Hiranand Ojha v. Emperor — 1904 DIGILAW 194 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. This application arises out of a proceeding held by the Sub-Deputy Collector of Palamau, under secs. 52 and 84 of the Land Registration Act (VII B. C. of 1876). one Nowrang Singh applied to have his name registered for a 4 annas share of a certain estate which was recorded in the name of the Petitioner, Hiranand Ojha. He alleged that he had bought that share of the estate under a deed of sale from the Petitioner, and the latter denied the transaction. The Sub-Deputy Collector decided in favour of the Petitioner and disallowed Nowrang's claim on the 19th of May 1903. The Deputy Commissioner on appeal upheld his decision on the 23rd October 1903. 2. The Sub-Deputy Collector then, on the 2nd of November 1903, drew up a proceeding under sec. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, orderiug that the Petitioner should be prosecuted under sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code for giving false evidence in the proceeding under the Land Registration Act. 3. This prosecution passed to the District Magistrate, and he employed the District Superintendent of Police to proceed with it. During that interval Nowrang applied to the Sub-Deputy Collector, under sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for sanction to prosecute the Petitioner under sec. 193 of the Penal Code, and J obtained sanction on the 10th of June 1904. The Petitioner appealed to the Deputy Commissioner, and that officer confirmed the sanction on the 15th of August last. It is this order which the Petitioner has applied to this Court to set aside. 4. A rule was issued calliug on the Deputy Commissioner to show cause why his order confirming the sanction should not be set aside on two grounds, first, that he was in error in holding that the Sub-Deputy Collector is a "Court," and that the proceeding before that officer was a "judicial proceeding," within the meaning of sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and, secondly, that the proceeding under sec. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code having been dropped, the application for sanction ought not to have been allowed. The Deputy Commissioner has shown cause, and the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer has appeared to support his case. 5. The first ground is not quite clear, because sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and, secondly, that the proceeding under sec. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code having been dropped, the application for sanction ought not to have been allowed. The Deputy Commissioner has shown cause, and the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer has appeared to support his case. 5. The first ground is not quite clear, because sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not contain the expression "judicial proceeding," It speaks of "any proceeding In any Court." The first ground, therefore, would seem to mean that the Sub-Deputy Collector, in the proceeding under the Land Registration Act, was not a "Court" within the meaning of sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that his proceeding was not a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of sec 193 of the Penal Code. 6. The contention on behalf of the Petitioner is that the Sub-Deputy Collector was not a "Court," and it may be noticed that, if he was not a Court, no sanction was necessary and the prosecution might then fall under the second part of ' sec. 193 of the Penal Code. In this view, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the questions whether the proceeding under the Land Registration Act was a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of sec. 193 of the Penal Code; and whether the Sub-Deputy Collector in that procecdiug was a "Court" within the meaning of sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. One further point has been raised with reference to sec. 193 read with sec. 191 of the Penal Code, namely, whether the Petitioner was bound to state the truth in the proceeding under the Land Registration Act. It is contended that he was not so bound. But we think it is clear that he was bound. By sec. 53 of the Land Registration Act, the Land Registration Collector had exactly the same powers to compel witnesses to give evidence, as are given to a Civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure, and, unless it can be maintained that a witness is not bound to state the truth in the Civil Court acting under the Civil Procedure Code, it is clear that the Petitioner was as much bound to state the truth before the Sub-Deputy Collector, as he would have been bound in the Civil Court. 8. 8. With regard to the second ground on which the rule was issued, the Deputy Commissioner says that the proceeding under sec. 476 was not dropped in the ordinary sense of the word, but acting in compliance with certain remarks made by this Court in a similar case, he considered it improper to continue that proceeding. The sanction, therefore, given to Nowrang is really a continuation of that proceeding; and we do not think it was wrongly given. For these reasons we discharge the rule.