JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. A question of some interest and novelty is involved in this appeal. It is whether the natural mother of a son who has been adopted into another branch of a family under the form of adoption known as the dwyamushyayana, retains her status and rights as natural mother so as to be capable of inheriting the property of her son who has been so adopted, in the absence of nearer heirs. Whether, In fact, a Hindu who has been adopted in this form of adoption can, according to Hindu law, have two mothers, as he certainly can have two fathers. The question arises under the following circumstances: Naubat Ram, the grandson of one Basti Ram, prior to his death, adopted one Ragbunandan when an infant under the dwyamushyayana form of adoption, and afterwards died on the 26th of February, 1867, leaving his widow, Rani Ganesh, Kunwar, and his adopted son surviving him. After his death Ganesh Kunwar took possession of his property, including a share in a village called Himmatpur and the entire of another village called Lohar Nagla, which are the subject-matter of the present litigation. Raghunandan died without issue shortly afterwards, leaving a widow, Naraini Kunwar, who on the death of Rani Ganesh Kunwar on the 7th of August, 1878, was recorded as owner of the property. Naraini Kunwar died on the 24th of November, 1893, and thereupon Chandi Din, the sister's son of Naubat Ram, claimed to be entitled to the property of Naubat Ram, Debi Sahai was his adopted son, and he sold the property to the plaintiff Behari Lal. The defendants, Shib Lal and others, who had no legal claim whatever to the property, instituted a suit against Naraini Kunwar claiming to be the sagotra sapindas of Naubat Ram, A compromise was entered into and under it Shib Lal obtained possession of the property now in dispute. We append a genealogical tree of the family. 2. The plaintiffs claim is by purchase from Debi Sahai, the adopted son of Chandi Din, and his case is that Chandi Din succeeded as a bandhu to the property of Naubat Ram on the death of Naraini Kunwar on the 24th of November, 1893. We append a genealogical tree of the family. 2. The plaintiffs claim is by purchase from Debi Sahai, the adopted son of Chandi Din, and his case is that Chandi Din succeeded as a bandhu to the property of Naubat Ram on the death of Naraini Kunwar on the 24th of November, 1893. The case of the defendant, Shib Lal is that the adoption of Raghunandan Prasad being in the dwyamushyayana form his connection with his natural family was never severed, and consequently on the death of his wife Naraini Kunwar, his natural mother, Badam Kunwar, became entitled to his property as his heir, and, she being alive, the plaintiff has no present title to possession. It is admitted that but for the form of the adoption of Raghunandan, the defendant Debi Sahai would be next in succession after Naraini Kunwar. The defendant, Shib Lal, however, contends that having regard to the form of adoption of Raghunandan Prasad, his mother, Badam Kunwar never lost her rights as his natural mother to succeed to his property, and that consequently the plaintiff has failed to establish his title. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge acceded to this contention and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. He held that so long as Musammat Badam Kunwar was alive, a bandhu of Raghunandan Prasad through his adoptive parents, has no right to possession of the property. This was the only point decided in the Court below. 4. The evidence establishes that at the time of adoption it was agreed between the natural and the adoptive father that Raghunandan Prasad should remain the son both of them, namely the natural father and the adoptive father. It was also proved that all the ceremonies held in connection with Raghunandan Prasad, such as tonsure, investiture of the sacred thread, marriage and sradh, were performed by Naubat Ram, and that none of them were performed by his natural father. 5. The argument of the learned advocate for the appellant based upon this was that inasmuch as none of the initiatory ceremonies were performed by the natural father of Raghunandan, his connection with his natural family was severed, save that he continued to be the son of his natural father for the purpose of inheriting his property and performing his obsequies. The argument of the learned advocate for the appellant based upon this was that inasmuch as none of the initiatory ceremonies were performed by the natural father of Raghunandan, his connection with his natural family was severed, save that he continued to be the son of his natural father for the purpose of inheriting his property and performing his obsequies. That in other respects the relations with his own family were severed, and that he could not transmit the property which the might inherit from his natural father to any member of the family of that father. A passage from the Dattaka Mimansa, a work of high authority, is cited in support of this contention, but it does not appear to us to do so. It is article 41, section 6, of that treatise, which describes the two forms of dwyamushyayana adoption, one called the nitya or absolute form the other anitya or incomplete form. This article runs as follows: “Accordingly, sons given and the rest (who are sons of two fathers) are of two descriptions, those absolutely sons of two fathers and those incompletely so of these those are named absolute dwya-mushyayana who are given in adoption with this stipulation—‘this is son of us two’ (the natural father, and adopter). The incomplete dwyamushyayana are those who are initiated by their natural father in ceremonies ending with that of tonsure, and by the adoptive father, in those commencing with the investiture of the characteristic thread; since they are initiated under the family names of both even they are sons of two fathers, but incompletely so. Should a child, directly on being born, be adopted, as his initiation under both family names would be wanting, he would partake only of the family of the adopter.” The learned advocate for the appellant asks us to read the last sentence in connection with and as qualifying the earlier portion of the article which treats of the absolute form of adoption, and, to hold that Raghunandan Prasad was adopted in the incomplete form, and that his relationship with his natural parents was on adoption so severed that he could not transmit any right of succession to his natural mother. We are unable to follow him in this. We are unable to follow him in this. It appears to us that an adoption in the absolute form depends upon and has its efficacy in the stipulation entered into at the time of adoption between the natural father and the adoptive father and does not depend upon the performance of any initiatory ceremony by the natural father. 