Judgement Appeal by special leave from an order of the Governor of Madras in Council (May 2, 1902) affirming an order of the Court of the Governors Agent at Vizagapatam (Dec. 8, 1900) rejecting the appellants plaint. The appellant is the zemindar of Jeypore, which is situated within what is called " the agency tract " of the district of Vizagapatam, and the zemindari is a scheduled district under the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 (being Act XIV. of 1874 of the Governor-Generals Council). Before the passing of the Indian Act (XXIV. of 1839), intituled " An Act for the Administration of Justice and Collection of Revenue in certain parts of the district of Ganjam and Vizagapatam," the ordinary regulations for the administration of civil and criminal justice prevailed in the agency tract. Sect. 2 of that Act enacted 11 that from and after the said 1st day of December, 1839, the operation of the rules for the administration of civil and criminal justice, as well as those for the collection of the revenue, shall Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 45 ( 1904- 1905) Maharajah of Jeypore V. Gunapuram Deenabandhu Patnaick 143 cease to have effect, except as hereinafter mentioned, within the under mentioned tracts of country at present included in the districts of Ganjam and Vizagapatam." By s. 3 of the Act it was enacted " that the administration of civil and criminal justice (including the superintendence of the police), and the collection and superintendence of the revenues of every description, within the tracts of country specified in the foregoing section, which are now included in the district of Ganjam, shall be vested in the Collector of Ganjam, and those which are now included in the district of Vizagapatam in the Collector of Vizagapatam, and shall be exercised by them respectively as agents to the Governor of Fort St. George." And s. 4 enacted " that it shall be competent to the Governor in Council of Fort St. George." And s. 4 enacted " that it shall be competent to the Governor in Council of Fort St. George by an Order in Council to prescribe such rules as he may deem proper for the guidance of such agents, and of all the officers subordinate to their control and authority, and to determine to what extent the decision of the agents in civil suits shall be final, and in what suits an appeal shall lie to the Sadr Adalat, and to define the authority to be exercised by the agents in criminal trials, and what cases he shall submit to the decision of the Fouzdary Adalat." In pursuance of the authority thus vested in him, the Governor of Madras from time to time framed rules, of which Rule X., clause 2, is as follows " Suits exceeding Rs.5000 in value shall be instituted in the Court of the Agent, who may, however, when he thinks proper, refer any such suit for the decision of the Divisional Assistant." Rule XII. lays down the procedure to be adopted on the trial of civil suits, which is substantially the same as that provided by the Civil Procedure Code then in force. Rules XX. and XXI. provide for appeals against original decrees in certain cases. And Rule XXII. was as follows " From decrees of the agent in suits wherein the landed possession of a zemindar, bissoye, or other feudal hill chief may have formed the subject of litigation, an appeal will lie to the Governor in Council alone, who may refer any such appeal for the decision of the Sadar Court, provided that the decree of the latter Court shall not be carried into execution without the permission of the Governor in Council." In July, 1892, a suit (No. 1 of 1892) was instituted on behalf of the appellant, then a minor, in the Court of the Agent to the Governor in Vizagapatam, for the purpose of resuming possession of three Jerayathi villages called Lakshmi Puram, Biridi, and China Biridi, situate in Gunupur Thana, included in the zemindari assets of the appellants zemindari of Jeypore, on the allegation that they had been given to the then defendants ancestors by the appellants ancestors, assessed with an annual kattubadi of Rs. 13 for rendering services as mazumdars in the Thana Office of Gunupur, and in order that they might enjoy the revenues of the villages in lieu of cash salaries, and that the then defendants had discontinued and refused to perform the said services. The defendants applied to the High Court at Madras to transfer the case from the Court of the Governors Agent to some other Court; and, both parties consenting, the transfer was ordered under, s. 15 of the Act 24 & 25 Viet. c. 104, to the file of the District Court of Vizagapatam. The District Court dismissed the suit on December 1, 1893, and no further steps were taken therein. In 1897 the appellant, after attaining his majority, brought similar suits in the Court of the Governors Agent in respect of other property within the ambit of his zemindari, and obtained decrees in his favour which were affirmed by a division bench of the High Court. On appeal from the division bench under s. 15 of the letters patent, the High Court decided on March 20, 1900, that it had no jurisdiction to transfer a suit from the Court of the Governors Agent to the District Court, that consent of parties made no difference, and that the agency rule No. XXII, was a valid one see Maharajah of Jeypore v. Papayyamma. (( 