JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. The decision of this appeal appears to us to be concluded by the ruling to their Lordships of the Privy Council, The suit was brought by the plaintiff Banarsi Das who is the son of one Behari Lal, to have it declared that the plaintiff's share in the property which was purchased by defendants in execution of a decree obtained against the plaintiff's father and uncle, was not liable to sale under that decree. One Madho Prasad, who was possessed of considerable property, died on the 15th March, 1885, heavily in debt. Shortly after his death Raghubar Dayal and Behari Lal entered into an agreement with the widow of the deceased Madho Prasad, and other members of the family, whereby they undertook to pay of his debts, provided they were placed in possession of the property and in receipt of the rent and profits for a period of nine years. Under the agreement, Raghubar Dayal and Behari Lal obtained possession of the property and satisfied the debts of Madho Prasad. On the expiry of the term of nine years, however, they declined to give up possession, and in consequence, Musammat Dhap Kuar, the widow of the deceased Madho Prasad, instituted a suit for recovery of possession of the property, for mesne profits and costs. The suit was decreed, and possession was restored to her. Then in execution of her decree for mesne profits and costs she caused a portion of the property of the judgment-debtors to be put up for sale, and this property was purchased by defendants appellants, and the sale was confirmed on the 24th September, 1901, prior to that, namely on the 17th May, 1901, the plaintiff in the present suit, Banarsi Das, instituted this suit to have it declared, that his interest in the property, which had been so sold, ought to be exempted from the sale on the ground that he was not impleaded by Musammat Dhap Kuar in her suit, and the debt in respect of which the sale was held was illegal. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to us to have misconceived the facts and misapplied the law on the subject. He says in the course of his, judgment; “In fact the position of Raghubar Dayal and Behari Lal was that of sureties who undertook to satisfy the debt due by Madho Prasad's estate. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to us to have misconceived the facts and misapplied the law on the subject. He says in the course of his, judgment; “In fact the position of Raghubar Dayal and Behari Lal was that of sureties who undertook to satisfy the debt due by Madho Prasad's estate. For this debt the plaintiff cannot be liable.” The defendants, judgment-debtors, were not sureties for the debt. They themselves having withheld possession of the property from the rightful owners were as principals, and not sureties, held liable to pay mesne profits or damages for the time during which they held possession, and also costs. The debt therefore was a personal debt of each of those parties and not a debt for which they were merely sureties. This is apparent from the statement of facts by the learned Subordinate Judge, and we fail to understand how he fell into this error of regarding Raghubar Dayal and Behari Lal as sureties merely. Now the debt being a personal debt of Behari Lal, his son, Banarsi Das was clearly liable to satisfy it unless he was in a position to establish that it was tainted with immorality. The law upon this question is clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Suraj Bansi Koer vs. Sheo Prasad Singh, [1880] L.R., 61. A, 88; S.C. I.L.R., 5 Cal., 148, in the following passage at page 106: “Where joint ancestral property has passed out of a joint family either under a conveyance executed by a father in consideration of an antecedent debt, or in order to raise money to pay off an antecedent debt, or under a sale in execution of a decree for the father's debt his sons, by reason of their duty to pay their father's debts, cannot recover that property, unless they show that the debts were contracted for immoral purposes, and that the purchasers had notice that they were so contracted.” 2. The law on the question is thus clearly laid down, and there can be no mistake as to the meaning of the language. To the same effect is the judgment of their Lordships in the case of Nanomi Babuasin v. Madhun Mohun, [1886] L.R. 13 I.A., 13; S.C., I.L.R. 13 Cal., 21. The law on the question is thus clearly laid down, and there can be no mistake as to the meaning of the language. To the same effect is the judgment of their Lordships in the case of Nanomi Babuasin v. Madhun Mohun, [1886] L.R. 13 I.A., 13; S.C., I.L.R. 13 Cal., 21. But it is said by the learned counsel for the respondent that the debt in this case in respect of which the execution proceedings were taken out by Musammat Dhap Kuar was an immoral debt, that is, that it was a debt which arose out of the tortious or wrongful act of the judgment-debtors in with holding possession of the plaintiffs property. 3. The answer to this is that the debt in the case to which we have last referred was a debt of similar nature. The decree in that case was for possession with mesne profits, interest and costs, just as was Musammat Dhap Kuar's decree in the present case. These cases it appears to us, conclude the decision of the present appeal. We therefore allow the appeals-set aside the decree of the lower Court, and direct that the plaintiffs claim do stand dismissed with costs in all Courts.