Judgement Appeal by special leave from a decree of the Chief Court (Aug. 8, 1901) reversing a decree of the District Court of Amherst (Nov. 7, 1900) and dismissing the appellants suit. That suit was brought in 1899 for a declaration that the appellant was a keitima daughter of one Ma Ye, deceased, and as such entitled to half of her estate as against the respondent, who was in possession of the whole of that estate under letters of administration thereto, and as admittedly the keitima daughter of the deceased. The question was whether the appellant was equally with the respondent a keitima daughter as alleged, and entitled to a moiety of the estate. The District Court decided it in her favour, the appellate Court against her. The parties were Burma Buddhists, amongst whom an essential part of keitima adoption is publicity and notoriety of the fact of adoption—publicity of the relationship and of the intention of the adoptive parents in regard to the inheritance of their estate by the adoptive child. The Courts in Burma require strict proof of the relationship when questions of the kind have come before them. It was held in Ma Gun v. Ma Gun (( 1874) 1 Chantoons L. C. 147.) that neither ceremony nor written document is required, " nothing, indeed, but a request from parents, and a notorious and public taking and bringing up in order that, or with the understanding that, they, i.e., the children, may inherit." There are two kinds of adoption—the keitima child, who is obtained from its own parents and openly brought up with a view to inherit; the apatitha child, who has no parents and who has been casually picked up and adopted. The former stands in the same position as a natural child for all purposes, including the right to inherit. The latter is excluded from inheritance by either natural or keitima children. The appellants case was that about forty-one years before suit ( 1858), Ko On and his wife Ma Ye requested Ebrahim Cassim Chayanglia and his wife Ma Ku (who was cousin to Ma Ye) to allow them to adopt their two daughters, the respondent and the appellant, and that, the request having been granted, they publicly adopted at the same time the respondent and the appellant as their keitima adopted children, promising at the same time that they should inherit all their property. The respondent in her written statement denied that the appellant, who was her natural sister, was ever adopted by Ma Ye or Ko On. The District Court decided in favour of the appellant mainly on the admission and evidence of the similarity of treatment of the two sisters by Ko On and Ma Ye when they were together. He did not find the fact of simultaneous adoption as alleged in the plaint to be proved. He ruled that the appellant might prove an adoption at any time either before or after her natural mothers death. He found in favour of her status as an adopted child, without any definite finding as to time and place of the actual giving and taking. The Chief Court found that the appellant had failed to prove the simultaneous adoption alleged in the plaint. The judges considered that four different versions of the fact of her adoption had been put forward and none of them proved. They thought that the evidence established a marked difference in the position of the two sisters relatively to Ko On and Ma Ye, as shewn by the appellant living for several years with her natural mother and with two husbands in succession, whilst the respondent lived continuously for nearly forty years with her adoptive parents. Lawson Walton, K.C., and McCarthy, for the appellant, contended that the evidence proved the simultaneous adoption alleged in the plaint. Otherwise that it proved the appellants status as adopted child, even if the exact time and manner of the fact of adoption were left in doubt. It was admitted the respondent was a keitima adopted child, and it was both proved and admitted that both appellant and respondent were treated by Ko On and Ma Ye in exactly the same manner. No distinction could be drawn between their respective relations to their adoptive parents. The Chief Court was wrong in treating the question at issue as one of the time and mode and fact of adoption. The appellant was entitled to rely on a course of treatment spreading over a great number of years. No distinction could be drawn between their respective relations to their adoptive parents. The Chief Court was wrong in treating the question at issue as one of the time and mode and fact of adoption. The appellant was entitled to rely on a course of treatment spreading over a great number of years. Cowell, for the respondent, contended that the District Judge in effect had found that no adoption took place before the death of Ma Ku, which was long after the adoption alleged in the plaint, and that the Chief Court had found that no adoption of the appellant had ever taken place. Consequently there were concurrent findings of fact against the allegation on which the suit was brought. Four different versions of the same fact had been given by the appellant which were mutually contradictory, and according to the Chief Court ought not to have been entertained. The evidence and admission of the parties shewed only that when the two sisters were together they were treated with equal consideration; but the Chief Court was right in finding that substantially there was a marked difference made between them. The respondent resided continually with her adoptive parents for forty years. The appellant lived with her natural mother, and afterwards with two husbands in succession. The evidence did not raise a presumption as to any definite factum of adoption. As to what it is necessary to prove according to the practice of the Courts in order to establish a keitima adoption, see Ma Mein Gale v. Ma Kin. (( 1893) 1 Chantoons L. C. 168.) Lawson Walton, K.C., replied. 