JUDGMENT : 1. The judgment of the Court after setting out the facts stated above, proceeded as follows:— Upon the genuineness of this document, apart from a question of non-joinder of a party to which we shall presently refer, the success of the present appeals appears to us to depend, for if this document be not genuine, it is clear to us that it is immaterial whether the custom set up by the plaintiff, namely, that on the death of the younger male members of the family without male issue their property reverts to the Raj, is proved to exist, inasmuch as if that custom did exist, then on the death of Jian Kuari, which occurred on the 17th of February, 1812, the property of Kishen Singh ought to have reverted to the Raj, but instead of so reverting the evidence establishes, and indeed it is admitted that the property was held contrary to the alleged custom from the death of Jian Kuari up to the death of Chet Singh in the year 1849, and consequently the statute of limitation would be a bar to any claim which the plaintiff can now put forward. *** 2. It will be observed that the plaintiff claimed the property not merely by virtue of its being part of the Raj and devolving with it, but also under and by virtue of the sipurdnmna. If it came to him under the sipurcinamd, it would not be impressed with the character of impartiality nor be the subject to the alleged custom upon which the plaintiff relies. It was severed from the Raj and held by Chet Singh as his absolute property and so became subject to the ordinary rules of descent under the Hindu Law. Consequently, upon the death of Raja Mahesh Sitla Buksh Singh, it devolved upon the plaintiff and his only brother Babu Bhawaneshri Pratap Narain Singh, as members of a joint Hindu family. After the conclusion of the arguments which lasted for several days and then judgment; was being considered, it occurred to one of us that Babu Bhawaneshri Partap Narain Singh ought to have been a party to the suit inasmuch as if the genuineness of the sipurdnama be established, he is entitled to an interest in the property. After the conclusion of the arguments which lasted for several days and then judgment; was being considered, it occurred to one of us that Babu Bhawaneshri Partap Narain Singh ought to have been a party to the suit inasmuch as if the genuineness of the sipurdnama be established, he is entitled to an interest in the property. We pointed out this to the learned Advocates of the parties and entertained an application which was made on behalf of the plaintiff for the addition of the name of his brother to the array of parties in the several suits and appeals. Babu Bhawaneshri Pratap Narain Singh on the matter coming to his notice filed petitions in each of the appeals and therein expressed his willingness to be joined as a party and prayed that the relief sought by the plaintiff in the several suits might be granted. 3. The respondent objected to this application mainly on the ground that under section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act the suits were barred as against Bhawaneshri Pratan Narain Singh when the question as to his joinder in the array of parties was raised, and that it would not be proper for the Court to add him as a party of its own motion, if the effect of doing so would be to preclude the defendants-respondents from relying on the bar of the statute. It was pointed out to us that in the suits out of which appeals Nos. 246, 247, 252 and 265 arose, objection was taken by the defendants in their written statements to his non-joinder. This objection, however, was admittedly not pressed at the trial. If it had been, the plaintiff would undoubtedly have applied for and obtained leave to implead his brother. Under the circumstances we determined of our own motion to add Babu Bhawaneshri Pratap Narain Singh as a defendant and respondent in the several suits and appeals. This does not, as we understand the law, preclude us from considering and giving effect to the provisions of the Limitation Act if they create a bar to the suits. We shall consider this matter later on. Before we do so, it will be well, we think, to dispose of the main question involved in the appeals. 4. This does not, as we understand the law, preclude us from considering and giving effect to the provisions of the Limitation Act if they create a bar to the suits. We shall consider this matter later on. Before we do so, it will be well, we think, to dispose of the main question involved in the appeals. 4. It will help us to understand the case if we shortly’ consider what can be gleaned in regard to the origin and history of the Basti Raj as well as some of the earlier dealings with its property. The origin and history of it are obscure, but we have gathered some information in regard to them from public documents. We find in volume 6 of the Historical Account of the North Western Provinces of India, edited by Mr. E.T. Atkinson, at pp. 677 and 678, that the Rajas of Basti belonged to the same stock of Kulbans Rajputs as those Rasulpur Rajas who were extinguished by the house of Bansi, and that the Basti domain is a remnant of the Kulbans kingdom which once extended from the heart of Bahraich to the heart of Basti, and that the foundation of that kingdom is traced by Mr. Thomson to one Sej who came from a village to the south-west of Delhi in the time of the Toglakh Emperors, 1321-1402 A.D., and overcame by treachery Ugra Sen, the Raja of Gonda, annexed his territory (see also Manual of Titles, North-Western Provinces, published by authority in 1899, p. 74).’ Prom the report of the settlement of the Basti district, prepared in 1891, page 41, it appears that from the time of Akbar until the latter days of Native Rule the local Rajas enjoyed almost complete independence and paid tribute rather than revenue to the Central Government. Before its cession to the East India Company in 1801, Basti belonged to the Navvab Wazir of Oudh. In a book entitled “Rajas and Nawabs of the North-Western Provinces,” published under authority in 1877, the following account is shortly given of the Basti Raj. “It is uncertain at what time this Raj was established. The original Raja is supposed to have been a Bhar, One Gardhi Singh Rajput took possession of land in Mawanagar without any grant from the ruling sovereign at Delhi. His descendant, Madho Singh, was defeated and driven away about 1330 by Udhraj Singh of Baghulam. “It is uncertain at what time this Raj was established. The original Raja is supposed to have been a Bhar, One Gardhi Singh Rajput took possession of land in Mawanagar without any grant from the ruling sovereign at Delhi. His descendant, Madho Singh, was defeated and driven away about 1330 by Udhraj Singh of Baghulam. He subjugated the whole parganah of Mansurnagar, Basti. The present Raja is his descendant. The family are Kulbans Rajputs.” 5. We gather from the sources to which we have referred that for a period of five or six hundred years the Basti Raj has been in existence, and that it was in its origin in the nature of a subordinate principality. From the pedigree it will be observed that it has descended according to the rules of strict primogeniture for a number of generations. These facts lend colour to the argument that the Raj is impartibly. We shall see however from some documents which have been put in evidence, further indications of the custom, alleged on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, and as these documents seem to as to throw some light upon the situation at the time when the sipurdnama set up by the plaintiff is stated to have been executed, we may briefly advert to them. 6. [Their Lordships after considering these documents and the other evidence in the case came to the conclusion that, the sipurdnama was genuine and valid. Then their Lordships continued:— We now come to the question of the non-joinder as a party to the suit of the plaintiffs brother, Babu Bhawneshri Pratap Narain Singh, As we have mentioned, the question of non-joinder was raised in several of the written statements but it was never pressed. During the argument of the; appeals the question was never broached by any one and it was not until the point occurred to one of us when preparing our judgment that any objection on the score of the nonjoinder was raised, It has been argued on behalf of the respondents that a suit now instituted by Babu Bhawneshri Pratap Singh would be statute barred, and that the Court, ought not to add him as a party, if doing so would have the effect of depriving the respondents of the benefit of limitation. It has been further contended on behalf of the respondents that the plaintiff-appellant being a joint tenant, cannot alone maintain a suit for the whole or any part of the joint family property, and that consequently the suits were bound to fail. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the plaintiff as the head of the family was as such entitled to eject trespassers, and that the statute of limitation did not furnish any bar to the suit by reason of the addition to the array of the parties of Babu Bhawneshri Partap Narain Singh; that in fact any co-sharer has a right to eject a trespasser and a fortiori the head of the family. The plaintiff did not in express terms sue on behalf of his brother as well as himself. To do so would in fact have been inconsistent with the principal claim which he set up, namely, that the property formed part of an impartible Raj and in accordance with the custom prevailing in the Raj, reverted to the Raj on the death of a collateral member of the family without male issue. He claimed, however, in the alternative, to be entitled to the property by virtue of the sipurdnama, and obviously in putting forward this claim he must have done so for the benefit of his brother as also of himself, for the property in that case devolved upon them as the only sons of Raja Mahesh Sitla Buksh Singh, without being impressed with the character of impartibility. Babu Bhawneshri Pratap Narain Singh, when the point in question was raised, was not merely willing to be a party to the proceedings, but in the petitions which he has filed asked the Court to decree the plaintiff's claim. To determine the suit against the appellant on this tardily raised point is not a course which one would be disposed to adopt. If the question had/been raised at the trial, the plaintiff would have no doubt obtained the consent of his brother to his name being added in the array of parties to the proceedings. Mr. Mayne in his work says, “It would seem that one co-sharer may sue to eject a mere trespasser when his object is to remove an intruder from the joint property without at the same time claiming any portion of it for himself.” (Ed. Mr. Mayne in his work says, “It would seem that one co-sharer may sue to eject a mere trespasser when his object is to remove an intruder from the joint property without at the same time claiming any portion of it for himself.” (Ed. 6, p. 371.) He refers to the case of Radha Prasad Wasti v. Esuf : [1881] I.L.R., 7 Cal., 414. In that case GARTH, C.J., in the course of his judgment observes, “when a tenant has been put in possession of ijmali property with the consent of all the sharers or what is the same thing, has been placed there by the managing share-holder, who has authority to act for the rest, no one or more of the co-sharers can turn the co-sharer out without the consent of the others. But no man has a right to intrude upon ijmali property against the will of the co-sharers or of any of them. If he does so he may be ejected without notice, either altogether, if all the co-sharers join in the suit, or partially, if only some of the co-sharers wish to eject him; and the legal means by which such a partial ejectment is effected, is by giving the plaintiffs possession of their shares jointly with the intruder, as explained in the case of Hulo-dhur Sen v. Gooroodoss Roy : [1873] 20 W.R., 126, per JACKSON, J.” 7. The point arose in a case not unlike the present, namely, the case of Guruvayya Gonda v. Dattatraya Anant : (1903) I.L.R., 28 Bom., 11. 