JUDGMENT Pratt, J. - The two Plaintiffs in this case sued for a declaration that they are the legitimate sons of the late L.T. Lucas, and as such are entitled to a certain share of his estate. The Defendants are the widow of L.T. Lucas who is administratrix of his estate, and also his children and the children by Lucas' first wife. Lucas was a Greek, and Anna Stephanos, the mother of the Plaintiffs, was an Armenian and sister of his first wife. They were all domiciled in British India. 2. The Plaintiffs succeeded in both the lower Courts, it being held that though Lucas belonged to the Creek Church which does not recognise the validity of a marriage by a man to his deceased wife's sister, nevertheless he did for a time profess the Roman Catholic faith and that he was lawfully married to Anna Stephanos at Dacca by the Pro-vicar Apostolic. Such a marriage is permissible by the Roman Catholic Church only if the necessary dispensations have been obtained, one of which is for an impediment of affinity in the first degree. The extract from the marriage Register of the Dacca Roman Catholic Church is in the following terms:-- On the 4th May 1857, without any publication of banns previous dispensation being given, and after diligent enquiries an impediment of affinity in the second degree being discovered, and previous dispensation being given by virtue of my powers received from Rome, and dispensation being given also disparital cuttus, I the undersigned Provicar Apostolic of Eastern Bengal, having previously observed what is prescribed by the Holy Catholic Church for the validity of mixed marriages have united in matrimony" [here follow the names and descriptions of L.T. Lucas and Anna Stephanos]. 3. The lower Courts held that in spite of an impediment of only the second decree being recited in the marriage Register, it must be presumed that all the necessary dispensations had been obtained, and that this presumption had not been rebutted. In appeal before us it is contended (1) that the presumption relied on is rebutted by the recitals in the Register itself, (2) that marriage between the parties was absolutely prohibited by both the Greek and Armenian Church and could not be possibly legalized, (3) that the law of the Roman Catholic Church was not the law of the class to which Lucas belonged. 4. 4. As regards the question of presumption it was observed by Wilson, J., in the case of Lopez v. Lopez ILR 12 Cal. 706 (1885), that the presumption in favour of everything necessary to give validity to a marriage is one of very exceptional strength and that the evidence to rebut the presumption must be strong, distinct, satisfactory and conclusive. In that case the parties were East Indians, and members of the Roman Catholic religion, one being the deceased wife's sister of the other. 5. The man was described as a bachelor in the marriage Register implying ignorance as to his real status on the part of the officiating priest, and yet it was presumed that a dispensation of the first decree had been granted. 6. In the present case it has been found that the Provicar Apostolic and the parties were well known to each other and the District Judge pertinently remarks, "I cannot believe for a moment that the Provicar Apostolic granted a dispensation, which he knew to be invalid, and preformed the ceremony of marriage which he also knew to be invalid," the Register does not expressly say that a dispensation of the second degree was obtained and not one of the first degree. The statement that the impediment of affinity was in the second degree may, under the circumstances, be reasonably taken to be a slip of the pen We think the Courts have rightly applied the presumption, and that the same has not been rebutted by anything contained in the extract from the marriage Register. 7. The remaining contentions are that there was an absolute and immoveable bar to the marriage, and that Lucas was not governed by the law of the Roman Catholic Church. 8. We may premise that there is no evidence on the record as to the law prevailing in the Armenian Church. There is an observation of the District Judge which has been quoted as equivalent to a finding that Lucas could not marry his deceased wife's sister according to the tenets of the Armenian Church, but he seems to have only stated this as being involved in the contentions of the Appellants, and we do not think he could have intended to accept it as law without proof. 9. 9. However, upon the authorities it would appear that the question we have to decide is not affected by the status of the wife, if the husband possessed the necessary legal capacity for entering into a valid marriage. In the case of Lopez v. Lopez ILR 12 Cal. 706 (1885), it was held that the prohibited degrees for the parties to the marriage were not the degrees, prohibited by the law of England, but those prohibited by the customary law of the class to which they belong, that is to say, the law of the Roman Catholic Church as applied in this country. In Dicey on the Conflict of Laws, Ch. XXVI, Rule 169, it is laid down that provided certain conditions as to the form of celebration are complied with, a marriage is valid when each of the parties has according to the law of his or her respective domicile, the capacity to marry the other. In a foot-note it is stated, "This rule is only affirmative. It is possible that a marriage may be valid though the husband alone has capacity to marry according to his lex domicilii. Sottomayer v. De Barros, 1879, 5 P.D. 94." And at p. 646 (Edition of 1896) the following exception is set out: "A marriage celebrated in England is possibly not rendered invalid by the incapacity of the wife according to the law of her domicile to marry the husband, if the husband, being domiciled in England is, by English law, under no incapacity to marry the wife." And further at p. 647, "The suggested limitation has been acted upon in one case to the extent stated in the exception and must provisionally at least be assumed in spite of its illogical character to be good law." 10. The case in question was that of Sottomayer v. De Barros L.R. 5 P.D. 94 (1879). The man and woman were Portuguese, and related as first cousins, the former being domiciled in England. The woman was domiciled in Portugal, and was under the law of her domicile incapable of marrying her first cousin. It was held that their marriage in England was valid. 