JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The only question raised on this appeal is as to whether or not the suit is barred under the special period of limitation mentioned in sec, 634 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (III of 1899, B.C.). The suit was instituted on the 4th September 1902. On the 26th November 1901 the Corporation gave a notice to the Plaintiffs to stop the building, which they were erecting. On the 16th July 1902, the Plaintiffs gave the notice which is required by sec. 634. It is suggested that in point of fact, they had given the notice at an earlier date, that is on the 8th April 1902, but we do not think that the letter of the 8th April is a notice within the section to which I have referred. The notice must be taken to have been given on the 16th July 1902. If the three months mentioned in sub-sec. 2 of sec. 634 runs from the expiration of the month after the notice has been delivered, this suit is not barred. Sec. 634 says:--"(1) No suit shall be commenced against any Municipal authority, officer or servant or any person acting under the direction of any Municipal authority, officer or servant in respect of any act purporting to be done under this Act or any rule, bye-law or regulation made hereunder, until the expiration of one month next after written notice has been delivered or left at the Municipal office or place of abode of such officer, servant or person, stating the cause of action and the name and place of abode of the intending Plaintiff, and the plaint must contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) Every such suit must be commenced within three months next after the accrual of the right to sue." The contention of the Corporation is that the expression "accrual of the right to sue" does not mean that which in its ordinary signification it does mean, but that it means the accrual of the cause of action. The legislature, however, in this very section, seems to have contemplated a difference between the expression "cause of action" and the expression "right to sue," for, in the first paragraph of sec. The legislature, however, in this very section, seems to have contemplated a difference between the expression "cause of action" and the expression "right to sue," for, in the first paragraph of sec. 634, it uses the expression "cause of action" and in the second paragraph, it uses the expression "right to sue." It seems to us, accepting the view of the learned Judge in the Court of first instance, that the language is reasonably clear. When did the Plaintiffs' right to sue?--not when the cause of action arose but at the date of the expiration of the month's notice, from which date they had three months within which to commence it. The Plaintiffs were debarred by the section from commencing a suit until the expiration of that period. As they had no right to continence this suit until the expiration of the month after delivering the notice the expression "accrual of the right to sue" must, as we think, apply to the date when the month's notice expired, from which date they had three months within which to commence their action. And this they did. 2. It has been suggested that this construction, having regard to the general law of limitation, may result in the Plaintiffs deferring the delivery of the notice until the ordinary period of limitation is on the eve of expiry. That, perhaps, is a contingency not very likely to happen in cases of this class. Such a consideration might be a reason for amending the Act, but what we have to do to-day, is to construe the Act as it stands. 3. For the reasons given above, I think, that this suit was not time-barred and that this appeal must, accordingly, be dismissed with costs. 4. There is a cross-objection as to the amount of damages awarded by the Court of first instance. The Court has given the Plaintiffs Rs. 2,500: The Plaintiffs say that they are entitled to more. 5. It is not very usual in cases of this class, where no question of principle is involved, for this Court to interfere with the decision of the Court of first instance upon such a question. If the Plaintiffs had themselves been more energetic, the erection of their building would certainly not have been stopped for so long a period. 5. It is not very usual in cases of this class, where no question of principle is involved, for this Court to interfere with the decision of the Court of first instance upon such a question. If the Plaintiffs had themselves been more energetic, the erection of their building would certainly not have been stopped for so long a period. The notice given by the Corporation was, on the 26th November 1901, and, allowing them a reasonable time for taking legal advice and delivering the notice under sec. 634, they might well have instituted their suit by January 1902 and then applied for an interlocutory injunction, and as on this appeal, the merits have not been contested--the Corporation must therefore be taken to have been clearly wrong--it seems probable they would have succeeded. In that case, the Plaintiffs could have gone on with their building, and the damage now complained of would not have ensued. We are not, therefore, disposed to interfere with the view taken by the Court of first instance on this point. 6. I regret that in the order staying execution of the decree, there was not an undertaking on the part of the Corporation to be answerable for any damage chat might result to the Plaintiffs from the suspension of the decree. That apparently was not asked for, and so was omitted, and I do not think, we can now grant an enquiry as to damages sustained, if any, by reason of this stay of execution. 7. I cannot, however, leave the case without expressing my regret in the interests of the rate-payers of Calcutta that this suit should have been contested, as it has been, by the Corporation. The Defendants have not, on this appeal, challenged the correctness of the view of the Court below on the merits; they have only argued the point of limitation. I have made a calculation and find that, apart from the costs of this appeal and their own costs of litigation, it has cost the Corporation roundly Rs. 5,500, and if their own costs are anything like the Plaintiffs', nearly another Rs. 3,000 would have to be added and apart from the costs of this appeal, the litigation has cost the rate-payers over Rs. 8,000. I do not know who is responsible in these matters, but more supervision or more care, might, apparently, be exercised. 8. 5,500, and if their own costs are anything like the Plaintiffs', nearly another Rs. 3,000 would have to be added and apart from the costs of this appeal, the litigation has cost the rate-payers over Rs. 8,000. I do not know who is responsible in these matters, but more supervision or more care, might, apparently, be exercised. 8. As regards the costs of the cross-objection we make no order. The appeal will be dismissed with costs. The cross-objection will be dismissed without costs. Sale, J. I agree and wish to associate myself with the remarks which the Chief Justice has made as regards the unfortunate nature of this litigation. Harington, J. I also agree.