JUDGMENT : Banerji, J. This appeal arises out of a suit for pre-emption brought in respect of a sale made on the 2nd of August, 1899. The suit was brought on the 23rd of September, 1902. The Court of first instance dismissed it holding that it was time-barred under article 10 of the 2nd Schedule to the limitation Act. The lower appellate Court has set aside that decree and remanded the case under section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. From this order of; remand this appeal has been brought. The question which we have to determine is whether article 10 governs the suit, or article 120 which the lower appellate court has applied. If the claim for pre-emption is a claim in respect of a sale, which it undoubtedly is, then the only article applicable is article 10, and as the property sold in this case is not capable of physical possession, the limitation must be computed from the date of the registration of the sale deed. The suit having been brought after the expiry of the period of one year, prescribed by that article, this claim would be time barred. 2. Let us see whether this case can be excluded from the operation of article 10. It appears that in the sale deed, the property now claimed, which is a share in a patti called patti sabz, was described as a share in patti zard which did not belong to the vendor. A suit was brought by the vendee for possession of the share which, he alleged, had been sold to him, namely, the share in patti sabs. In this suit a compromise was entered into and a decree was passed in the terms of the compromise, awarding possession to the vendee over the share now claimed. The plaintiff in this suit must be deemed to have based his claim either upon the sale of 1899, or upon the decree passed in the suit to which we have referred. It has been held in Abdur Razzak v. Mumtaz Husam, [1903] I.L.R. 125 All, 334 that a right of pre-emption does not arise upon a transfer effected by virtue of a decree, and that there must be a person acquiring property by a contractual relation. Therefore the plaintiff cannot claim pre emption upon the basis of the decree passed in the suit brought by the vendee. Therefore the plaintiff cannot claim pre emption upon the basis of the decree passed in the suit brought by the vendee. If this claim is as it undoubtedly is based upon the sale, it is clearly time-barred. The court or first instance was therefore right. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the court of first instance, with costs in all courts.