1904. Dec. 8. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. The question in this case is whether the respondent and the appellant are both keitima adopted daughters of the deceased Ma Ye, a Burmese lady of con siderable fortune, who died on April 14, 1899, or whether "the respondent alone stood in that relation to the deceased. Ma Ye had been married ; her husband, Ko On, predeceased her by a few years, and she was childless. The two litigants are sisters by blood, being both daughters of a lady named Ma Ku, who was cousin of Ma Ye. Ma Ye had been married ; her husband, Ko On, predeceased her by a few years, and she was childless. The two litigants are sisters by blood, being both daughters of a lady named Ma Ku, who was cousin of Ma Ye. The respondent, who is the elder of the two sisters by a year and some months, is admitted to be a keitima adopted daughter of Ma Ye ; and the suit, which was initiated in the Court of the judge of Moulmein by plaint on September 19, 1899, was brought to obtain a declaration that the appellant is keitima daughter of Ma Ye, and entitled to a half of her estate. The written statement of the respondent was, in substance, a denial that the appellant had been adopted ; and the first and leading issue settled for the trial of the cause, to which alone the attention of their Lordships was invited, was as follows " Was the plaintiff adopted by the late Ko On and Ma Ye so as to entitle her to inherit ? " Evidence was taken before the learned judge of Moulmein and on commission, and on November 7, 1900, he decided in favour of the appellant. On appeal this judgment was reversed on August 8, 1901, by the Chief Court of Lower Burma. Upon the issue in the suit, which has been above set forth, it is to be observed that the thing to be established is a relation between these two persons, Ma Ye and the appellant. Neither ceremony nor written document is required to constitute or initiate that relation. There must be, on the one hand, the consent of the natural parents, and, on the other, the taking of the child by the adoptive parent with the intention and on the footing that the child shall inherit. What has to be ascertained is whether with the consent of her parents the appellant was adopted by Ma Ye as her child and one of her heirs. While the consent of the natural parents is a legal condition of the relation, this cannot seriously be said to present any substantial difficulty in the way of this appellant. What has to be ascertained is whether with the consent of her parents the appellant was adopted by Ma Ye as her child and one of her heirs. While the consent of the natural parents is a legal condition of the relation, this cannot seriously be said to present any substantial difficulty in the way of this appellant. From her early childhood she and her mother were left by her father to shift for themselves, and her mother had before her marriage lived in Ma Yes house and was on affectionate terms with that lady. It happens that while the mother is dead the father was examined on commission, and he gave direct and positive evidence of his consent and of the adoption ; and the judge has believed his testimony. The question of fact whether the appellant was adopted by Ma Ye and treated by her as her keitima adopted daughter is to be determined as a question of evidence. A few of the more salient facts must be noted in the order of time. The appellant, to begin with, was born in Ma Yes house in or about 1857, so that the early incidents of her childhood are sufficiently remote to account for inaccurate or varying recollection on the part of the witnesses. Between her birth and the death of her natural mother, which occurred in or about 1869, there is a period during which she lived at times with Ma Ye and at times with Ma Ku. From Ma Kus death to her own first marriage she lived with Ma Ye, a period of four or five years. In or about 1873 she married Ismail Lotia. While the circumstances of this marriage were not creditable and would have strained any but a strong tie, this was very soon condoned the husband was employed by Ma Ye; the appellants first two confinements took place in the house of Ma Ye, and the third in a house hired by that lady. The first husband died in or about 1884, and from his death the appellant and her children lived in Ma Yes house until her second marriage in or about 1888. This second marriage, again, was not at first regarded as satisfactory, and it was delayed until Ma Yes consent was obtained. The first husband died in or about 1884, and from his death the appellant and her children lived in Ma Yes house until her second marriage in or about 1888. This second marriage, again, was not at first regarded as satisfactory, and it was delayed until Ma Yes consent was obtained. From that time the appellant, while living with her husband, was frequently at Ma Yes house, and Ma Ye frequently at hers ; and one of her children was constantly with Ma Ye, Finally, Ma Ye died in the arms of the appellant on April 14, 1899. These bare facts in the appellants life shew