8. In that case a suit was originally-brought by two plaintiffs to recover possession of a house, the 2nd plaintiff being described as the manager of the family. Subsequently, at a late stage of the suit, the (defendants having raised an objection of non-joinder of parties, the other members of the family who were satisfied to be represented by the plaintiff No. 2 as the manager of the joint family, were joined as co-plaintiffs after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for the suit. The first Court allowed the claim, but on appeal the lower appellate Court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit as time-barred under section 22 of the Limitation Act. The first Court allowed the claim, but on appeal the lower appellate Court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit as time-barred under section 22 of the Limitation Act. It was held on appeal by Sir L.H. JENKINS, C.J., and ‘JACOB, J., reversing the decree of the lower appellate Court and restoring that of the first Court, that section 22 of Limitation Act does not in itself purport to determine directly whether the joinder of the parties after the; institution of the suit shall in all cases necessarily involve the bar of limitation, if the period prescribed for such a suit has then expired. JACOB, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed that such a result must depend upon consideration of the question whether the joinder was necessary to enable the Court to award such relief as may be given in the suit as framed.” Later on he observes: “It is further clear that the plaintiff No. 2 was from the outset joined as manager of the joint family in view of the alternative prayer for declaration of their ownership and for consequential recovery of possession of the property, failing proof of the oral leases. The question therefore before us is rather whether the claim could have been decreed in the suit of plaintiff No. 2 as manager, or whether the non-joinder of the other co-sharers, minors and adults, was a defect which could be overlooked by reason of the delay on the part of the defendants in taking objection to it. The question therefore before us is rather whether the claim could have been decreed in the suit of plaintiff No. 2 as manager, or whether the non-joinder of the other co-sharers, minors and adults, was a defect which could be overlooked by reason of the delay on the part of the defendants in taking objection to it. If fresh parties are merely joined for the purpose of safeguarding the rights subsisting as between them and others claiming generally in the same interest, the determination (by application of provisions of section 22 of the Limitation Act) of the date of the institution of the suit as regards such freshly joined parties does not ordinarily affect the right of the original plaintiff to continue the suit, and would not therefore attract the application of the general provisions of the Limitation Act.” He then proceeds, “the main question in this appeal is whether, had the additional plaintiffs not been joined, it would have been competent to the Subordinate judge to pass a decree for ejectment against the defendants on the facts alleged and proved in favour of the original plaintiffs.” He then cites some authorities and concludes by saying, “We must hold that the bar of limitation was not established, as the defendant's objection to non-joinder of parties having been taken at a late stage of the suit may be disregarded. 9. This decision appears to us to be consonant with justice and we are prepared to follow it. We are unable to discover any substantial difference in the facts of that case and those in the case before us. In both the suit was to eject trespassers by co-sharers; in the one, one of the plaintiffs being described as manager of family, in the other, the sole plaintiff being described as Raja, that is, head of the family. In both cases the members of the family who were not represented were placed in the array of parties after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for the suit. In the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, and in three other of the suits the objection is raised by the defendant but was not pressed. It was this Court which pointed out the defect in the matter of parties. In the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, and in three other of the suits the objection is raised by the defendant but was not pressed. It was this Court which pointed out the defect in the matter of parties. If the Raj is impartible and if the property comprised in supurdnama was impressed with the character of impartiality, the plaintiff alone would be entitled to it. We therefore hold that the objections thus tardily presented to the, joinder of the plaintiff's brother as a party to the suits and appeals are untenable, and that the statute of limitation furnishes no bar to the suit.