Judgement Appeal from the above Sadar Court (Nov. 13, 1899) setting aside a decree of the District Judge of Shikarpur (Nov. 5, 1898) which dismissed the suit. The suit was brought on May 11, 1897, by the respondents to redeem all the mortgages which might be held to be proved, specifying those of May 15, 1874, and June 4, 1878, which are referred to in their Lordships judgment, but eventually proceeding upon those of 1878. The appellants, so far as now material, contended—(1.) that they and their co-defendants were owners, and not mortgagees, of the land, who derived their title from bona fide purchasers for value at auction sales of the mortgaged land under decrees obtained by the mortgagees in their suits in 1878 and 1879, and that the respondents, therefore, were not entitled to redeem; (2.) that even if the sales were not valid, the defendants and their predecessors had held adverse possession of the land in suit for more than twelve years, and that the suit was therefore barred by the law of limitation. The first Court dismissed the suit. Shortly stated, its view was that the estates of the original mortgagors were fully represented in the mortgagees suits of 1878 and 1879 and in the subsequent proceedings, and that there was no reason for supposing that the purchasers at the auction sales bought benami on behalf of the mortgagees. Even if the mortgagees were the real purchasers through their nominees at those sales, they "held the lands since 1881 under a different title and adversely to plaintiffs, whose claim is now time barred." With reference to this issue as to a limitation bar, the Sadar Court traced the history of the defendants connection with the lands, and referred at length to the mortgagees suits, 160 of 1878 and 372 of 1879, which were brought to recover the amount of the mortgage money under the circumstances detailed in the judgment of their Lordships. With regard to suit 160 of 1878, the judge of the Sadar Court observed, with reference to the contention of the plaintiffs that " the whole proceeding was a fraud and a farce, and absolutely null and void," that he did not consider that the decree in the suit and the sale following thereon could be treated as absolute nullities without having been set aside, or that the very grave irregularities and very probable collusion of the unauthorized guardian of the minor Amirbaksh could do more than shew that the claim, which must be deemed well founded, was decreed and realized in a manner indicating that there was an intention to take an unfair advantage of the minor. But in regard to suit 372 of 1879, the learned judge was of opinion that the only person bound by the award and decree thereon was the defendant named Bugro. He then discussed the con tention of the defendants in this suit that if the decrees and sales were invalid they were protected by adverse possession of over twelve years, which would give them a title under the law of limitation even if they were, trespassers, which was the view adopted by the lower Court. As to this the learned judge found as a fact that the purchasers at the sales were palpably mere benami purchasers, who had never in any way interfered with the possession of the mortgagees. The latter, to all appearance, continued in possession by virtue of their mortgages precisely as they had done before, and precisely as they would have done if the nominal purchasers had altogether abandoned all idea of profiting by their purchases and redeeming the pro perty by virtue of their purchase of the equity of redemption. As the mortgagees themselves continued in possession they could not convert their mortgages before default made, and before they were even redeemable, into an out-and-out sale, for a very small further sum, admitted in the one case by the unauthorized guardian, Alahnawar, of the minor (Amirbaksh) on immunity secured for himself, and awarded in the other case by a monstrous and absurd and palpably iniquitous decision of Kodumal, one of the mortgagees in O.S. 372 of 1879. "The real point in this long and apparently complicated case, obscured by details really immaterial, is a very simple one, viz., whether a mortgagee can, without bringing a regular suit on his mortgage and shewing what remains due after account of receipts, and without waiting for the time when under the mortgage he can sue for the money on default made, and without giving the mortgagor the time which the Courts allow for redemption by a suit of a totally different kind, deprive the mortgagor of his equity of redemption and obtain for himself the full ownership of the property mortgaged so as to purchase his own security and convert the mortgage into a sale to himself without a suit on the mortgage ? And a long current of decisions say that he cannot do this; and that if he does, he can still be redeemed, on payment of principal, interest, and costs." " It was further observed by the Court that the case reported in 5 Beng. L. R. 450, and the many cases cited in the note at p. 460 of the report of that case, fully shewed the grounds on which the principle rested, and that the present