JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. Of the grounds of appeal mentioned in the memorandum of appeal, two only have been pressed in argument before us. The others have been abandoned, The two points which have been pressed are—(1) that the suit is barred by limitation, and (2) that the Municipality are not responsible for the wrongful acts of their Secretary. The suit was brought by the plaintiff for damages for an alleged illegal distress. The circumstances being shortly as follows:— In July, 1898, the Municipal Board of Mussoorie, acting under rule 54 of their bye-laws published a list of houses within the limits of the Municipality, and the assessments made in respect of those houses for the purpose of calculating house-tax. According to this assessment, the value of the plaintiff's house was increased by a sum of Rs. 200, namely, from, Rs. 1,000, at which it has been valued previously, to Rs. 12,000, the value stated in the assessment. Notice of this assessment was duly published on the 28th of July, 1898, and thereupon Mr. Goodall, the plaintiff appealed against the assessment to the Board. The appeal was rejected. Subsequently, on the 23rd of August, 1898, Mr. Keating, the Secretary of the Board, applied by letter to Mr. Goodall for payment of the sum of Rs. 60-12-0 which he claimed as house-tax due for the year 1898-99, in the latter inaccurately stated to be 1897-98. It is admitted, by the Secretary that the sum claimed was in excess of the sum due by twelve annas. In reply to this demand for payment Mr. Goodall wrote to the Secretary, and requested him to let him know by what process of calculation he had arrived at the conclusion that Rs. 60-12-0 represented the tax due by him. In reply to this letter the Secretary wrote to say that “the amount of Rs. 60-12-0 represented 1/10 allowed to the tenant at 3 per cent, for furniture only, and on the balance at 1/6 and ½ per cent, to the owner.” This has reference to some statement which is allowed for furniture, but it is not altogether intelligible, and has not been fully explained to us. Nothing turns upon it. Mr. Goodall shortly afterwards sent a cheque for a sum of Rs. 47-80 in satisfaction of the claim of the Board against him in respect of the house-tax. Nothing turns upon it. Mr. Goodall shortly afterwards sent a cheque for a sum of Rs. 47-80 in satisfaction of the claim of the Board against him in respect of the house-tax. The Board did not accept the amount so paid in full satisfaction, but sent a receipt for it as in part payment. To this Mr. Goodall objected, expressly informing the Board by letter that if the cheque was kept he would consider that the Board had accepted the amount in full payment of the claim against him. There were two courses open to the Board on receipt of this cheque, namely, either to accept it on the terms on which it was offered in full satisfaction of the claim against the plaintiff, or to return it. They adopted neither course. They kept the cheque and cashed it. But they did not absolve Mr. Goodall from liability in respect of the balance said to be due from him, for we find that on the 21st of December, 1898, a peremptory notice was sent to Mr. Goodall, informing him that un-less the balance of the bill was paid within seven days from date, a warrant of distress would be issued. Mr. Goodall was surprised at the receipt of this notice, and he at once replied to the Secretary of the Board and pointed out the illegality of the act which they were contemplating and cautioning them very plainly that, Whilst he would offer no opposition to the distraint, he would claim heavy damages against the Board if it levied any distress upon his property. It appears that Mr. Goodall made a recalculation of the amount due by him and found that the sum which he had paid was deficient by Rs. 2-8-0, and this sum he sent to the Board, and it was accepted by them. Shortly afterwards, namely on the 21st of March, 1889, a warrant was obtained from a Magistrate according to the provisions of section 46 of Act No. XV of 1883. In granting in this warrant, the Magistrate acted in a purely ministerial capacity, vide, M.J. Powell vs. The Municipal Board of Mussoorie, [1900] I.L.R., 22 All., 123. This warrant was issued for the sum of Rs. 21-14-9, which was obviously in excess of the balance said to be due when the first demand for payment was made. In granting in this warrant, the Magistrate acted in a purely ministerial capacity, vide, M.J. Powell vs. The Municipal Board of Mussoorie, [1900] I.L.R., 22 All., 123. This warrant was issued for the sum of Rs. 21-14-9, which was obviously in excess of the balance said to be due when the first demand for payment was made. The sum actually due, according to the notice given to the plaintiff was only Rs. 10. But it appears, that the Secretary, on examining the accounts of the plaintiff, found that some arrears were due and he added those arrears to the claim in respect of the tax for 1898-99, and so the warrant for the larger sum issued, A seizure was made and some furniture of the plaintiff was sold, and the amount mentioned in the warrant was realised. The present suit for damages for alleged illegal distress was instituted on the 15th February, 1900. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion upon the evidence that the distress was illegal, and that the Board were clearly responsible for it and gave a decree for the sum of Rs. 500 damages. He found that the warrant had been obtained by misrepresentation and maliciously and not under a bona fide belief that the amount claimed was really due. In the course of his judgment he says that the defendants entirely failed to show that the plaintiff was indebted to them, that they had also failed to show that they had passed any resolution that a warrant should be issued, and that their Secretary took out a warrant illegally and without any justification. Upon these findings he came to the conclusion that in point of law the Board was responsible for the acts of their Secretary. Now it is admitted by the learned Government Advocate who has presented the case on behalf of the appellants with his usual clearness and force, that the issue of the warrant of distress was unjustifiable, inasmuch as the plaintiff had paid to the Board all that he considered due to them under the circumstances which we have described, and the Board had accepted the sum so paid. This is clearly correct, and it has been properly admitted that the issue of the warrant was illegal and indefensible. This is clearly correct, and it has been properly admitted that the issue of the warrant was illegal and indefensible. He, however, rests the success of the appeal upon two points—(1) that the suit is barred by limitation, and (2) that the Municipal Board are not responsible for acts of their Secretary which were found by the Court below to have been malicious acts on his part. We should take the question of limitation first. The contention is that article 2 of schedule II of the Indian Limitation Act (Act No. XV of 1877) is the article applicable to this case. That article provides a period of limitation for a suit for compensation for the doing or omitting to do an act in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in British India. The period provided by the article Is 90 days from the time when the act or omission takes place. There appears to be little doubt but that an act such as the issuing of the distress warrant in the present case would fall within the wide and general terms of this article. In fact, it is difficult to see what act or omission done in pursuance of any enactment would not come within its terms. We find, however, that article 28 expressly provides a period of limitation for the case of illegal distress. It prescribes a period of one year for a suit “for compensation for an illegal, irregular, or excessive distress.” Now is this the article which governs the present case, the suit having been brought on the 15th of February, 1900, was clearly within time. If, on the other hand, article 2 be applicable, the suit is barred. We have no hesitation whatever in holding that where the statute of limitation by an express article specifically provides a period of limitation for a suit in respect of an illegal distress, that article must be accepted as the governing article in such a case. The fact that another article framed in general terms, such as article. 2, is wide enough to embrace a suit for compensation for illegal distress cannot, we think, be allowed to effect the operation of the article which was expressly framed to meet the case of such a suit. The fact that another article framed in general terms, such as article. 2, is wide enough to embrace a suit for compensation for illegal distress cannot, we think, be allowed to effect the operation of the article which was expressly framed to meet the case of such a suit. If a suit like the present is govern-ed by article 2, then it follows that article 28 is not merely redundant but is also inconsistent with article 2. We think that the contention of the appellant in this case cannot be supported, and we hold with the learned District Judge that the suit was not barred. 