JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. This is an appeal under section 10 of the Letters Patent, brought by the plaintiff in a suit to raise the amount due to him on foot of a mortgage of the 27th of November, 1895. The mortgage was executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff to secure a loan of Rs. 1,200 and interest at the rate of Rs. 1-8-0 per cent per mensem with compound interest, calculated with yearly rests. The loan was for a period of two years certain, but before the expiration of the two years, namely, on the 15th of June, 1897, apparently acting under the provisions of section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendants paid into Court a sum of Rs. 1,209-4-0 the amount alleged to be then due by them to the plaintiff for principle and interest. Notice of this payment was given to the plaintiff, but no steps were taken by him to withdraw the money nor was any objection taken to the deposit save as to the insufficiency of the sum so paid in. The defendants did not comply with the provisions of section 83. They deposited the money to the account of the mortgagee, but for some reason or other best known to themselves, they associated with the mortgagee one Baboo Gaur Hari Chakravarti. The Court of first instance in the suit which was brought by the plaintiff to raise the amount of the mortgage debt by sale of the mortgaged property, found that the payment into Court made by the defendants on the 15th June, 1897, was, having regard to the terms of the mortgage-deed, premature, and therefore not a payment within the meaning of section 83-Consequently he gave a decree for sale of the mortgaged-property, but inasmuch as the plaintiff after having received notice of the deposit delayed to take proceedings for the recovery of the debt, he came to the conclusion that he was not entitled to interest after the due date of the mortgage, namely, the 27th of November, 1897, and he for the same reason refused to give the plaintiff the costs of the suit. 2. Against this decree the plaintiff appealed, claiming, in the appeal to have interest up to the date of payment and also claiming the costs of the suit. No appeal was preferred by the defendants. 2. Against this decree the plaintiff appealed, claiming, in the appeal to have interest up to the date of payment and also claiming the costs of the suit. No appeal was preferred by the defendants. They acquiesced in the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the payment into Court was not valid, within the meaning of section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act. On appeal to the learned District Judge he came to the conclusion that the Court of first instance was wrong in holding that the payment into Court was premature; and having considered what sum was actually due on foot of the mortgage, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to interest or the costs of the suit, and dismissed the appeal. 3. No question, we may observe, was raised in that appeal in regard to the finding of the Court of first instance that the payment into Court was not a valid payment. Consequently the learned District Judge had no other course open to him but to dismiss the appeal. If the defendants had by a cross appeal questioned the propriety of the decision of the Court below, as regards the validity of the payment into Court, then the District Judge would have been bound to have dismissed the suit, inasmuch as he found that a sufficient sum had been paid into Court to the credit of the mortgagees under section 83. 4. From the decree of the District Judge an appeal was preferred to this Court when the matter was fully considered. The learned Judge before whom the appeal came, expressed the opinion that if in the appeal the propriety of the construction of the mortgage deed had been challenged, he should have found it difficult to adopt the interpretation put upon it by the learned District Judge, an interpretation which, he observed, was based on a wrong reading of the deed. But inasmuch as no ground of appeal was directed to this question, the learned Judge did not entertain it. As this was a question of law which had been discussed in the lower appellate Court, having been considered necessary for the due determination of the issues before that tribunal, we are disposed to think that the learned Judge of this Court might well have entertained it. As this was a question of law which had been discussed in the lower appellate Court, having been considered necessary for the due determination of the issues before that tribunal, we are disposed to think that the learned Judge of this Court might well have entertained it. We do not think, however, it necessary to go into this question inasmuch as there is another question which is fatal to the respondent's case. As we have pointed out, the money was deposited by the defendants not to the account of the mortgagee alone but to the account of the mortgagee and a person, who happens to be his pleader in the present suit. This payment was clearly not a payment within the meaning of section 83. Payment under section 83 must be a payment to the mortgagee alone so that the mortgagee may, on receipt of the notice of deposit, apply to the Court by petition”, and forthwith obtain payment without the concurrence or sanction.of any other person. The section confers on mortgagors an exceptional privilege which other debtors do not enjoy of paying the amount of their debt into Court and so relieving themselves of any further liability. An exceptional privilege of the kind, however, must not be abused; and a mortgagor who does not strictly observe the provisions of the section but makes a payment which involves the necessity of a decision by the Court as to the rights of parties other than the mortgagee, cannot be regarded as having made the payment within the, meaning of the section. The deposit in this case even if it were a good deposit in other respect, could not have been drawn out without the concurrence of or notice to the Vakil to whose credit it had been deposited jointly with the mortgagee. As then we are of opinion in this case that there has been no valid deposit under section 83; it appears to us that the plaintiff is clearly entitled to the amount of his mortgage debt together with interest after the due date up to the date of payment; and we think that the justifiable omission on his part to take any notice of such a deposit as was made in this case clearly does not disentitle him to interest or to his costs of the suit. We therefore allow this appeal set aside the decree of this Court and that of the lower appellate Court, and modify the decree of the Court of first instance by allowing the plaintiff interest at the stipulated rate up to the date of payment and also his costs of suit. The plaintiff will be entitled to the costs of this appeal and also in all courts. We extend the time for payment up to the 15th of April, 1904.