case appeared to afford a very striking illustration of the justification for the principle. The mortgage debt had not even become payable when the property was sold, and every unfair advantage was taken of the debtors, and no account of the profits which the debtors alleged would be in their favour was taken. The Court, therefore, considered that on these grounds all the mortgagors or their assignees were entitled to redeem on payment of whatever might be found due on account taken on the mortgages. . . . The Court, therefore, considered that on these grounds all the mortgagors or their assignees were entitled to redeem on payment of whatever might be found due on account taken on the mortgages. . . . The plaintiffs in their plaint declared their willingness to pay the whole of the mortgage debt, and as the ground on which they were entitled to redeem was that the mortgagees could not acquire the equity of redemption directly or indirectly by purchase at a Court sale, except by a suit brought on the mortgage on account taken and time especially allowed for redemption, there seemed to be no reason why the redemption of the whole of the mortgaged property should not be allowed to the plaintiffs, who would, however, have to give credit in the account for the amount of the debts decreed in favour of the decree-holders in the suits respectively numbered 160 of 1878 and 372 of 1879." C. W. Arathoon, for the appellants, contended that the execution sales of the equity of redemption effected under the decrees in the suits of 1878 and 1879 were effective, and the appellants thereby became absolute owners, at all events as against the respondents. Accordingly the present suit to redeem was not maintainable unless it included a prayer to cancel those sales in execution. The suit to redeem was barred against independent adverse holders in twelve years, and a suit to set aside the sales would have been barred in one year. The errors in procedure in those suits were not of a class which vitiated the whole proceedings, rendering the sales nullities, but were mere irregularities within the meaning of s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code see Mussamut Bibi Walian v. Banke Behari Pershad Singh (( 1903) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 182.); Malkarjun v. Narhari. (L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 216. s22) A suit should have been brought to set aside the sales under s. 311 of the Code, and was now barred by art. 12 of the Limitation Act, Sched. II. The titles in the property sold had now passed to the purchasers see Doulat Ram v. Mehr Chand (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 187.) ; Husein v. Shankargiri Guru (( 1898) Ind. L. R. 23 Bomb. 119.); Martand v. Dhondo (( 1897) Ind. L. R 22 Bomb. 624.); Pandit Lakshman v. Anpurna. (( 1896) Ind. II. The titles in the property sold had now passed to the purchasers see Doulat Ram v. Mehr Chand (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 187.) ; Husein v. Shankargiri Guru (( 1898) Ind. L. R. 23 Bomb. 119.); Martand v. Dhondo (( 1897) Ind. L. R 22 Bomb. 624.); Pandit Lakshman v. Anpurna. (( 1896) Ind. L. R. 21 Bomb, 793.) The evidence shewed that the purchasers at the sales in the suits of 1878 and 1879 were bona fide purchasers and in a position to hold adversely to the respondents. The respondents right to redeem was there-fore extinguished, as more than twelve years had elapsed before action brought. Reference was made to Kamini Debi v. Ramlochan Sirkar (( 1870) 5 Beng. L. R. 450.); Mahabir Pershad Singh v. Macnaghten. (( 1889) L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 107,114.) Cohen, K.C., and Ross, for the respondents, contended that the evidence shewed that the real purchasers at the sales in question were the mortgagees, who were in possession of the property sold. The mortgagees themselves, being usufructuary mortgagees, and before the mortgage period had expired, bought in the equities of redemption benami in the names of the so-called purchasers. Their purchases under such circumstances cannot make their possession adverse against the mortgagors, at least until notice is given of an intention to hold adversely. Reference was made to arts. 144 and 148 of Sched. II. of Act XV. of 1877. Moreover, it is clear that the estates of all the original mortgagors were not fully represented in the litigation of 1878 and 1879. Consequently the decrees did not bind them, and the sales in execution, so far as regards the interests of the unrepresented mortgagors, were mere nullities and could be disregarded. No prayer to set them aside was necessary, and accordingly the one-year limitation to a suit for that purpose did not apply. Reference was made to Kishen Chunder Ghose v. Mussumat Ashoorun (Marshall, 647.) and the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 99. Arathoon replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. No prayer to set them aside was necessary, and accordingly the one-year limitation to a suit for that purpose did not apply. Reference was made to Kishen Chunder Ghose v. Mussumat Ashoorun (Marshall, 647.) and the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 99. Arathoon replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. The suit in which this appeal has been brought was one for the redemption of two mortgages dated June 4, 1878, of certain immovable property described as the Pir or Chaudhri Wah (canal) with land measuring 3003 jirebs (equivalent to 1516 acres and 23 gundas) situate in the Registration District Upper Sindh Frontier. The mortgagors were Mahomedans, but not all members of one family. They are now represented by the respondents. The mortgagees were two persons named Tekchand and Kodumal, who are represented by the appellants. The suit was originally brought in the Court of the District Judge at Shikarpur, and was transferred to the Court of the Assistant Judge. The present appeal is from the Sadar Court of the Province of Sindh sitting on appeal from the Assistant Judge. The facts are somewhat complicated, and it will be necessary to state with some precision the tenure of the lands in question and the shares in which the several mortgagors were entitled. The lands were held under five patas, or leases, granted by Government for terms of seven years and renewed from time to time. The current patas at the date of the mortgages in question were numbered 174, 175, 178, 243, and 244. Pata No. 174, dated September 23, 1874, was in the name of Naurez. No. 175, of the same date, was in the name of Sanwan. No. 178, of the same date, was in the name of Khan Muhammad. Nos. 243 and 244, dated respectively July 23, 1875, and March 20, 1877, were in the name of Bugro. Although the patas were granted by Government to the persons named, the wah and lands held with it and comprised in the patas in fact belonged to the following proprietors One moiety belonged to Nabibaksh and his brother Alibaksh, and the other moiety belonged as to one-third (or one-sixth of the entirety) to Naurez, and as to two-thirds (or two-sixths of the entirety) to Khan Muhammad, Sanwan, and Bugro in equal undivided shares. Two previous mortgages dated May 15, 1874, had been executed by these proprietors. One of these mortgages was by Nabibaksh (on behalf of himself and his brother Alibaksh), Naurez, Bugro, Sanwan, and Khan Muhammad in favour of Tekchand and Kodumal for Rs.5600, and the other mortgage was by the same mortgagors in favour of Waliram, Kodumal, and Tekchand for B.s.2000. Waliram was a partner with Kodumal and Tekchand. These mortgages, like those of 1878, were usufructuary mortgages. Before the execution of the mortgages of 1878 Naurez died leaving a widow and four children, including a son, Amirbaksh. Khan Muhammad died leaving seven children, including a son by his first wife named Kadurbaksh, and Sanwan died leaving a widow and four children, including a son, Sumar. The first mortgage of June 4, 1878, was by Nabibaksh, on behalf of himself and Alibaksh only, of one moiety of the property for Rs.4300, made up of Rs.2470—one-half of the amount stated to be due on the first mortgage of 1874—Rs.378 balance due on the second mortgage, Rs.852 due on settlement of accounts, and Rs.600 due in respect of one-half of the assessment and clearance expenses of the last year. It was in favour of Kodumal and Tekchand, and was an usufructuary mortgage for a term of five years from date, expiring, therefore, on June 4, 1883. The points deserving special notice are that one-fourth of one-half of the produce was reserved to the mortgagor for his maintenance and other expenses connected with the wah and land, and the responsibility of cultivation and looking after the land rested on the mortgagor in consultation with and with the consent of the Showkars. On the same June 4, 1878, Kadurbaksh purported to convey the share of Khan Muhammad in the property, which he described as his share, to Bugro in consideration of Rs.955 8a. 10p., being " his share " of the mortgage debts created by the two mortgages of even date which Bugro agreed to pay, but reserving to himself the land denoted by survey No. 30 in pata No. 178, and containing eight acres, which he stated was his ancestral property. This small piece of land was also excepted from the two mortgages. This small piece of land was also excepted from the two mortgages. By the second mortgage deed of June 4, 1878, Bugro, Sumar, and Amirbaksh purported to mortgage the other moiety of the property to Kodumal and Tekchand for Rs.4300, made up in the same manner as in the first deed, for a like term of five years, and subject to the same stipulations as to cultivation and so forth. At this date Sumar and Amirbaksh were both minors. It is apparent on the face of the mortgages of 1878 that as between the parties to these deeds the debts created by the previous mortgages of 1874 were satisfied, and, in fact, it is admitted in the appellants written statement of defence, and in their case on this appeal, that the mortgages of 1874 were extinguished, but apparently only as between the parties. Waliram, however, was not a party to the deeds of 1878, and on May 1, 1879, he commenced a suit (No. 372 of 1879) against