with reference to the point which has been strongly insisted on behalf of the Respondent that the letter goes beyond the limits of the ordinary privilege, we feel that we must look upon the letter as a whole and if it is looked upon as a whole, the particular passage, which is objected to, really appears as a statement of the reason which induced the writer to make the request that he does. And if that is so, we think that it falls within illustration (a) to the 9th exception to sec. 499, and that the insertion of that inference alone is not sufficient to take the letter out of the exception, unless it could be shown that there was something further in the letter leading us to the conclusion that it was not written bond fide. 10. Now, the position of affairs when the letter was written was this : According to the prosecutor, Virchand had left the firm on the 12th of February. But Virchand's position with regard to the firm was peculiar. 10. Now, the position of affairs when the letter was written was this : According to the prosecutor, Virchand had left the firm on the 12th of February. But Virchand's position with regard to the firm was peculiar. According to the prosecutor, there had been no adjustment of accounts on the 12th of February; Virchand had overdrawn, he says, to the amount of two thousand rupees or more, and yet notwithstanding, after this alleged severance from the firm, the prosecutor pays claims made against Virchand as a member of the firm, although at the time Virchand, according to him, was indebted to the firm to the sum of two thousand rupees. The position appears to us to be extremely peculiar. 11. Then the financial position of the prosecutor is a matter which calls for some remark. He states himself that he brought no capital into the business and that his banking account for the six months previous to the case stood at the credit of 10 or 12 rupees. It is true that he says that his wife had money; but the point to which we have to direct our attention in view of this letter is the financial position of the firm of Seedick and Co., and we find that the firm was without capital and that the principal partner was credited with 10 or 12 rupees in his account at the bank. 12. Now, what facts were known to the Appellant? He had litigation with the prosecutor. It is said that the decrees which he obtained were obtained on the prosecutor's admission as to the rates of brokerage between them. But still the fact remains that the Appellant was unable to obtain payment, until he brought his suits, and apparently, after bringing his suits, he did not succeed in getting the money until he took steps to have the decree executed. At the time the letter was written, three suits were pending against the prosecutor, the Appellant being the Plaintiff, and out of these three suits two at least were subsequently decreed. On those facts, the Appellant was justified in describing himself as a creditor of the prosecutor. 13. We have it, therefore, that the Appellant was in fact a creditor of the prosecutor, that the Appellant knew that a member of the prosecutor's firm had presented his petition in insolvency. On those facts, the Appellant was justified in describing himself as a creditor of the prosecutor. 13. We have it, therefore, that the Appellant was in fact a creditor of the prosecutor, that the Appellant knew that a member of the prosecutor's firm had presented his petition in insolvency. He knew that payment of his claims against the prosecutor had been resisted up to the time of the getting of a decree: He knew that at the time Virchand filed his petition he bad claims against the prosecutor's firms. Under those circumstances, we are unable to say that the letter which he wrote goes beyond the limits of a privileged communication. 14. We think from the evidence that the letter was written with the bond fide intention of protecting the interests of the Appellant and, we think, looking at it was a whole, that it does not contain more than what the Appellant was fairly entitled to state, because we think that the one passage which has been relied upon by the prosecutor ought really to be regarded as an expression of the reasons which induced the Appellant to write the letter be did. For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and direct that the fine or so much thereof as has been paid be refunded.