that from her own birth to Ma Yes death the two are closely associated in Ma Yes house. Nor can it escape observation that on the death of mother and husband the appellant reverts to Ma Yes house, and that even during the lives of mother and husband that house is more to her than it would be but for some special tie. Further, the care and authority of Ma Ye are exerted when occasion arises. The outline thus drawn is filled up by numerous witnesses ; and their Lordships, looking to the nature of the matters spoken to by those witnesses, cannot but ascribe a special weight to the impressions formed and the conclusions arrived at by the judge of first instance. One consideration, how ever, must be mentioned as considerably narrowing the controversy. At an early stage of the trial the counsel for the respondent admitted that whenever the respondent and the appellant during their youth were together in Ma Yes house they were treated in the same manner, except that the respondent alleges she was and the appellant was not entrusted with the keys. The significance of this admission lies in the fact that the respondent was, on her own shewing, a keitima adopted daughter. Accordingly, it is admitted that in Ma Yes house the appellant was treated as a keitima adopted daughter was treated; and this applies to not weeks or months, but years. (The matter of the keys does not detract from the admission, as presumably this was an indivisible privilege and the respondent was the elder sister.) Again, the true question being what was the relation, it is a question of secondary, although doubtless considerable, importance when it began. (The matter of the keys does not detract from the admission, as presumably this was an indivisible privilege and the respondent was the elder sister.) Again, the true question being what was the relation, it is a question of secondary, although doubtless considerable, importance when it began. The respondent and the learned judges in the Court of Appeal have made much of the fact that the witnesses for the appellant ascribe the adoption some to one period and some to another. At the distance of thirty or forty years it is not surprising that there should be this variance. But it has not been shewn to the satisfaction of their Lordships how this objection meets or gets rid of the large body of evidence which goes to prove that Ma Ye called both girls her daughters, and told people they were her daughters, while Ma Yes conduct towards the appellant completely accorded with the truth of the statements thus ascribed to her. It seems probable that the true solution of the question as to the time of adoption is the simple one adopted by the learned judge of first instance—that the father of the two speaks truly, and that the appellant was adopted in her early childhood; that Ma Ye let the natural mother have the girl much with her while young; that the appellants return to Ma Yes house on the death of her natural mother looked of itself like an adoption; but that her position as Ma Yes adopted daughter had existed all along. The vicissitudes of the appellants matrimonial affairs throw her life into strong contrast with the more steady and stay-at-home life of the respondent; but these circumstances cannot abate the result already brought- about, while in one view they render the more significant the intimacy which subsisted between the appellant and Ma Ye from the earliest days of the appellant down to the last moments of Ma Ye. The learned judges in the Chief Court of Lower Burma have discussed the evidence in much detail, some of their appreciations and discriminations being of a character more generally possible to the judge who heard and saw the witnesses. The learned judges in the Chief Court of Lower Burma have discussed the evidence in much detail, some of their appreciations and discriminations being of a character more generally possible to the judge who heard and saw the witnesses. But, towards the close of his judgment, Birks J. says " It is clear that the fact of adoption had been inferred from the conduct of Ma Ye to the plaintiff, and had Ma Me Gale " (the appellant) " been the only daughter of Ma Ku, I think the judge might have been justified in his inferences. The conduct of this kindly old couple may be easily explained by the fact that the two sisters were very fond of each other, and that they did not wish to make any difference of treatment apparent." This rather roundabout explanation is not to be found in the deposition of the respondent, who ought to have known, and is unsupported by the rest of the evidence. Nor does the learned judge furnish any satisfactory explanation of the body of testimony which explains this identity of treatment by Ma Yes own statements that both girls were hers. To say, as Fox J. has done, that these things took place long ago, and that the Burmese are proverbially inattentive and inexact, is an observation which hardly meets the circumstantial and unshaken evidence given by several persons on a point the importance of which was crucial, and on which cross-examination has failed of any substantial effect. Their Lordships are satisfied that the case was rightly decided by the judge of first instance, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be allowed, the judgment of the Chief Court of Lower Burma reversed with costs, and the judgment of the judge of the Court at Moulmein restored. The respondent will pay the costs of this appeal.