JUDGMENT : BLAIR, J. 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment. The defendants allege that they cannot be ejected, because there is still in existence and effect a lease under which they hold. The evidence, which they produced of such a lease, was a kabuliat signed and registered by one of them. It is found that the plaintiffs were fully aware of the new kabuliat and gave consent by being present at the time of registration. It has been argued in support of the appeal that the case is practically concluded by a ruling of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 72 of 1897, judgment of which was pronounced on the 16th March, 1898, by the learned Chief Justice, Sir JOHN EDGE, and another of my brethren who disposed of the case in appeal under the Letters Patent against the judgment of a member of the present Bench I find it difficult to draw any substantial difference between the facts of that case and the facts of the present case. It seems to me that whatever hardships might be involved the provisions of law are clear and definite, The section, under which the plaintiffs claim that no lease has been made by them is 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The words seem to me to be very clear which are,—”a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument.” The word ‘instrument’ shows that the document must be one which must have certain executive force, and that upon its execution the lease is completed. 2. The second paragraph of that section which runs as follows: “All other leases of immovable property may be made either by an instrument or by oral agreement” seems to support that conclusion. In this case it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the fact of the plaintiffs having permitted the tenants to remain in possession and having received rents from them amounts to the creation of a lease by a registered instrument. That is a contention to which I cannot assent. It seems to me that the words of the section are plain. That is a contention to which I cannot assent. It seems to me that the words of the section are plain. The most emphatic oral agreement proved up to the hilt or admitted by the plaintiffs would not make a lease within the meaning of the first paragraph. In the case of sale under section 54 the same words are used, namely, such transfer can be made, except in certain cases “only by a registered instrument.” Could it be contended for a moment that a document accepting property so said to be sold or devised by the owner of the property would amount to a registered instrument? In this case there is no document purporting to transfer property. There is, however, something in the nature of a recital in the kabuliat to that effect, which may have been assented to by the plaintiffs; but in my opinion that would not make a registered instrument within the meaning of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. I see no reason to differ from the unreported case referred to above. I would decree the appeal and, varying the decree of the lower Courts, decree the whole of the plaintiffs' claim. BANERJI, J. 3. Having regard to the fact that it is a common practice in these provinces to treat a kabuliat as the instrument creating a tenancy and that a ruling such as that contended for by the appellants may unsettle titles, I do not desire to express any opinion upon the first question raised in this appeal. There is another ground, however, upon which, in my judgment the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for ejectment. Upon the finding of Court below, and upon the allegations of the defendants themselves they have entailed a forfeiture of their lease, if, in fact, a lease was granted to them in 1898. It is admitted on their behalf that they would be liable to ejectment if they failed to pay for three months the rent payable by them. It is admitted in the written statement of the defendant that they did not pay any rent after the 21st July, 1899, and they do not allege that they tendered any rent after that date. It is admitted in the written statement of the defendant that they did not pay any rent after the 21st July, 1899, and they do not allege that they tendered any rent after that date. The suit was not brought until ten months' rent had become due after that date, and therefore, under the terms of the lease set up and admitted by the defendants themselves they are liable to ejectment. Upon this ground alone I would decree the claim for ejectment and would agree with the order proposed by my learned brother. 4. The order of the Court is that the appeal is decreed, the decree of the court below is varied and the plaintiffs' claim is decreed in full with costs in all courts.