Nabibaksh, Bugro, Sumar, Kadurbaksh, and Amirbaksh, described asa " minor aged about fourteen years, legal representative of Naurez, deceased, by his guardian, his uncle Alahnawaz," to recover Rs.249 10a. 3p. for principal and interest in respect of his share of the sum due under the mortgage to himself and his partners of May 15, 1874. The proceedings in this suit were somewhat extraordinary. On June 4, 1879, a petition signed by Waliram, Nabibaksh, Bugro, and Alahnawaz, described as "guardian of Amirbaksh," was presented to the Court praying that the points in issue between them should be referred for final disposal to the arbitration of Kodumar (the partner of Waliram). The petition was not signed by Kadurbaksh or Sumar, and appended to it was a postscript signed by the same parties praying that the names of Sumar and Kadurbaksh might be struck off from the suit. On the same day (June 4, 1879) the Subordinate Judge made an order for reference accordingly. Shortly afterwards Nabibaksh died leaving two widows, an infant son, Muhammad Hasan, and a daughter. The names of the widows and son were added to the record, and the usual summonses served on them to appear. On the same day (June 4, 1879) the Subordinate Judge made an order for reference accordingly. Shortly afterwards Nabibaksh died leaving two widows, an infant son, Muhammad Hasan, and a daughter. The names of the widows and son were added to the record, and the usual summonses served on them to appear. Kodumal made his award that the plaintiff Waliram should recover Rs.350 from Bugro, the property of Nabibaksh deceased, Sanwan deceased, Khanan or Khan Muhammad deceased, and Naurez deceased, in three instalments with interest, and the judge made an order, dated December 20, 1879, to that effect. On February 8, 1881, the wah and lands (except the lands comprised in pata No. 174 in the name of Naurez) were sold in execution to Darianomal, son of Kodumal and gomashta of his firm. It is not now disputed that he was benamidar for Kodumal and Tekchand. The sale purported to be subject to a mortgage to Kodumal for Rs.5600, meaning, apparently, the mortgage of May, 1874, and ignoring, therefore, the subsequent mortgage of 1878. By an inexplicable blunder it appears to have been assumed in making the sale that the lands were the property of the several persons in whom the patas stood, although the true facts as to the proprietorship were mentioned in the application for execution and in the memorandum of sale. On April 29, 1878, Kodumal and Tekchand commenced a suit (No. 160 of 1878) against " Naurez, deceased, by his legal representative Amirbaksh, by his guardian, his uncle Alah Nawaz," the last named personally, and one Mubarak, to recover a sum stated to be due to them and one Motandas (who was also named as defendant) from Naurez, Alah Nawaz, and Mubarak on settled account. This suit was compromised for a lump sum of Rs.519, and default having been made in payment the land comprised in pata No. 174, standing in Naurezs name, on October 11, 1880, purported to be sold in execution to one Ubhuromal, who shortly afterwards transferred it to Darianomal. In this case also it was assumed that pata No. 174, standing in the name of Naurez, was his exclusive property, although the true state of the title appeared on the proceedings in the suit. The present suit was commenced on January 11, 1897. In this case also it was assumed that pata No. 174, standing in the name of Naurez, was his exclusive property, although the true state of the title appeared on the proceedings in the suit. The present suit was commenced on January 11, 1897. The original plaintiffs were Alibaksh, the heirs of Nabibaksh, Naurez, Sanwan, Khan Muhammad, and Bugro, and by amendment one Nur Muhammad, who is a purchaser of one-half of their interests, was added. The defendants were the sons of Tekchand and Kodumal, both deceased. The first question is whether the suit is barred by limitation. This point is put in two ways. It is contended that there has been adverse possession for more than twelve years of the equity of redemption, and the title of the appellants who now represent the original defendants cannot, therefore, now be disputed. Secondly, it is said that the defects in the proceedings in the two suits in which the equity of redemption was purported to be sold were at most irregularities which might entitle the parties to have the execution sales set aside if they had come in time, but, no proceedings for that purpose having been brought within the time allowed by law, the sales are now unimpeachable. The circumstances relied on as evidence of adverse possession are— that since the dates of the execution sales no accounts have been demanded by or rendered to the mortgagors or their representaties, no payments of subsistence money which they were entitled to under the mortgages have been made to them, and the parties after the sale ceased to cultivate the land and left the village, and renewed patas have been granted to nominees of the mortgagees. If the purchasers had been independent third parties, and accounts had been rendered