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1904 DIGILAW 40 (ALL)

Lalla Mal v. Kesho Mal

1904-03-12

BANERJI, STANLEY

body1904
JUDGMENT : Stanley, J. This suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, was brought by the plaintiffs-appellants for recovery of the sum of Rs. 1,000 and interest alleged to be due to them under the following circumstances. The defendants Nos. 46 carry on business at Agra, under the style of Tara Chand Chela Ram, and have a branch establishment at Bombay. They drew a Shahjog Hundi at Agra on the Bombay branch of their firm payable to the defendants 1-3. The payees endorsed the Hundi to the plaintiff who sent it to their” agent at Bombay, one Kashi Nath, for collection. It appears that Kashi Nath, before he was able to obtain payment of the Hundi, was seized with plague and died on 14th of March, 1898. The plaintiffs appear to have been early apprised of this fact, for we find that on the following day, the 15th of March, they went to the drawers of the Hundi and induced them to send a telegram to Bombay to stop the payment of the Hundi if it had not been already paid. The answer to this telegram was “Hundi received, not paid Rs. 1,000.” Therefore, on the 15th of March, the drawees were aware that the Hundi was not to be accepted or paid. Notwithstanding this, on the 16th of March, the defendant, Chunna Mal, in whose house Kashi Nath lived, got possession of the Hundi, without, as has been found, the authority of Kashi Nath, brought it to the office of the drawees and obtained payment. Under these circumstances the question is whether or not the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs for the amount so paid. Now it is to be observed that the Hundi is a Shahjog Hundi, not a Hundi payable to bearer but payable to a respectable holder. The court of first instance found in favour of the plaintiffs claim, and gave a decree accordingly. On appeal the learned the District Judge reversed the decision of the court below, and dismissed the suit. The District Judge appears to consider that a Shahjog Hundi stands in the same position as a Hundi payable to bearer. But this is clearly not so as has been held by a Bench of this Court in the unreported second appeal No. 422 of 1896 in which it was held that a Shahjog Hundi is only payable to a respectable holder. But this is clearly not so as has been held by a Bench of this Court in the unreported second appeal No. 422 of 1896 in which it was held that a Shahjog Hundi is only payable to a respectable holder. The same question came before one of us when sitting in the High Court at Calcutta in law upon the subject was discussed, at considerable length, and it was ruled in accordance with previous authorities that a Hundi payable to Shahjog is only payable to the respectable holder and is not the same as a Hundi payable to bearer. 2. This question however, is not of very much importance in deciding the present appeal, because we are clearly of opinion that in making the payment to Chunna Mal under the circumstances, the drawees failed to exercise any proper discretion and did not make payment in due course within the meaning of section of the Negotiable Instruments Act. On the contrary having had the notification contained in the telegram to which we have referred they ought to have exercised extreme caution in making payment if they made payment at all until they had received further instructions. In making the payment to Chunna Mal they acted negligently, not having any reasonable ground for believing that Chunna Mal was entitled to receive payment. We, therefore, must allow this appeal. The learned District Judge is wrong in supposing that the drawees would not have been justified under the the circumstances in refusing to pay to any person who came to them with the Hundi for payment. They were bound to see that the note was paid in due course as pointed out by us within the meaning of section to of the Negotiable Instruments Act. For these reasons we are of opinion that the view taken by the court of first instance was correct and therefore we allow the set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore the decree of the court of first instance. The defendants respondents must pay the costs of this appeal also the costs in the lower appellate court. The objection under section 561 necessarily fails and is dismissed with costs.