JUDGMENT : Knox, J. The appellants to this second appeal are prior mortgagees. A suit was brought by the respondent, who is a puisne mortgagee, for redemption of the prior mortgage. He sought to effect this by payment of Rs. 2,000. The court found that Rs. 4,577 was due on account of principal and that a further sum of Rs. 699 was due by plaintiff on account of costs. The whole amount thus due was Rs. 5,276. A decree was given in terms of section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, ordering that, upon the plaintiff paying to the defendant or into court this sum on a day fixed, the plaintiff was to have redemption of the property, but if such payment was not made, the property mortgaged was to be sold. The plaintiff failed to pay the sum thus fixed, and on the application of the appellants the property was sold and realised some Rs. 700 short of what had been Found due to the prior mortgagee. The appellants now seek to recover the balance by arrest of the respondent. The courts below have thrown but the application and the appellants come here in second appeal. The learned Vakil, who appears for them, failed to point out to us any words in the decree justifying the Order he asks for. The only penalty in the decree for non-payment of the mortgage money and costs was a sale of the property, and that has taken place. There are no words in the decree rendering the respondent personally liable. It is a remarkable circumstance that whilst section 93 provides for the sale realising more than the amount due, it makes no provision for the contingency of the sale” realising less. In a very able and ingenious argument the learned Vakil sought to show that the language of section 90 was wide enough to cover the present case. Even if the words “such sale” could be given the extended meaning asked for, there is the further difficulty of the word “defendant” which occurs in that section and which has been interpreted by this Court in Ram Lal v. Sil Chand, [1901] I.L.R. 23 All., 439, in a sense adverse to the present contention. 2. Even if the words “such sale” could be given the extended meaning asked for, there is the further difficulty of the word “defendant” which occurs in that section and which has been interpreted by this Court in Ram Lal v. Sil Chand, [1901] I.L.R. 23 All., 439, in a sense adverse to the present contention. 2. We regret that we are unable to help the appellants, but we think that they might have foreseen this difficulty, and have moved this Court to make an order rendering the respondent personally liable for the costs they incurred in answering him. 3. For the above reasons we dismiss this appeal, but under the circumstances we make no order as to costs.