1900) Ind. L. R. 23 Madr. 329.) Shortly afterwards the appellant made an unsuccessful attempt to get the District Court to review its decree of December 1, 1893, and then presented his plaint in the present suit to the Court of the Governors Agent, contending that the decree of December 1, 1893, was made by a Court without jurisdiction, and therefore did not amount to res judicata, and that he was entitled to have his claim of Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 45 ( 1904- 1905) Maharajah of Jeypore V. Gunapuram Deenabandhu Patnaick 144 resumption tried on its merits in a Court competent to decide it. The Court referred the appellant to the High Court to rescind its own order of transfer, considering that itself had no authority to ignore it. Whether the District Court was competent or not, the High Court had held that it was. It rejected the plaint. The Governor in Council on appeal affirmed this order without hearing the appellant. The Court referred the appellant to the High Court to rescind its own order of transfer, considering that itself had no authority to ignore it. Whether the District Court was competent or not, the High Court had held that it was. It rejected the plaint. The Governor in Council on appeal affirmed this order without hearing the appellant. Its Chief Secretary issued an order (No. 637) rejecting the appeal, and afterwards an order (No. 851) informing the vakil that the Government would neither recon sider its order nor furnish reasons therefor, Finally, on a suggestion made by the Judicial Committee, and under the direction of the Secretary of State for India, the Governor in Council heard the appellants vakil in support of the appeal, and by an " Order No. 753a, Judicial, dated May 2, 1902," again rejected it. After setting out the facts and the arguments submitted by the appellants vakil, the order proceeded as follows— " The allegation of gross negligence on the part of the guardian can, in the circumstances of the case, carry little weight, seeing that for five years after the Maharajah came into charge of his estate no attempt was made on the ground of this negligence to obtain a rehearing of the case. With this exception, the arguments now put forward on behalf of the appellant are purely legal in character; in putting them ; forward the Maharajah relies on the view that the discretion which the Governor in Council exercises under s. 4 of Act XXIV. of 1839 is a judicial discretion—that is to say, that the present appeal should be treated in the same manner, and decided upon the same principles, as if it were heard in an ordinary Court of justice. "The Governor in Council is, however, unable to accept this view as to the manner of disposal of appeals from the Agency Courts. It is competent for the Governor in Council, under s. 4 of Act XXIV. of 1839, to prescribe rules for the guidance of his agents and of their subordinates, and these rules have been prescribed. When under Rule XXI. It is competent for the Governor in Council, under s. 4 of Act XXIV. of 1839, to prescribe rules for the guidance of his agents and of their subordinates, and these rules have been prescribed. When under Rule XXI. an appeal to the Sadr or High Court is open, that Court deals with it in the same manner as with appeals from other Courts subordinate to it, and it would, no doubt, similarly deal with appeals transferred to it by the Governor in Council under Rule XXII. But so far as the Governor in Council retains appellate jurisdiction there is nothing to shew that he is in any way fettered in the discharge thereof; the whole scope and purpose of the legislation governing the scheduled districts is to declare them as not included in or as removed from the operation of the general Acts and Regulations and the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts of Judicature, and to place control in all matters in the hands of the executive authorities, subject to the provisions of 33 & 34 Viet. c. 3. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that in respect of the class of cases of which the present is one, the Governor in Council shall apply to each the principles of equitable jurisprudence, and these only so far as political expediency permits. In these wild tracts the absolute rights of the individual—as evolved by civilized communities—are of small consequence compared with the maintenance of the peace and order that make for social progress. " The question then is, Is it equitable or expedient that the decision of the District Judge in 1893, passed after a thorough trial of the case, should by reason of a legal defect imported into the whole proceedings by the High Courts order of 1900 now be permitted to come again before the Courts? The Governor in Council is clearly of opinion that to the unsophisticated minds of the uncivilized tribes of the Vizagapatam Agency the idea that a cause, tried and determined so long ago, could or should now be reopened at the instance of the Maharajah of Jeypore would be regarded as a gross infraction of the natural justice which they do understand, and as truckling to the authority and resources which the Maharajah possesses. The result of compliance with the appellants request would be to diminish the confidence of these hill tribes in the power and desire of Government to protect them and to do justice, and thus to create a political danger which there is absolutely no reason to incur." W. C. Bonnerjee and K. W. