JUDGMENT : AIKMAN, J. 1. The applicants purchased certain immovable property at a sale held in execution of a decree for money. The sale was confirmed on the 7th October, 1901. On 22nd July, 1902 the applicants applied to the Court under section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an order for delivery of possession. The Court ordered the Amin to put the applicants into possession of the property. The Amin returned the warrant unexecuted, reporting that a person other than the judgment-debtor resisted the purchaser in getting possession. Upon this it was open to the purchasers to apply to the Court under section 335 of the Code to enquire into the matter of the resistance and pass such order thereon as it should think fit. Article 167 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act fixes a period of 30 days counting from the date of the resistance within which such an application must be presented. The purchasers did not, within the time allowed by law, make any application under section 335. On the 23rd December, 1902, they made a fresh application to be put into possession. The learned Subordinate Judge by his order, dated the 10th January, rejected this application. The purchasers ask this Court to interfere in revision. In my judgment this application ought not to be granted. 2. I think the lower Court was right in rejecting the second application made to it. If a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree fails within the period allowed by law to apply to the Court to enquire summarily into the matter of the resistance to his getting possession. I hold that he is relegated to his remedy of a civil suit against the person resisting him. It is true that in the case of Muttia vs. Appasami, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 50 an opinion was expressed that there is nothing to prevent a purchaser who is resisted in his attempt to get possession of the property purchased from making a fresh application for delivery without making any complaint under section 334 of the Code. That was a case in which the purchaser was resisted not by a third party but by the judgment-debtor. On the other hand, in the case of Vinayakrav Amrit vs. Dev Rao Govind, (1887) I.L.R. 11 Bom. That was a case in which the purchaser was resisted not by a third party but by the judgment-debtor. On the other hand, in the case of Vinayakrav Amrit vs. Dev Rao Govind, (1887) I.L.R. 11 Bom. 473 an order of a Subordinate Court refusing, as in this case, a second application for delivery of possession was sustained. It was remarked in that case that to grant a second application “would virtually make clause 167 of the Statute of Limitation a dead-letter.” The case of Narain Das vs. Hazari Lal, (1896) I.L.R. 18 All. 233 was relied on as supporting the applicants' plea, but in that case the question as to whether a second application under section 31.8 of the Code would lie was not expressly decided. For the above reasons I am of opinion that the only remedy open to the purchaser is to bring a regular suit against the person resisting him” and I would reject this application with costs. KNOX, J. 3. I am inclined to the view that the application for delivery of possession under section 318 is substantially an application for execution of a decree by ordering delivery of possession of the property purchased. It is true that the ruling of Muttia vs. Appasami, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 504 differs from the case before us somewhat, still I hold the principle therein contained is the principle which should govern this case. However, in view of the expression of my learned brother, the application must be rejected.