and payments made by the mortgagees to them instead of to the mortgagors, the circumstances relied on would have been cogent evidence of adverse possession of the equity of redemption in favour of such third parties. But their Lordships cannot differ from the finding of the appellate judge, that in each case the nominal purchasers were the agents only of the mortgagees, or the firm of which they were members, who were the real purchasers; and this was not seriously disputed by Mr. Arathoon. The firm appears to have consisted of many branches and contained many partners. Arathoon. The firm appears to have consisted of many branches and contained many partners. Darianomal, the purchaser in suit No. 372 of 1879, was (as already mention) son of Kodumal and gomashta of the firm. In the language of the witness Khiarajmal, "Dariano bought the lands for the shop." Ubhuromal, the other purchaser, was also an employee of some kind of one branch of the firm. As changes took place from time to time in the constitution of the firm, the mortgaged property as an asset of the firm was credited at an agreed figure in favour of an outgoing or against an incoming partner. But there have been no separate dealings with the equity of redemption as a distinct subject of property. Their Lordships are satisfied that the possession has been that of the mortgagees throughout, and the question at issue is exclusively one between mortgagor and mortgagee. As between them, neither exclusive possession by the mortgagee for any length of time short of the statutory period of sixty years, nor any acquiescence by the mortgagor not amounting to a release of the equity of redemption, will be a bar or defence to a suit for redemption if the parties are otherwise entitled to redeem. It is almost unnecessary to add that a renewal of the patas or the making of a new settlement with Government in the names of nominees of the mortgagees did not alter the real title to the lands. The question, therefore, is whether the equity of redemption not only purported to be, but was in fact sold under the decrees. Their Lordships agree that the sales cannot be treated as void or now be avoided on the grounds of any mere irregularities of procedure in obtaining the decrees or in the execution of them. But on the other hand the Court had no jurisdiction to sell the property of persons who were not parties to the proceedings or properly represented on the record. As against such persons the decrees and sales purporting to be made would be a nullity and might be disregarded without any proceeding to set them aside. If authority be desired for these elementary propositions, it may be found in the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock in Kishen Chunder Ghose v. Mussumat Ashoorun. (Marshall, 647.) It will be convenient to consider the case of each of the mortgagors separately. If authority be desired for these elementary propositions, it may be found in the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock in Kishen Chunder Ghose v. Mussumat Ashoorun. (Marshall, 647.) It will be convenient to consider the case of each of the mortgagors separately. In doing so it will not be necessary for their Lordships to consider whether there is sufficient evidence of fraud or chicane on the part of the mortgagees, or whether the proceedings in suit No. 372 of 1879 deserved the epithets which the appellate judge applies to them. Those proceedings were conducted with great irregularity, but the only question for consideration is whether the Court had jurisdiction to sell the property which purported to be sold. In suit No. 160 of 1878 it will be remembered that none of the persons interested were parties to the suit except Amirbaksh, sued as representative of Naurez, deceased. Nabibaksh was a defendant to the suit No. 372 of 1879, and signed the agreement of reference. On his death very shortly afterwards his two widows and his son Muhammad Hasan, aged about six years, by his mother, one of the widows, were named as his legal representatives on the record. The judge was satisfied by evidence that they were served with a summons to appear, and that they were prepared to accept the award of the arbitrator; and they were also served with notice of the sale. Their Lordships think that Nabibakshs estate was sufficiently represented for the purpose of the suit although the name of his infant daughter was omitted, and that his share of the equity of redemption in the property sold in execution of the decree in No. 372 of 1879 is therefore bound by the sale, and irredeemable. This share was one-fourth, or (say) six twenty-fourths. Nabibaksh, however, executed the mortgages of 1878 on behalf of his brother Alibaksh as well as of himself. Alibaksh is still living, and is a plaintiff in the present suit and one of the respondents. It must be presumed that Nabibaksh was authorized to sign the mortgages for his brother. At any rate, Alibaksh by suing for redemption admits it. And possibly it might have been held that Nabibakshs authority extended to representing him in Walirams suit. But by no possibility could