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1904 DIGILAW 29 (ALL)

Darbari Mal v. Shiam Dei

1904-02-25

BURKITT, STANLEY

body1904
JUDGMENT : BURKITT, J. 1. In this [suit the plaintiffs-respondents, Musam-mat Shiam Dei and Musammat Gobind Dei sought to have the defendants Darbari Mal and Mangat Ram, ousted from certain properties. The titles of the parties depend on two deeds of mortgage and on the litigation which ensued on those mortgages. The first mortgage was executed on the 25th of February, 1874, by four men, namely Baljit Singh, Sarup Singh, Chandan Singh and Gopal Singh, grandsons of one Raghunath Singh. Raghunath Singh bad five sons. The executants of the mortgage are sons of four of them. The fifth son, one Debi Singh, neither personally nor through either of his sons, had any connection with it. The property mortgaged was 4½ biswa share in the village Dayanatpur. The mortgagee was one Lachman Das who is now represented by the plaintiffs-respondents. The whole interest of the five sons and grandsons of Raghunath Singh in the village was 11½ biswas, so that considerably less than one-half of the family property was hypothecated in this bond. 2. The second mortgage was executed on the 18th of January, 1880. The parties to it were Chandan Singh, Durjan Singh and Kanhai Singh the three sons of Gulzar Singh, one of the sons of Raghunath Singh, The property which they purported to mortgage was a 2 biswas and 6 biswansis share which roughly represents one-fifth of the interest of the whole family in the village. The mortgagee was one Bansi Dhar. 3. The title of the plaintiffs in this suit is made out in the follow-in way: After the death of Lachman Das, his representatives, on the 24th of February, 1880, instituted a suit on the mortgage of February 25, 1874. In that suit they did not implead Bansi Dhar or his representatives. After proceedings in the Subordinate Courts a final decree was parsed on this mortgage by this High Court on the 29th July, 1881. It was a decree for sale of the mortgaged property, excepting the interest of Debi Singh and his sons who had not joined in the mortgage. We are told that the High Court held that each one of the grandsons of Raghunath Singh who joined in the mortgage, represented his branch of the family and acted on its behalf. 4. It was a decree for sale of the mortgaged property, excepting the interest of Debi Singh and his sons who had not joined in the mortgage. We are told that the High Court held that each one of the grandsons of Raghunath Singh who joined in the mortgage, represented his branch of the family and acted on its behalf. 4. On the 20th April, 1885, execution was had on the decree and four biswas were sold and purchased by Musammat Sohni, the widow of Lachman Das. It is said that she was benamidar for her husband. But however, that may be, the interest of the purchaser in those 4 biswas has now vested in the two plaintiffs—Musammat Shiam Dei and Musammat Gobind Dei. Part of the property of which the original mortgagee's representatives were put in possession by the decree of the 29th of July, 1881, is that which is in dispute in this case. The predecessor-in-title of the defendants-appellants was put into possession of it in execution of a decree which we shall presently mention. 5. Turning next to the defendants' title it is made out thus: We have already mentioned the mortgage executed in favour of Bansi, Dhar on the 18th January, 1880, by the three sons of Gulzar Singh. Banti Dhar instituted a suit on that mortgage but did not implead Lachhman Das or his representatives. He obtained a decree for sale on the 9th of August, 1884, and in execution of that decree he put up for sale the interest of two only of his mortgagors, namely Durjan and Kanhai. Their interest was sold on the 21st of September, 1896, and purchased by the decree-holder, Bansi Dhar whose son, Piare, afterwards assigned it to the defendants-appellants, Darbari Mal and Mangat Ram. They admittedly are now in possession. By this suit the plaintiffs-respondents seek to oust them. 6. Now, on the facts of the case as above set out, it appears to us that the plaintiffs have no title to eject the defendants. Plaintiff's claim entirely depends on the litigation between Lachhman and his mortgagors. To it Bansi Dhar was no party, though he should have been, and therefore neither he nor the present defendants-appellants who stand in his shoes, are in any way bound by the decree obtained on Lachhman Das's mortgage. The plaintiffs-respondents here are the attacking party. Plaintiff's claim entirely depends on the litigation between Lachhman and his mortgagors. To it Bansi Dhar was no party, though he should have been, and therefore neither he nor the present defendants-appellants who stand in his shoes, are in any way bound by the decree obtained on Lachhman Das's mortgage. The plaintiffs-respondents here are the attacking party. It is they who seek to turn the defendants out of the possession which they obtained in execution of Bansi Dhar's decree. It is immaterial whether in Bansi Dhar's decree he ought not to have impleaded Lachman Das. The defendants-appellants are now in possession and are entitled to remain so until ejected by some one with an unimpeachable title. The only title the respondents can show is that derived from the auction proceedings on Lachhman Das's mortgage. To those proceedings the predecessor-in-title of the appellants was no party and his representatives are not bound by them. These proceedings as against the appellants conferred on the respondents here no legal authority to oust the defendants-appellants. It may be that there was a flaw in the defendants' title, and that if the plaintiffs were in possession under the decree on the mortgage to Lachhman Das, the defendants would not be successful in a suit to eject them, but the plaintiffs who are out of possession have not shown as against them any superior title or any title which entitles, them to ask a court of justice to eject the defendants. 7. For the above reasons we think the decisions of the lower courts are wrong. We allow this Appeal, we set aside the decrees of the lower courts, and direct that the plaintiffs' suit shall stand dismissed with costs in all courts.