11. The man and woman were Portuguese, and related as first cousins, the former being domiciled in England. The woman was domiciled in Portugal, and was under the law of her domicile incapable of marrying her first cousin. It was held that their marriage in England was valid. 11. Now in India there is no legislative prohibition against persons who are not British subjects and of English domicile marrying though they be within the prohibited degrees as understood in England, It thus follows from the case just cited, considered in conjunction with that of Lopez v. Lopez ILR 12 Cal. 706 (1885), that the Courts in India will not disallow a Roman Catholic of Indian domicile, who has obtained the necessary dispensations, from marrying his deceased wife's sister, though by the law of her own Church, she may be incapable of contracting the marriage. The Armenian Church might possibly not recognise the marriage, but the husband's capacity renders the marriage valid in law, and the Courts in India will accordingly declare the issue of such marriage to be legitimate. 12. In Rattigan's Law of Divorce the subject is summarised thus at p. 136: "(a) If both parties are domiciled in India. There being no express law in British India which defines the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity, each case must be decided by reference to the personal law of the parties to the marriage, i.e., to the customary law of the class to which such persons belong. If both parties are subject to the same personal law, the marriage will be invalid if forbidden, valid, if allowed by that law. If, on the other hand, they are not subject to the same personal law, the marriage, if allowed by the personal law of the husband will (presumably) not be invalid by the law of British India simply because it may happen to be forbidden by the personal law of the woman." 13. In the next place it is urged that Lucas' profession of the Roman Catholic faith was not genuine, and that he speedily reverted to his original faith, viz., that of the Greek Church and so remained until his death, the children of marriage in question having been baptized in the Greek Church and brought up in that religion. In the next place it is urged that Lucas' profession of the Roman Catholic faith was not genuine, and that he speedily reverted to his original faith, viz., that of the Greek Church and so remained until his death, the children of marriage in question having been baptized in the Greek Church and brought up in that religion. Therefore it is contended that the law of the class to which Lucas belonged, was the law of the Greek Church alone. It is not, however, the province of a Court to examine the sincerity of a man's religious convictions. A convert to Mahomedanism, for example, is permitted in this country to practice polygamy without being required to prove the sincerity of his conversion. In the present case, the fact of Lucas' embracing the Roman Catholic faith and his being received into the Romish Church, is not open to question in second appeal, and as he was married while in full communion with that Church, he must be regarded for the time being as governed by the law of the class known as Roman Catholics, and his subsequent apostacy will not affect the validity of that marriage. 14. In the result we find no valid reason for declaring void the marriage, which was duly solemnized in the year 1857, and we accordingly dismiss he appeal with costs. Mitra, J. 15. I agree with my learned brother, and for the reasons given by him, that this appeal should fail. I would, however, add a few words. 16. In this country, there is no enactment absolutely forbidding the marriage of a domiciled British Indian subject with his deceased wife's sister. A Hindu may marry his wife's sister even during the lifetime of his wife A Mahomedan may marry his deceased wife's sister. There is no lex domicilii. Sec. 37 of of Act XII of 1887 (The Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act) lays down that in questions relating to marriage the personal laws of Hindus and Mahomedans will respectively regulate them. As regards the followers of other religions the section says that the Courts in India should apply the rule most consonant with equity, justice and good conscience. 17. We have here the case of the marriage of a man of the Roman Catholic persuasion for at least the time being and an Armenian woman, both domiciled inhabitants of British India. As regards the followers of other religions the section says that the Courts in India should apply the rule most consonant with equity, justice and good conscience. 17. We have here the case of the marriage of a man of the Roman Catholic persuasion for at least the time being and an Armenian woman, both domiciled inhabitants of British India. The rule to be applied is that of equity, justice and good conscience. It was so held in Lopez v. Lopez ILR 12 Cal. 706 (1885) on an interpretation of enactments similar to Act XII of 1887. 