it be considered that he was represented by the widows or infant son of his deceased brother. At any rate, Alibaksh by suing for redemption admits it. And possibly it might have been held that Nabibakshs authority extended to representing him in Walirams suit. But by no possibility could it be considered that he was represented by the widows or infant son of his deceased brother. In fact, his interest in the property seems to have been ignored altogether. He is not mentioned as a debtor in the award, and there is no decree against him. The Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to sell his share, amounting to six twenty-fourths. The next share to be considered is Naurezs original 1/3 x ½ x 4/24. Amirbaksh was, of course, one of the heirs of Naurez, but in no other sense his legal representative. It is not pretended that Alahnawaz was in any legal sense or in fact his guardian, or was ever appointed his guardian ad litem. It is, however, contended by the appellants that Naurezs heirs are bound by the proceedings in both suits, and that his share of the property, whatever it was, was effectually sold in the suit No. 160 of 1878, or at any rate that the share of Amirbaksh himself passed by the sale. The Indian Courts have properly exercised a wide discretion in allowing the estate of a deceased debtor to be represented by one member of the family, and in refusing to disturb judicial sales on the mere ground that some members of the family, who were minors, were not made parties to the proceedings, if it appears that there was a debt justly due from the deceased, and no prejudice is shewn to the absent minors. But these are usually cases where the person named as defendant is, de facto, manager of a Hindu family property, or has the assets out of which the decree is to be satisfied under his control. The appellants relied on the judgment of this Board in Malkarjun v. Narhari. (L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 216.) In that case a judgment had been given against a debtor, who afterwards died, and in executing the decree against his estate a person was served, as his heir, with notice of the intended sale. The person served objected (as it was proved rightly) that he was not the heir of the deceased, but the Court overruled the objection. 216.) In that case a judgment had been given against a debtor, who afterwards died, and in executing the decree against his estate a person was served, as his heir, with notice of the intended sale. The person served objected (as it was proved rightly) that he was not the heir of the deceased, but the Court overruled the objection. The purchaser at the sale was a stranger, and not the judgment creditor. It was to this state of circumstances that Lord Hobhouses observations were directed. His Lordship said "He (the person served) contended that he was not the right person, but the Court, having received his protest, decided that he was the right person, and so proceeded with the execution. In so doing the Court was exercising its juris diction. It made a sad mistake it is true, but a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed for setting matters right, and if that course is not taken the decision, however wrong, cannot be disturbed." Their Lordships think that these observations do not apply to the case now before them. In suits No. 372 of 1879 and No. 160 of 1878, the judge seems to have accepted without question the statement on the record that Amirbaksh was legal representative of Naurez, and Alahnawaz was his guardian and never applied his mind to the matter. Doubtless he would have done so if the suits had proceeded in the ordinary course, but in the former case the proceedings were cut short by the agree ment for reference, and in the latter case it was in effect a consent decree. It was not, therefore, the case of an erroneous decision, ruling, or exercise of discretion of the judge in a matter in which the Court had jurisdiction. Their Lordships think that the estate of Naurez was not represented in law or in fact in either of the suits, and the sale of his property was therefore without jurisdiction and null and void. Nor can they hold that the share of Amirbaksh himself in his fathers estate was bound. In the opinion of their Lordships it is not a mere question of form, but one of substance. Nor can they hold that the share of Amirbaksh himself in his fathers estate was bound. In the opinion of their Lordships it is not a mere question of form, but one of substance. In coming to this conclusion their Lordships are quite sensible of the importance of upholding the title of persons who buy under a judicial sale; but in the present case the real purchaser was the judgment creditor, who must be held to have had notice of all the facts. Sumar and Kadurbaksh never signed the agreement for reference to Kodumal in suit No. 372 of 1879, and the Court was asked to strike their names out of the record. They were not, therefore, parties to any of the subsequent proceed ings which were founded exclusively on the agreement, and it is immaterial whether their names were actually