JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. This is an appeal under section 10 of our Letters Patent from a judgment of one of the learned Judges of this Court passed on appeal from a decree of the learned District Judge of Aligarh, on appeal from a decree of the Collector of that district, affirming in appeal a decree of an Assistant Collector of the 2nd Class in a suit to recover arrears of rent instituted under the provisions of section 93 of Act No. XII of 1881. The suit, which was one under clause (a) of the section just mentioned, was instituted on the 9th May, 1901, and its object was to recover the sum of Rs. 140 as rent of certain pasturage rights which the plaintiff alleged to be due from the defendants under a sub-lease granted by him and accepted by them. The suit was instituted in the Court of an Assistant Collector of the 2nd Class who was then (1901) competent to hear it, but who, since the passing of the N.W.P. Tenancy Act No. II of 1901, ceased to exercise, from January 1st, 1902, jurisdiction in such a suit where the subject-matter exceeded Rs. 100. In defence, the defendants pleaded (I) that as the land in dispute was uncultivated, it was not governed by Act XII of 1881” the suit is therefore not cognizable by the Revenue Court” and (2) they denied that the plaintiff was a lesser of the land or that they held a sub-lease under him. They alleged that they were lessees under the zamindar, and not sub lessees under the plaintiff. In the Court of first instance the first issue fixed by the Assistant Collector raised the question of jurisdiction. Other issues were directed to the question of fact mooted in the pleadings. On the first issue the Assistant Collector giving full reasons for his decision, held that the suit was cognisable by a Revenue Court. On the facts he found for the plaintiff, and on October 25th, 1901, gave a decree for the amount claimed. The defendants appealed. In their memorandum of appeal they again pleaded to jurisdiction of the Revenue Court to try the suit, and raised the same issues of fact as before the Court of first instance. The appeal lay to the Collector under section 183 of Act No. XII of 1881. The defendants appealed. In their memorandum of appeal they again pleaded to jurisdiction of the Revenue Court to try the suit, and raised the same issues of fact as before the Court of first instance. The appeal lay to the Collector under section 183 of Act No. XII of 1881. It was presented on November 20th, 1909, and was dismissed on December 2nd, 1901. It would appear that the question of jurisdiction was not argued nor was pressed before the Collector. Probably the appellants' legal advisers considered it a hopeless plea. Anyhow the Collector in his appellate judgment did not notice it. His judgment is somewhat curt and deals only with the questions of fact. The judgment does not decide any question of jurisdiction. Now it is unquestionable that under section 189 of Act No. XII of 1881, the appellate decision of the Collector was open to appeal to the District Judge. But that Act was repealed as from January, 1902, the date on which the new Tenancy Act No. II of 1901 came into force, and it was after that date, namely, on February nth, 1902 that the defendants preferred an appeal to the District Judge from the appellate decree of the Collector. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether if that appeal had been preferred before January 1st, 1902, it would have been affected by section 6 of Act No. I of 1868—the General Clauses Act. The appeal to the District Judge was preferred after Act No. II of 1901 had come into force, and we are of opinion that though the appeal to the District Judge was preferred from a decree passed under the provisions of the repealed Rent Act, nevertheless as it was instituted after the New Act came into force, we must refer to new statute to ascertain on what terms the latter permits an appeal from an appellate decree of a Collector. Those terms differ considerably from those provided in section 189 of the repealed Act, and are much more limited. Those terms differ considerably from those provided in section 189 of the repealed Act, and are much more limited. They [section 180, clauses (2)] omit entirely the first and second clauses of section 189 of the former Act and while retaining the third they modify its language not a little and add a provision giving an appeal from the appellate decree of a Collector in suits in which in that appellate decree a question of jurisdiction has been decided.” The reason for the first of these omissions is clear. It is because an Assistant Collector of the 2nd class is no longer empowered to hear suits in which the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 100. Why the second clause was omitted, we cannot say. 2. Now as an appeal from an appellate decree of a Collector can be admitted under the new Act only if it comes under the conditions prescribed by section 180, clause (2), of that Act, we have to see whether the appeal preferred to the District Judge in this case comes within either of the conditions prescribed by the section just cited. There is no allegation that any question of proprietary title was decided by the Collector on appeal. It is also clear that he did not decide any question of jurisdiction. No doubt, in the memorandum of appeal before* him, a question of jurisdiction was raised. But the Collector, probably for reasons set forth in an earlier portion of this judgment, did not decide that question. No allusion to it is to be found in his decision. An appeal under sub-section (b) of the second clause of section 180 of Act No. II of 1901, is permitted only when in the appellate decree of the Collector a question of jurisdiction has been decided. 3. It is not sufficient that such a question has been raised in the memorandum of appeal before the Collector. It must also have been decided. Here there was no decision of any such question. Therefore, in our opinion no appeal lay to the District Judge in this case. The District Judge however, entertained the appeal and eventually reversing the appellate decree of the Collector, he dismissed the suit with costs. The judgment of the learned Judge is based entirely on the facts. He also took no notice of the question of jurisdiction, which was again raised in the memorandum of appeal. The District Judge however, entertained the appeal and eventually reversing the appellate decree of the Collector, he dismissed the suit with costs. The judgment of the learned Judge is based entirely on the facts. He also took no notice of the question of jurisdiction, which was again raised in the memorandum of appeal. From the decree of the District Court a further appeal, was presented to this Court by the plaintiff, whose suit had been dismissed by the District Judge. In the memorandum of appeal, it was contended that as the new Tenancy Act had come into force before the appeal was presented to the District Judge, the latter had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, no question of proprietary title or of jurisdiction having been decided by the Collector. 4. The appeal came on for hearing before one of the learned Judges of this Court, who dismissed it, holding that “the case clearly falls within the range of section 180 of the Tenancy Act of 1902 (1901) and the question of jurisdiction having been decided, an appeal did lie to the District Judge.” In these observations of the learned Judge of this Court, we are unable to concur. In our opinion for “reasons set forth at length in an earlier portion of this judgment, the Collector did not decide any question of jurisdiction. The foundation of the District Judge's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal is the decision of such a question by the Collector, and no such question having been decided, we hold that no appeal lay. 5. It was further contended before us that section 175 of the new Tenancy Act precluded an appeal under the. Letters Patent of this Court from the judgment of the learned Judge of the Court. In our opinion that contention has no substance. When an appeal is instituted in this Court and is heard by a Judge of the Court sitting alone, an appeal from his judgment is allowed by section 10 of our Letters Patent. Section 175 of the Tenancy Act is not a section which purports (inter-alia) to regulate the procedure to be observed by the Judges of this Court in hearing appeals. It can refer only to matters outside, and cannot have the effect of modifying section 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. 6. Section 175 of the Tenancy Act is not a section which purports (inter-alia) to regulate the procedure to be observed by the Judges of this Court in hearing appeals. It can refer only to matters outside, and cannot have the effect of modifying section 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. 6. We must, therefore, allow this appeal, and setting aside the decree of this Court and of the District Judge, we restore the appellate decree of the Collector with costs in all Courts.