JUDGMENT Woodroffe, J. - This is an application for substitution upon a Registrar's summons after a mortgage-decree made in this suit on the 8th July 1901. Pursuant to the decree the Registrar took the accounts thereby directed and made his report on the 5th December 1901. The 3rd of July 1902 was appointed as the day for payment. The Defendant having failed to pay to the Plaintiff the sum due under the mortgage decree and costs, an order absolute for sale was made on the 7th September 1902. Thereafter the Defendant paid to the Plaintiff certain sums of money on the 5 th September 1902, the 6th April and the 25th July 1903. The Plaintiff died on the 12th January 1904 leaving a Will of which he appointed his sons, the present applicants, executors, and they on the 2nd August 1904 applied for and on the 19th August 1904 obtained probate of their father's Will. They state that, except as above-mentioned, the Defendant has not paid anything either to their father during his lifetime or to them after their father's death and that, they are desirous of having their names substituted in the cause-title and register of this suit in place and stead of the deceased Plaintiff their father and of having the sale of the mortgaged property proceeded with. They accordingly on the 22nd November 1904 took out a Registrar's summons for an order that the cause-title in the plaint and the register of the suit be amended by substituting the names of the applicants as 'sons and executors in the place and stated of the deceased Plaintiff their father and that thereupon the reference and the sale of the mortgaged property pursuant to the decree and the order made in this suit and dated respectively the 8th July 1901 and the 2nd September 1902 be proceeded with and that the costs of and incidental to this application be costs in the cause. 2. Numerous objections have been taken the effect of which if upheld is admitted to be that nothing can be done and the sale which has been directed by the decree in this suit cannot take place. 3. Various sections of the Code have been referred to for the purpose of showing that none are applicable. 2. Numerous objections have been taken the effect of which if upheld is admitted to be that nothing can be done and the sale which has been directed by the decree in this suit cannot take place. 3. Various sections of the Code have been referred to for the purpose of showing that none are applicable. This is not, as has been supposed, a proceeding in execution in the usual sense of the term but a carrying out of the directions contained in the decree passed in this suit, viz., that upon default the mortgaged property should be sold. Then it is said, referring to Ch. XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, that if sec. 365 is applicable the application is barred. That section it has been held does not apply to a suit in which a decree has, as in the present case, been made. 4. It is unnecessary, however, to consider any section other than sec. 372 under which, it is stated, the application is made. 5. It is objected that this application does not come within the words "other cases" as these words mean, it is submitted, cases other than death, marriage and insolvency and the event in the present instance is the death of the Plaintiff. But I think that these words mean cases other than those specifically provided for in the preceding sections. If, therefore, the preceding sections though they may have dealt with the event of death have so dealt with particular cases only, other cases will fall under sec. 372 : so while sec. 365 refers to death it does so only as occurring before decree. 6. It is next said that there has been no devolution of interest "pending the suit," but that such devolution occurred after the suit had come to an end, viz., it is alleged, on the 2nd September 1902 after the passing of the order absolute for sale. I cannot accept the contention that absolutely and in every case after decree no suit is pending. For some purposes a suit may still under sec. 372 be treated as a pending suit even after a decree has been made. The determination of the question whether a suit is or is not pending does not always depend upon the question whether a decree has or has not been passed in it. For some purposes a suit may still under sec. 372 be treated as a pending suit even after a decree has been made. The determination of the question whether a suit is or is not pending does not always depend upon the question whether a decree has or has not been passed in it. This may be so in some cases assuming, as to which there appears to have been expressed some doubt, that the section does not apply to proceedings in execution and that the word 'suit.' is limited to proceedings up to the decree. In other cases this is not so for the decree may be of a preliminary character such as decrees directing an account, the settlement of a scheme, partition under sec. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is, however, urged that in the present case there was a final decree when the order absolute was made. In my opinion, however, the suit cannot be said to have come to an end until the actual sale under that order takes place--up to which time as has been recently held by this Court, the mortgagor has the right to pay and redeem. It has, with reference to the doctrine of lis pendens, been considered Chunni Lal v. Abdul Ali Khan I. L. R. 23 All. 331, 334 (1901), that a suit is not at an end until there is a final decree, that in a mortgage suit the lis would certainly not be completed before the passing of the order absolute and would probably not be completed before the actual sale or in the case of a decree for foreclosure until the mortgagee was actually placed in possession under his foreclosure. A case more directly in point is that of Parma Lal v. Aghore Nath Neogy Unreported, decided by Sale, J., on the 10th May 1893. 7. In this case an application was made on behalf of the Plaintiff on a petition asking that the representatives of the Defendant Aghore Nath Neogy should be made parties in the suit in his place and stead. The suit was a mortgage suit in which a decree was made on the 8th September 1882. The Registrar's report was made on the 28th February 1883 and the 8th September 1883 was fixed as the date of payment of the mortgage money. The suit was a mortgage suit in which a decree was made on the 8th September 1882. The Registrar's report was made on the 28th February 1883 and the 8th September 1883 was fixed as the date of payment of the mortgage money. On the 13th January 1885 an order absolute for sale of the mortgaged premises was made. Subsequently on the 7th February 1885 an office copy of the order was filed in the usual way in the Account Department for the purpose of proceeding to a sale of the property. 8. In that case Mr. Justice Sale observed as follows :--"In the first place I think the suit is a pending suit, the decree is a mortgage decree and though an order absolute under the Transfer of Property. Act has been made yet it is clear that this does not prevent the representatives of the mortgagor from applying, at any time up to the actual sale of the property by tender of the mortgage debt to him, that the proceedings be set aside and the property redeemed...... Further it is clear that under the order for sale various proceedings have to be taken, amongst others examination of title requiring examination of witnesses. It is clear also that according to the practice under the Judicature Acts in England, after the usual mortgage decree the suit is held to be a pending suit up to the time when the property is actually sold. For these reasons, 1 have no hesitation in holding that notwithstanding the order absolute for sale the suit is still a pending suit. The Court further held that sec. 372 was the section applicable to applications like the application then before it subsequent to decree. This decision, with which I agree, is a clear authority in support of the applicant's contention. No question arises of limitation assuming the case to fall, as I hold it does, within sec. 372. I make therefore the order in terms of the summons.