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that this order was wrong and Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 45 ( 1904- 1905) Maharajah of Jeypore V. Gunapuram Deenabandhu Patnaick 145 should be set aside, and the case remitted to the Court of the Governors Agent to admit and register the plaint as of the date when the same was presented him. It was contended that the view which the Governor in Council had taken of Act XXIV. of 1839 and of the rules made thereunder was erroneous. He was bound in hearing appeals to act on judicial and legal principles and not arbitrarily, and was not entitled to base his decision on grounds of political expediency as stated in his order. His discretion where it exists must be exercised according to judicial principles. The former suit was coram non judice, and therefore the decree of December 1, 1893, was a nullity, and was decided so to be on March 20, 1900, and the present plaint could not be rejected under s. 54, clause (c), of the Civil Procedure Code as barred by any positive rule of law; and see Act XV. of 1877, s. 14. Reference was made to 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, s. 3, and Safford and Wheelers Privy Council Practice, pp. 32, 769, Reg. v. Bertrand (( 1867) L. R. 1 P. C. 520.), and Pakala Balakristnama Patrulu v. Sree Naraina Mardaraz Devu. (( 1864) 10 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 60.) The respondents did not appear. Dec. 19. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by THE LORD CHANCELLOR. This is an appeal by the Maharajah of Jeypore against the decision of the Governor of Madras in Council rejecting the claim of the Maharajah to have his suit determined under circumstances that may be shortly stated. In the year 1892 a suit was instituted in the Court of the Agent to the Governor at Vizagapatam on behalf of the Maharajah, then a minor, for the purpose of establishing his right to resume possession of certain villages. In the year 1892 a suit was instituted in the Court of the Agent to the Governor at Vizagapatam on behalf of the Maharajah, then a minor, for the purpose of establishing his right to resume possession of certain villages. On March 23, 1893, the defendants applied to the High Court of Madras for an order that the said suit should be removed from the Court of the Agent and transferred to some other Court, and, no opposition being made to such application by the parties who represented the plaintiff, an order was made transferring the suit to the District Court of Vizagapatam. The suit then became original suit No. 4 of 1893 on the file of that Court, and on December 1, 1893, the said Court gave judgment dismissing the suit, on the ground that no sufficient evidence had been given to establish the plaintiffs case, and that judgment was not appealed from. On March 29, 1900, the High Court of Madras decided that it had no jurisdiction to order the transfer of a suit from the Court of the Governors Agent to the District Court of Vizagapatam, and that the consent of the parties to the transfer could not cure that defect of jurisdiction. On October 27, 1900, the Maharajah presented his plaint to the Court of the Governors Agent against the present respondents for the same cause of action as was alleged in the former suit, stating the grounds on which he contended that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the suit, and that the decision itself was a nullity. The plaint was rejected on December 8, 1900, apparently on the ground that the decision upon the former suit precluded any further proceeding upon the same cause of action. From this an appeal was presented to the Governor in Council, who rejected the appeal on the ground that it would be inexpedient, and would set a bad example and encourage a multitude of suits for the same cause of action. Their Lordships are of opinion that the former decision of a Court adjudged by the High Court to be without jurisdiction cannot be treated as res judicata against the claim of the Maharajah to have his rights decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction, and that the decision of the Governor in Council, affirming the decision of the District Court, cannot be supported. The legal right to bring a suit, and to have it determined by the proper Court created for the purpose of determining such suits, cannot be barred upon the considerations of policy or expediency which are urged by the judgment under appeal. Their Lordships have already humbly reported to His Majesty as their opinion that the appeal ought to Law. Rep. 32 Ind. App. 45 ( 1904- 1905) Maharajah of Jeypore V. Gunapuram Deenabandhu Patnaick 146 be allowed and consequential directions given, but their Lordships reserved their reasons, and also the question of the costs, as to which the parties were to be at liberty to apply to their Lordships for directions. Mr. Bonnerjee, who appears for the appellant, now asks their Lordships to direct that the costs both here and below be costs in the cause, and their Lordships direct accordingly. In the meantime the money deposited by the appellant in the Privy Council Office as security for costs should be repaid to him.