JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. 1. The defendant-appellant was a lessee under a lease dated the 17th of May, 1879. The lease was for a period often years. But after the expiry of the term of the lease, the lessee held on. The rent reserved by the lease was a sum of Rs. 615, out of which Rs. 510 was to be paid as Government revenue. The original lessor was one Musammat Jai Dei, whose interests in one-half of the property were sold by auction in 1892, and were purchased by the fourth plaintiff, Bansi Dhar, The remainder of her interest was similarly sold in 1896 and was purchased by the other plaintiffs. These plaintiffs brought the present suit to recover the arrears of rent for the years 1304, 1305 and 1306 Fasli. They claimed the two sums; first the amount which was to be paid to the lessor by the lessee, and secondly, a sum of Rs. 262-11-0, which sum was to be paid as Government revenue, but which the lessee had not paid, and which had been realised from the first three plaintiffs. The total amount claimed was claimed by all the four plaintiffs. One of these plaintiffs, Parsotam Saran, was described in the plaint as minor. It was objected at the hearing on behalf of the defendant that Parsotam Saran was of age on the date of the suit. Thereupon, on the 14th of June, 1900, Parsotam Saran filed an application in the Court of first instance, asking for permission to prosecute the suit on his own behalf as a person who was of age. This application was refused upon the ground that Parsotam was a minor, and upon various other grounds the Court of first instance dismissed the suit. One of the contentions raised in the lower appellate Court related to the claim by Parsotam Saran. This application was refused upon the ground that Parsotam was a minor, and upon various other grounds the Court of first instance dismissed the suit. One of the contentions raised in the lower appellate Court related to the claim by Parsotam Saran. The learned Judge was of opinion that it was unnecessary to determine whether Parsotam Saran was of age on the date of the institution of the suit, and he made an order that as Parsotam was admittedly of age on the 14th June, 1900, on which date he applied to be permitted to proceed with the suit, his application ought to have been granted, and the learned Judge granting that application made the order that Parsotam be made a party to the suit as plaintiff in his own person as of age. With reference to this order, it is contended before us that as Parsotam was added as plaintiff by the order of the 26th September, 1901, limitation should be computed from the date of that order, and so computing it the claim would be time-barred, as the arrears of rent for the year 1305 Fasli had accrued due in August, 1898, that is, beyond three years from that date. This contention is in our judgment untenable. What the learned Judge did, was to grant the application of the 14th of June, 1900, that is, he did that which the Court of first instance ought to have done, so that Parsotam Saran was in effect made plaintiff in his own person not on the 26th of September, 1901, but on the 14th of June, 1900. On the date last mentioned, the claim save as regards a part of rent for 1304 was within time. The plea of limitation raised in the appeal, therefore, is in our judgment untenable. 2. The next contention on behalf of the appellant was that there was a misjoinder of plaintiffs and of causes of action. This contention was urged in this way. Some plaintiffs claimed not only arrears of rent, but also arrears of revenue which some of them had to pay. The claim of those plaintiffs was not the same as the claim of all the plaintiffs, and consequently the cause of action as regards the arrears of revenue being different from the cause of action as regards the arrear of rent, there was a misjoinder of plaintiffs. The claim of those plaintiffs was not the same as the claim of all the plaintiffs, and consequently the cause of action as regards the arrears of revenue being different from the cause of action as regards the arrear of rent, there was a misjoinder of plaintiffs. Section 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure was referred to in support of the argument. That section must, we think, be read along with section 26 of the Code. Under section 26 all persons may be joined as plaintiffs in whom the right to any relief claimed is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative. As regards the arrears of revenue all the four plaintiffs jointly claimed a right to relief. 3. Therefore all of them could jointly maintain the suit, although only some of them might be entitled to a decree. The same plaintiffs, who jointly claimed the arrears of revenue, also jointly claimed the arrears of rent, so that all the plaintiffs claimed relief against the same defendant, in respect both of arrears of rent and arrears of revenue. They could consequently bring a joint suit against the same defendant, and in so doing, they did not offend against the provisions of section 45. Further as the claim for revenue is in reality a claim for a part of the rent reserved by the lease, and as to this rent ail the plaintiffs, as representatives of the lessor, were entitled, in no view could it be said that there was a misjoinder of causes of action or of plaintiffs. There is in our judgment no substance in this appeal. We accordingly dismiss it with costs.