2. The other ground of appeal is that the Municipality is not responsible for the distress made in this case. Reliance is placed upon the finding of the District Judge that the warrant was obtained by misrepresentation maliciously by the Secretary of the Board. We have carefully read the evidence which was adduced before the lower Court, and we are unable to find any thing to justify this finding. Mr. Goodall himself does not allege that there was any malice or spite on the part of Secretary. On the contrary, he seems to think that it was the members of the Board who acted maliciously. He says, “The reason why I think the defendants acted maliciously, was that they attached much more property than was necessary to satisfy their demand, and they never gave me any excess which they may have collect-ed; and there was no necessity to go into my house to attach the property as there were many things outside the house which might have been attached.” Again he says referring to a letter which he Had published in the Mofussilite newspaper of Mussoorie: “In consequence of my having written this letter (Exhibit 13) which is a cutting from the Mofussilite newspaper of Mussoorie, Mr. Streatfield, late Superintendent of the Dun and Chairman of the Municipality, took offence, and I believe that that was the reason of all the malicious proceedings against me.” There is nothing in the evidence of Mr. Goodall which leads one to suppose that he suspected that the Secretary was actuated by any improper motive in applying for the warrant of distress and distraining his goods. Mr. Keating, the Secretary, was examined, and he says that in the proceedings against the plaintiff, he acted under the order of Mr. Goodall which leads one to suppose that he suspected that the Secretary was actuated by any improper motive in applying for the warrant of distress and distraining his goods. Mr. Keating, the Secretary, was examined, and he says that in the proceedings against the plaintiff, he acted under the order of Mr. Streatfield. He says: “the order of Mr. Streatfield, dated 19th December, directed me to take out the distress warrant for the balance. The balance was Rs. 12-8-0” 3. Then he explains how it came that he obtained a warrant for the sum of Rs. 21-14-9, showing that he examined the accounts of the plaintiff from the year 1894, and that he found that the amount due for arrears and also for the tax of 1898-99, was Rs. 21-14-9, and that accordingly he applied for a warrant for that amount. Now this evidence discloses no spite or ill-feeling on the part of the Secretary; it shows that the Secretary in the bona fide execution of his duty, examined the accounts of the plaintiff carefully and applied for a warrant for the sum which, in his opinion, was justly due. There is nothing which discloses any bias on his part or any unfair or unreasonable conduct towards the plaintiff. We may observe that the warrant which was obtained for Rs. 21-14-9 was not executed, but another warrant was obtained for the sum of Rs. 19-6-9, credit being given for the sum of Rs. 2-8-9, which had been paid later on, as we have mentioned by the plaintiff. Now it is apparent that the warrant in question was obtained by the Secretary in the ordinary course of, his employment acting in the interest of the Board. It is also admitted that the Board adopted his act, and received the amount realised from the sale of the plaintiff's property. This being so, it seems to us idle to contend, as has been contended that by reason of the fact that there was no special resolution of the Board, authorising the Secretary to obtain a warrant, the Board was absolved from, the responsibility. It is abundantly clear that everything, which, was done by Mr. Keating in this transaction, was done by him in his capacity as Secretary of the Board and for the benefit of the Board. It is abundantly clear that everything, which, was done by Mr. Keating in this transaction, was done by him in his capacity as Secretary of the Board and for the benefit of the Board. It is well settled law that every principal is civilly liable for every intentional wrong committed by an agent in the ordinary-course of his employment and for the benefit of the principal even though the principal did not authorise it, and even if he had expressly forbidden it. So here we find nothing to relieve the Board of the Mussoorie Municipality from liability for the admittedly wrongful and illegal act of detraining the plaintiffs goods for a debt which had no existence. A case somewhat similar to the present is that of Smith vs. Birmingham and Staffordshire Gas Light Company, [1884] 1 Ab., and El., 526. In that case a person of the name of Lumley on behalf of the defendant Company seized and sold some articles belonging to one Smith for money due to the Company for gas. Lumley had no authority under seal to carry out the distraint. It was held notwithstanding that the Corporation was liable in tort for his tortuous act, even though he had not been appointed by sale, the distress being professedly committed under a statute for a debt due to the Corporation. It was also held in that case that the jury might infer the agency from an adoption of the act of Lumley by the corporation as from their having received the proceeds of the seizure. If authority were necessary, this authority appears to support the view which we entertained throughout the hearing of the arguments of tin's appeal. For these reasons we hold that the appeal must fail. We therefore dismiss it with costs.