JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. The learned District Judge ought not in our opinion to have dismissed this suit, as he did, on the ground that the plaintiff was not in a position to maintain the suit. The claim which the plaintiff put forward in his plaint is as a reversioner to one Atul Chander Soor, deceased, for a declaration, that he is entitled to the property which belonged to Atul Chander Soor, and also for an injunction to restrain the defendant from wasting the property of the deceased and for the appointment of a receiver and any other relief to which the Court might consider him entitled. His claim is based upon the will of Atul Chander Soor, which is very simple in character. By his will, dated the 11th of December, 1896, Atul Chander Soor gave all his property to his mother, the defendant Srimati Rohilla Moni Dasi, to be held by her during her natural life subject to the payment of a small allowance to the wife of the testator, who appears to have been otherwise provided for, with remainder to three persons in equal shares, The three persons named as reversioners after the death of Srimati Rohilla Moni Dasi are—(1) Surendra Nath Biswas, (2) Srimati Nolini Kumari Dasi, wife of the plaintiff, and (3) the testator's sister, Srimati Basanta Kumari Dasi. Then the will contained a provision that in the event of the death of any of these parties, the share of the person so dying should devolve on his or her heirs-at-law. Surendra Nath Biswas died in June, 1897, and Musammat Nolini Bala Dasi died on the 27th of June, 1898. The plaintiff, as the husband of the last mentioned lady and father of Surendra Nath Biswas, now claim to be entitled to two-thirds of the property as presumptive heir of the deceased, Atul Chander Soor. 2. The learned District Judge has dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff is at the best merely a contingent reversioner, and as such, is not according to the authorities entitled to bring a suit for a declaration and an injunction. In the course of his judgment he observes:— ” The plaintiff undoubtedly cannot claim a vested interest in those legacies unless he pays the full court-fee, and he makes a distinct statement in section 8 of his plaint of such a claim. In the course of his judgment he observes:— ” The plaintiff undoubtedly cannot claim a vested interest in those legacies unless he pays the full court-fee, and he makes a distinct statement in section 8 of his plaint of such a claim. His suit, therefore, on this ground cannot hold. It also fails on the ground that it lies on a contingent interest, namely, the death of Musammat Rohilla Dasi. It has been clearly laid down in VIII, Calcutta, page 12, that such a suit cannot lie. There the plaintiff sued for a declaration of his right as a reversioner to certain property, and that certain deeds of sale executed in respect to it by the widows of its owner are void as against him, he being the presumptive heir after the death of surviving widow. It was held that a person standing in the position of a presumptive heir on the death of a widow is not entitled to maintain a suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act for a declaration of his so-called reversionary right. Section 42 refers only to existing and vested rights and not to contingent rights like those of a person who has only a chance of succeeding on the death of the female heir in possession of the property.” The case upon which the learned District Judge relies is the case of Greeman Singh v. Wahari Lall Singh, [1881] I.L.R., 8 Cal., 12. In it the plaintiff claimed to be entitled to certain property on the death of his grand-father's widow and he sued for a declaration that certain alienations made by the widow were void as against him. 3. The defence was that the plaintiff was not a reversioner, and certain parties who claimed to be the real reversioner intervened and were made defendants by order of the Court. The plaintiff in the Court below obtained a declaration of his reversionary right and the deeds of sale were on certain conditions declared to be void as against him. Thereupon the interveners appealed to the High Court. On appeal it was held that notwithstanding the provisions of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought and that the defendants who claimed as reversioner, should not have been made parties to the suit. Thereupon the interveners appealed to the High Court. On appeal it was held that notwithstanding the provisions of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought and that the defendants who claimed as reversioner, should not have been made parties to the suit. This decision was dissented from by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Gangayya v. Mohalakshni[1886] I.L.R., 10 Mad, 90, and we are unable to follow the reasoning of it, The rule which governs the present case is clearly laid down in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Rani Anand Kuer v. The Court of Wards[1880] L.R., 8 I.A. 14; S.C. I.L.R., 6 Cal,. 764. In that case it was held by their Lordships that the plaintiff being a contingent remote reversionary heir who had neither alleged nor proved that there were no nearer reversionary heirs in existence or that they had precluded themselves from suing, the suit should be dismissed. In the course of their Judgment their Lordships say: “Their Lordships are of opinion that although a suit of this nature may be brought by a contingent reversionary heir, yet, that as a general rule, it must be brought by the presumptive reversionary heir, that is to say, by the person who would succeed if the widow were to die at that moment, They are also of opinion that such a suit may be brought by a more distant reversioner if those nearer in succession are in collusion with the widow or have precluded themselves from interfering.” Now in the case before us, the plaintiff, according to the claim, which he makes is the person who would succeed to the property if the defendant, who is in possession were to die at the present moment, He therefore is the presumptive heir to the property, if his case be true, and as such, is entitled to maintain a suit of the character with which we are now dealing. We find illustrations of the application of the rule laid down in section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. We find illustrations of the application of the rule laid down in section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Illustration (e) runs as follows:— ” The widow of a sonless Hindu alienates part of the property of which she is in possession as such, The person presumptively entitled to possess the property if he survive her, may, in a suit against the alienee, obtain a declaration that the alienation was made without legal necessity and was therefore void beyond the widow's life-time.” This illustration shows that the present case is one to which section 42 is applicable, There was therefore no justification for the dismissal by the learned District Judge of the suit on the ground on which he relied in so doing. 4. The suit has not been tried on the merits. The only question which appears to have been discussed and determined by the Court below is the one with which we have dealt. But in the course of his judgment the learned District Judge seems to suggest that the court-fee which has been paid is inadequate, He says, “the plaintiff undoubtedly cannot claim a vested interest in those legacies unless he pays the full court-fee and he makes a distinct statement in section 8 of his plaint of such a claim.” He further says that a court-fee of Rs. 12-8-0 alone was paid. In this he is in error. We find that a court-fee of Rs. 11 was in the first instance paid and that amount being inadequate, a further court-fee of Rs. 10-4-0 was paid; so that in all Rs. 21-4-0 has been paid, and not, as the learned District Judge mentions, merely Rs. 12-8-0 It is argued by the learned Vakil on behalf of the respondents that the court-fee which has been paid is inadequate, inasmuch as the plaintiff claims in addition to his claim for an injunction and for a declaration of title also the appointment of a receiver. His argument is that if a plaintiff asks the court to appoint a receiver he must value such a claim and pay a court-fee accordingly. We are at a loss to see how a value could be put upon a claim for the appointment of a receiver. But assuming that such a claim could be valued, we are not satisfied that the court-fee of Rs. We are at a loss to see how a value could be put upon a claim for the appointment of a receiver. But assuming that such a claim could be valued, we are not satisfied that the court-fee of Rs. 21-4-0 which has been ‘paid is not adequate to cover the various claims which have been made in the plaint before us. If the learned District Judge had been of opinion that the court fee was inadequate, it would have been his duty to call upon the plaintiff to make good the deficiency, and certainly he would not have been justified in dismissing the suit without giving him an opportunity of making it good. The suit, therefore, has not been properly tried, and as the Court was in error in dismissing it on the preliminary ground to which we have referred, we must remand the case to the court below with directions to re-admit the suit under its original number and try it on the merit. It may be well to add that we do not decide that the plaintiff has established that he is entitled to the property as representing his widow and son. Upon this point we express no opinion. It will lie upon him to establish that he is so entitled and therefore presumptive heir to the property. The costs here and hitherto will abide the event