6. In the Dattaka Chandiika, a treatise on adoption, also an authority, the author, treating of this question, writes: “Relative to the subject in question (it is to be observed that) should an agreement subsist, stipulating that the son adopted should be son of the natural father and the adopter likewise, a special rule for bis participating in the family of both by reason of being a dwyamushyayana will be declared.” (Article 24, section 2.) In the synopsis to the work edited by Whitley Stokes on the law of adoption, at page 669, the special rules regarding the dwyamushyayana are given as follows: The adopted-son may retain filial relation to his natural father, in which case he is called a dwyamushyayana or son of two fathers. This double filial relation proceeds from the special agreement between the adoptive and natural father at the time of adoption or may exist without such agreement, as mostly if not always, in the case of the kritrima adopted son who is not alienated by his natural father. In the first case such son is denominated a complete (nitya); in the second, an incomplete (anitya) dwyamushyayana. The adopted son, who is the son of two fathers, inherits the estate and performs the obsequies of both fathers, but the relation of his issue (except in the case of kritrima son as usually affiliated in the Mithila country) obtains exclusively in the family of the adoptive father.” 7. That the adoption in the absolute form depends upon the stir pulation of the natural and the adoptive father is the view taken by Mr. Macnagbten in his work on Hindu Law. That the adoption in the absolute form depends upon the stir pulation of the natural and the adoptive father is the view taken by Mr. Macnagbten in his work on Hindu Law. He says, at page 71, volume I of his work: “There is a peculiar species of adoption termed dwyamushyayana where the adopted son still continues a member of his own family and partakes of the estate both of his natural and adopting father, and so inheriting is liable for the debts of each To this form of adoption the prohibition as to the gift of an only son does not apply. It may take place either by special agreement that the boy shall continue son of both fathers when the son adopted is termed nitya dwyamushyayana or otherwise when the ceremony of tonsure may have been performed in his natural family, when he is designated anitya dwyamushyayana, and in this latter case connection between the adopting and the adopted parties endure only during the life-time of the adopted. His children revert to their natural family.” 8. Sir Thomas Strange in his work on Hindu Law puts the matter very clearly. He says at Page 123, Volume II: “The result is that nitya data is a son adopted from the same gotra before or after the ceremony of the tonsure; or a son adopted from a different gotra before the tonsure; anitya data is a son adopted from a different gotra after he had received the tonsure in his natural gotra. The performance of the tonsure is the cause of the temporary nature of the latter species of adoption.” 9. The adoption in the absolute form may, according to this take place at any time before the ceremony of the tonsure, and go far as appears before any initiatory ceremony has been performed. It is by the gift that the relation of the son with his natural family is severed, and that the right of the son in the estate of the giver ceases. It is by the gift that the relation of the son with his natural family is severed, and that the right of the son in the estate of the giver ceases. This appears from article 19, section 2 of the Dattaka Chandrika, which explains the text of Manu as follows: “It is declared by this that through the extinction of his filial relation from gift alone, the property of the son given in the estate of the giver ceases, and his relation to the family of that person is annulled.” It seems to follow from this that if the gift is a qualified gift as it is in the case of an adoption in the absolute dwyamushyayana form, the son, who is so adopted, does not cease to have filial relation with his natural parents, nor is his relation generally with the family of his natural parents severed. 10. In the case before us the gift was a qualified gift. The son was given and accepted in the adoption upon the clear stipulation that he should continue the son of his natural father, and hence that his relations with the family of his natural father should not be severed. This being so, we know of no authority, as none has been cited to us for holding that a son so adopted is disqualified from transmitting his property to his heirs on the side of his natural father. It appears to us that as his relations with his natural parents have not been severed, the rights of such parents to participate in his property continue unimpaired. The mother occupies a higher position in regard to succession to her son than that of bandhus or sapindas her claim being placed on the ground of consanguinity and of the merit she possesses from having conceived and given birth to her son. For the foregoing reason we are of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge is correct, and that the appeal must fail. We dismiss it with costs.