removed from the record or not. Sanwans share (1/3 x 8/24) and Khan Muhammads share (1/3 x 8/24), therefore, did not pass by the sale in suit No. 372 of 1879, subject to the question of what passed by the conveyance from Kadurbaksh to Bugro. It is admitted that Bugros share (in patas 175, 178, 243, and 244) is irredeemable, and their Lordships think that this includes whatever he took by conveyance from Kadurbaksh. By the deed of June 4, 1878, Kadurbaksh purported to convey the whole of Khan Muhammads share, except the land denoted by survey No. 30 in pata 178. Whether he did so in fact (that is to say) whether he had by some means acquired it from his father, or whether he was authorized to sell more than his own heritage, is a question which has not been argued before their Lordships, and there are no materials upon which they can form an opinion. Prima facie his conveyance would pass only his own share, but if there be any question upon it the point must be decided in the Court below. Except so far as Khan Muhammads interest vested in Bugro, his estate is not bound by either decree. In any case the lands denoted by survey No. 30 in pata 178, being excepted from the mortgages, are not redeemable in this suit. Their Lordships, therefore, substantially agree with the appellate judge as to his view of the facts of the case. In any case the lands denoted by survey No. 30 in pata 178, being excepted from the mortgages, are not redeemable in this suit. Their Lordships, therefore, substantially agree with the appellate judge as to his view of the facts of the case. But the judge has made a decree for redemption of the whole estate, on the ground that " the mortgagees could not acquire the equity of redemption directly or indirectly by purchase at a Court sale except by a suit brought on the mortgage, on account taken and time specially allowed for redemption." Their Lordships cannot concur in this view, which they think is based on a misapplication of a sound principle of equity. Their Lordships throw no doubt on the principle, which has been acted on in many cases in India, that a mortgagee cannot, by obtaining a money decree for the mortgage debt and taking the equity of redemption in execution, relieve himself of his obligations as mortgagee, or deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem on accounts taken, and with the other safeguards usual in a suit on the mortgage. But in Walirams suit the parties agreed that the points in issue in the suit should be referred to arbitration, and the case was taken out of the hands of the Court. In suit No. 160 of 1878 the debt sued for was not the mortgage debt. The creditors were different and the debtors were different, and the debt does not appear from the plaint to have been secured by a mortgage. In any case the point taken by the appellate judge would not be a cause of nullity for want of jurisdiction, but a case of irregularity in procedure only. The result is that the respondents between them are entitled to redeem (1.) the whole of the lands comprised in pata No. 174, and (2.) the wah and the lands comprised in the other four patas, except the original six-twenty-fourths share thereof of Nabibaksh, and the original 1/3 x 8/24 share thereof of Bugro, and whatever share was conveyed to him by Kadurbaksh by the deed dated June 4, 1878, and except the land denoted by survey No. 30 in pata 178. The account of what is due on the mortgages to the appellants has already been taken, and the judge has rightly added the two sums of Rs.325 and Rs.300 paid by the purchasers on execution of the decrees in the two suits No. 160 of 1878 and No. 372 of 1879. But the judge has not allowed interest on these sums on the ground that no money in fact passed. The debts, however, were discharged in whole or in part, and there seems to their Lordships to be no reason why interest should not be allowed on these sums also. Their Lordships, therefore, will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the appellate judge, dated March 2, 1900, be varied by (1.) a declaration that the plaintiffs or some of them are entitled to redeem the above-mentioned shares in the wah and lands in suit; (2.) directions to ascertain (in case the parties differ as to it) what share in the property in suit passed by Kadurbakshs conveyance of June 4, 1878, and finally settle the shares which are redeemable and irredeemable having regard to the foregoing declaration and the result of such inquiry (if any), and to apportion the sum of Rs.7885 14a. 6p. mentioned in the said decree, with interest thereon (including the two sums of Rs.325 and Rs.300) at 9 per cent, per annum from March 2, 1900, and the amount of surplus of profits and mesne profits when ascertained in the shares in which the property in suit is ascertained to be redeemable and irredeemable, and for otherwise carrying into effect the foregoing declaration, and that quoad ultra the said decree be affirmed and the suit be remitted to the Sadar Court of Sindh to proceed accordingly. No costs were given of the appeal to the Sadar Court, and there will be no costs of this appeal.