JUDGMENT 1. This rule was granted to show cause why the sentence passed upon the Petitioners under sec. 342, I. P. C., should not be set aside. These persons were charged with offences under secs. 147 and 342, I. P. C. The common object of the unlawful assembly said to have been formed was, as stated in the charge-sheet, the wrongful confinement of Shahazada Singh, the complainant, on a false charge of theft. And, so far as the charge under sec. 342 is concerned, it is stated that the accused wrongfully confined Shahazada, and thereby committed an offence under that section. The Petitioner's have been convicted and sentenced under sec. 147, I. P. C., and the question before us is whether they could be separately sentenced under sec. 342, I. P. C. The Magistrate in his explanation states that because Shahazada, the complainant, was not taken over to the thana on a charge of theft within a short space of time, but that about four hours and-a-half elapsed before the parties reached the thana, the wrongful confinement was a separate offence altogether from the offence under sec. 147, I. P. C., such as would entitle him to pass a separate sentence for that offence. Looking at the transactions as they occurred, it seems to us that the whole was an entire transaction, beginning from the time when Shahazada was seized, and ending with his being put into the hands of the Police on a charge of theft. Wrongful confinement was, as we have already indicated, the common object of the unlawful assembly, and that was the essential ingredient in the constitution of the offence under sec. 147, I. P. C. That being so, we think that, having regard to the provisions of sec. 71, I. P. C., and the principle which underlies the decision of this Court in the case of Ramdihal v. Empress 3 C. W. N. 174 (1898), no separate sentence under sec. 342, I. P. C., ought to have been passed. We accordingly set aside the sentence under that section.