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1904 DIGILAW 43 (CAL)

Kamal Narain Adhikari v. Raja Jotindra Mohan Roy

1904-03-01

body1904
JUDGMENT 1. In this case a rule was issued, calling upon the Magistrate of the District to show cause why the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Satkhira, dated the 18th February 1904, should not be set aside, on the ground that it is not warranted by law. The Sub-Divisional Officer in question has submitted an explanation, which has been read by us, and the learned pleader for the opposite party has placed the matter in dispute very fully before the Court. It appears that a petition was presented before the Sub-Divisional Officer by the opposite party the Raja of Nurnagar to obtain from the officer in question an order under sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in connection with certain idols, admittedly in the possession and custody of the Petitioners and located in the temple of which they have the charge The proceeding which was drawn up gives the substance of the application made to the Sub-Divisional Officer. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in connection with certain idols, admittedly in the possession and custody of the Petitioners and located in the temple of which they have the charge The proceeding which was drawn up gives the substance of the application made to the Sub-Divisional Officer. It runs as follows:--"Whereas it has been shown to me that you would not take the idols Gobinda Deb and Mahalaksi Thakurani kept with you for the performance of their sheba to Ramnagar to perform the dole of these idols on the occasion of the ensuing dole festival and that you have expressed a desire and are ready to perform the dole of the idols at Raipur or at some other place on taking those idols there, and that you are determined to commit a riot on the Raja of Ramnagar going to bring the aforesaid idols, according to the everlasting practice, you are hereby directed that on the occasion of the ensuing dolejatra festival you should according to the everlasting practice take, at the proper time before the dole Purnima, the aforesaid two idols Gobinda Deb Thakur and Mahalaksi Thakurani to Ramnagar and should perform the rites necessary for the dole festival and that you should not perform the dole (worship) of the aforesaid Gobinda Deb Thakur and Mahalaksi Thakurani either at Raipur or at any other place or take those idols there without the permission of the Petitioner Raja Jotindra Mohan Roy.' "And the order upon that proceeding is in these terms: "Whereas it appears from the petition of Raja Jotindra Mohan Roy, dated the 18th February 1904, that Kamal Narain Adhikari and others named below intend to remove the idols Gobinda Deb and Mahalaksi from Raipur to any other place as they like and they are also determined not to take the idols to Ramnagar on the occasion of the dolejatra next ensuing for the worship on behalf of the Nurnagar Raj family according to the previous agreement and usage, and as such act will infringe the lawful and religious right of worship of the members of the Nurnagar Raj family and is likely to lead to a breach of the public peace, it is hereby ordered that notice should issue upon the persons named below, (i) directing them to take the idols to Ramnagar for the next dolejatra as usual; and (ii) forbidding them to celebrate the dolejatra at Raipur and to remove the idols from Raipur without the consent of the Nurnagar Raj family." 2. As we have already stated, the rule was obtained on the ground that the order in question was not warranted by law and that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to make such an order, as it was beyond the scope of sec. 44, Cr. P. C. 3. The order itself is divisible into two parts, and has in fact been divided by the Sub-Divisional Officer into two parts. The first part directs the Petitioner to take the idols to Ramnagar for the next dolejatra "as usual." 4. The learned pleader for the opposite party contends that inasmuch as sec. 144 contemplates two distinct kinds of orders, the Deputy Magistrate being satisfied that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace, has made the first portion of his order under the second branch of the provisions of sec. 144, that is to say, he has directed the Petitioner to take certain order with regard to the idols. It will be noticed at once that the order proceeds upon the assumption that the Nurnagar Raj has the right to compel the Petitioners to bring from their temple the idols in question to the residence of the opposite party, and not only to do that, but also to compel them to perform the worship of the idols at the house of the Raja. The Petitioners deny any such right on the part of the Nurnagar Raja, and admittedly the order could not be made, supposing it was made under the second part of that section, without its being assumed that the Nurnagar Raja had a right to call upon the Petitioners to do that particular act. We are not aware of any provision of law or any decided case which vests in the Criminal Court the power first to decide the question of right and then to proceed to base an order upon it. The mischief of holding that the Criminal Court has such power is obvious. As we have pointed out, any person may present a petition alleging that he can compel another person to bring certain documents or books to his place because it was customary to do so and the Magistrate would proceed to decide upon the allegation of custom and go on to make the order under sec. 144 and that summarily even without giving notice to the other side. 144 and that summarily even without giving notice to the other side. We consider such a course is wholly unwarranted by law and that the Deputy Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make such an order. It may be that the Raja has the right alleged by the Deputy Magistrate in his explanation. But if he has that right, he has his remedy. That remedy he could seek in the proper Court and obtain it more satisfactorily than in a Criminal Court. 5. We therefore set aside the first part of the order complained against. We are not prepared to say that, if the words "without the consent of the Nurnagar Raj family" were omitted, the second part of the order would not come under sec. 144. As at present advised, we think those words are redundant: and, as the chief question in this case turns upon the right of the Nurnagar Raj family to compel the Petitioners to take the idol to Nurnagar, we do not propose to interfere with the second branch of the order complained against. We must however point out that an order of that character made in that way is likely to lead in the future to considerable confusion and difficulty.