JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. In view of the facts which have been established in evidence, the decree of the lower appellate Court, confirming the decree of the Court of first instance, cannot, in our opinion, be supported. The plaintiffs in the double capacity of mortgagees and proprietors claimed to be entitled to possession of a shop situate in the town of Kasganj. The shop belonged to one Changa Mal, who on the 10th of February, 1839, sold it to two persons, viz Londa Mal and Chhote Lal. They on the 16th of February, 1839, executed a usufructuary mortgage of the property in favour of the predecessors in title of the plaintiffs, and on the same day the predecessors in title of the plaintiffs executed a lease in favour of their mortgagors for a definite term of 10 months, reserving a monthly rent of Rs. 2-8-0. The claim, which has now been put forward on behalf of the representatives of the mortgagees, is made after the lapse of a period of over 60 years. In the Court of first instance an attempt was made by them to prove the payment of rent after the expiration of the term of the lease. But this attempt failed, and the decision of the Court of first instance upon this question was not challenged in the lower appellate Court. Consequently we have it that from the end of the year 1839, up to the present time no rent whatever has been paid on foot of any tenancy of the property in question. We have further no evidence whatever to establish that the defendants or their predecessors in title who had been in possession of the property from 1839 were in such possession with the assent of the predecessors in title of the plaintiffs in such a way as to constitute a tenancy within the provisions of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. If there were any evidence from which the Court could draw the inference that a new tenancy was created after the expiration of this former tenancy, the Court would possibly be in a position to come to the conclusion that such a tenancy was created. 2. If there were any evidence from which the Court could draw the inference that a new tenancy was created after the expiration of this former tenancy, the Court would possibly be in a position to come to the conclusion that such a tenancy was created. 2. But in the absence of all evidence to enable us to draw any such inference, we must hold that the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties determined some time at the end of the year 1839. The defendants-appellants have had therefore adverse possession of the shop in dispute for a period of upwards of 60 years. This being so, the suit of the plaintiffs was obviously statute barred. It is said, however, that as mortgagees of the property, they are entitled to recover the portion of the property which was included in their mortgage. The answer to this contention is that upwards of 60 years before the institution of the suit the term of the mortgage had expired. Therefore the claim of the plaintiffs as mortgagees must likewise fail. For these reasons we hold that the decrees of the Court below are erroneous, and we must set them aside. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower Courts, and direct that the plaintiffs suit stand dismissed with costs in all Courts.