JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - By a consent decree, dated the 9th of June 1879, in which the Plaintiff in the present suit was the Defendant, and the Defendant in the present suit was the Plaintiff, it was ordered and decreed by consent that upon the death of a certain lady named Khemamoyee Dassee, the Defendant, should pay to the Plaintiff, if then alive,--which event happened, for her absolute benefit, the sum of rupees ten thousand in addition to, a monthly allowance of rupees one hundred, secured to her by the agreement of Bhadra 1272 B. S. Khemamoyee Dassee died on the 11th of September 1896; and on the 20th of May 1898, the Plaintiff in the suit to which I have just referred, took proceedings to execute the decree for the said 10,000 rupees and certain arrears of maintenance, as to which there is no dispute. On the 25th of June 1898 the present suit was instituted; and, on the 7th of September 1898, an injunction was granted restraining the Defendants, their servants and agents, from executing the decree of the first suit to which I have referred : and it was ordered that the Registrar of this Court do out of certain Government securities of the nominal value of rupees sixteen thousand, deposited with him by the Plaintiff retain in his hands, a portion of the securities of the actual value of rupees ten thousand, and endorse and deliver over the balance to the Plaintiff. By the present suit, the Plaintiff asked for a declaration that the said sum of rupees ten thousand, payable under the said consent decree of the 9th of June 1879, has been paid and satisfied, and for an injunction to restrain the Defendant from executing the said decree for rupees ten thousand; and for an interim injunction. He also asked that the Defendant, might be ordered to pay to him such compensation as might be thought fit, for her wrongful conduct. 2. The defence is that the suit will not lie, having regard to sec. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is urged for the Defendant that this is a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree or to the stay of the execution thereof; and, that that must be decided in the execution proceedings and no separate suit would lie. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is urged for the Defendant that this is a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree or to the stay of the execution thereof; and, that that must be decided in the execution proceedings and no separate suit would lie. If the matter rested there, I do not suppose there could be any reasonable doubt, but that the case ought to have been dealt with under sec. 244. 3. It is, however, contended for the Plaintiff, that sec 244 is controlled by sec. 258, The Plaintiff sets up an adjustment of the matters in dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the first suit, and that under that adjustment, the present Defendant agreed that the 10,000 rupees should be used in defraying a portion of the expenses of the sradh ceremony of Khemamoyee Dassee. That adjustment was not certified in accordance with the provisions of sec. 258, and he contends that, inasmuch as that adjustment has not been certified, and as the Court executing the decree cannot recognize any such adjustment, the legislature could not have intended that the matter should be decided under sec. 244, when it would be impossible for the present Plaintiff to show, having regard to sec. 258 that the adjustment had been made. In other words that justice could not be done him if the matter be determined under that section. 4. If the matter had been res integra I should have thought that that argument could not properly prevail, but the matter has been the subject of much judicial decision, and we have been referred to many cases dealing with the question. 5. It is unnecessary for present purposes to review those authorities. In my opinion, the view expressed by the majority of the Court in the case of Azizan v. Matuk Lal Sahu I. L. R. 21 Cal. 437 (1893), where all the authorities were reviewed, is correct. 6. I may, however, point out that I cannot see how the present contention can successfully prevail, having regard to the view expressed by the Privy Council in the case of Prosonna Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal I. L. R. 19 Cal. 683 : s. c. 19 I. A. 166 (1892). In that case, it appears from the record, that the adjustment had not been certified under sec. 683 : s. c. 19 I. A. 166 (1892). In that case, it appears from the record, that the adjustment had not been certified under sec. 258: and, I can scarcely think, seeing that Sir Richard Couch was a member of the Court, that if it had been considered that sec. 258 controlled, in the manner urged by the present Appellant, the operation of sec. 244, so important a point would have been overlooked either by the learned counsel who argued for the Appellant or by their Lordships who decided the case. The point was pithily dealt with in the case of Bairagulu and another v. Bapanna I. L. R. 15 Mad. 302 (1892). Sec. 244 is therefore a bar to the present suit, so far as it relates to the question of whether or not the 10,000 rupees had been paid and satisfied. This being so, it is unnecessary to decide whether, having regard to sec. 56 of the Specific Relief Act, an injunction could have been properly granted. 7. On the question of damages, we are asked to allow an amendment of the plaint. This was refused by the Court below and it is very late now to ask for it. There is no allegation of any damage in the plaint, and we have felt some difficulty in ascertaining what amendment is really asked for. It is by no means apparent that the Plaintiff, as yet, has sustained any damages : the 10,000 rupees has not been paid to the Defendant. To allow the Plaintiff now to amend would virtually amount to allowing him, at this late stage, to make a new case. We therefore refuse this application. 8. The appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Hill, J. I am of the same opinion. I shall only add that in so far as the suit seeks for an injunction to restrain the Defendant from proceeding with the execution of the decree in question, it conflicts in my opinion with the provisions of sec 56 of the Specific Relief Act of 1877. Stevens, J. I also concur.