18. Now where is this rule of equity, justice and good conscience to be found? The answer given in Lopez v. Lopez ILR 12 Cal. 706 (1885) is that we have to look to the usages of the class to which the parties belong. But the parties in that case belonged both to the class which was governed by the law of the Roman Catholic Church as applied to this country. Here the usage is difficult to ascertain if there was any, Nor is there any evidence of usage adduced by the parties which is especially applicable to a case like this. There is evidence that the Greek Church absolutely prohibits the marriage of a man with the sister of his deceased wife. There is also evidence that on a proper dispensation being granted such a marriage may be valid if the parties are Roman Catholics. There is, we are informed, no evidence on the record as to usage in India as regards the Armenian Christians. The rule laid in Lopez v. Lopez ILR 12 Cal. 706 (1885) does not help us in the solution of the question raised in this case Brook v. Brook 9 H.L.C. 193 (1861), Sottomayer v. De Barros L.R. 3 P.D. 1 (1877) and Mette v. Mette 1 Sw. and Tr. 416 (1859) turn on the lex domicilii of one or both parties to the marriage or the place of the celebration of marriage, and do not touch a ease where there is no lex domicilii or lex situ which may affect the contract. 19. and Tr. 416 (1859) turn on the lex domicilii of one or both parties to the marriage or the place of the celebration of marriage, and do not touch a ease where there is no lex domicilii or lex situ which may affect the contract. 19. There being no Municipal law or well-established usage prohibiting the marriage of a domiciled British Indians of the Christian religion with reference to consanguinity or affinity, I am disposed to test its validity by the rule laid down in Story's Conflict of Laws, sec. 113, as the rule of equity, justice and good conscience. "Christianity is understood to prohibit polygamy and incest and therefore no Christian country would recognise polygamy and incestuous marriages. But when we speak of incestuous marriages, care must, be taken to confine the doctrine to such cases as by the general consent of all Christendom are declared incestuous. It is difficult to ascertain exactly the point at which the law of nature or the authority of Christianity ceases to prohibit marriages between kindred, and Christian nations are by no means generally agreed on this subject." In Brook v. Brook 9 H.L.C. 193 (1861) Lord-Cranworth approves of this passage, saying that it is strictly consonant to the law of nations. He says, speaking of a marriage between a man and his deceased wife's sister--"It was contended that according to the argument of the Respondent such a marriage even between two Danes celebrated in Denmark must be contrary to the law of God, and that therefore if the parties to it, were to come to this country we must consider them as living in incestuous intercourse, and that if any question were to arise here as to the succession to their property we must hold the issues of the second marriage to be illegitimate. But this is not so. We do not hold the marriage to be void because it is contrary to the law of God, but because our law has prohibited it on the ground of its being contrary to God's law. It is our law which makes the marriage void and not the law of God. And our law does not affect to interfere with or regulate the marriages of any but those who are subject to its jurisdiction." 20. Referring to the opinion of Mr. It is our law which makes the marriage void and not the law of God. And our law does not affect to interfere with or regulate the marriages of any but those who are subject to its jurisdiction." 20. Referring to the opinion of Mr. Justice Story, Lord Cranworth adds--"But suppose the case of a Chrisitian country in which there are no laws prohibiting marriages within any specified degrees of consanguinity or affinity or declaring or defining what is incest, still even there, incestnous marriages would be held void, as polygamy would be held void being forbidden by the Christian religion. But then to ascertain what marriages are, within that rule, incestuous, a rule not depending on Municipal laws but extending generally to all Christian countries, recourse must be had to what is deemed incestuous by the general consent of Christendom. It would never be held that the subjects of such a country were guilty of incest in contracting a marriage allowed and approved by a large portion of Christendom merely because in the contemplation of other Christian countries it would be considered against God's laws." 21. In the present ease the marriage would be valid by the law of many Christian countries, and certainly cannot be regarded as incestuous by the general consent of Christendom. In re Bozzelli's Settlement 1902, 1 Ch. Div. 751 (1902) Swinfen Eady, J, followed the opinion of Mr. Justice Story and held that incestuous means, incestuous by the general consent of Christendom. The Colonial Statutes recognize the validity of the marriage of a man with a deceased wife's sister, and they have received the sanction of the Crown. And I do not see on what principle, except that of Municipal law or well-established usage, may the marriage in this case be declared invalid. The marriage was celebrated in a Christian Church by a Christian clergyman and was recognised by the community to which the parties belonged. There is a presumption as to its validity and not being incestuous by the general consent of Christendom should he declared valid in our Courts.