JUDGMENT 1. By an order made by the Additional District Judge of the 24-Pergunnahs, dated the 4th August 1903, the decree against the Petitioner, who is also the Appellant in appeal from Order No. 424 of 1903, and others was directed to be transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Khulna for execution. The application for transfer was originally made to the Munsif who had passed the decree. The application however was refused by the Munsif on the ground that the property for the arrears of which the decree had been passed was situated within the jurisdiction of the Court and the decree-holder was not acting properly in asking for the transfer to Khulna where the Appellant was practising as a pleader. This view of the Munsif was not accepted by the Additional District Judge for reasons recorded in his judgment. The rule was obtained by the applicant on the ground that the order complained of had been passed without jurisdiction. The contention is that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal having regard to the provisions of sec. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is said that a question relating to the transfer of a decree is not a question arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed relating to execution. No objection was made before the District Judge as to his jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The question is raised for the first time in this Court and reliance is placed on the cases of Nilmony Singh Deo v. Biressur Banerjee I. L. R. 16 Cal. 744 (1889) and Suja Hossein v. Monohur Das I. L. R. 22 Cal. 921 (1895). The first case, however, is easily distinguishable. There the decree-holder, who had obtained a decree for rent under Act X of 1859 in the Court of the Collector of Manbhoom, asked for a transfer of the decree for execution to Burdwan and it was so transferred. By the time the application for execution was made to the Court of the District Judge of Burdwan, 12 years had expired from the date of the decree, and the question arose as to whether under sec. 230 of the CPC the decree was capable of execution. By the time the application for execution was made to the Court of the District Judge of Burdwan, 12 years had expired from the date of the decree, and the question arose as to whether under sec. 230 of the CPC the decree was capable of execution. This Court answered the question in the negative and held that the application for transfer of the decree for execution was not an application for the execution of the decree itself, and therefore the application could not come under sec. 230 of the Code. No question was raised as to whether an application for transfer of the decree involves a question relating to the execution of the decree. The case of Suja Hossein v. Monohur Das I. L. R. 22 Cal. 921 (1895) was overruled on an application for review by the judgment in Suja Hossein v. Monohur Das I. L. R. 24 Cal. 244 (1896), and in the latter case it was distinctly held that an application for transfer of a decree is an application for a step taken in aid of execution and saved the decree from being barred by limitation. 2. The question before us, therefore, is really decided by the last judgment of this Court in the case of Suja Hossein v. Monohur Das I. L. R. 24 Cal. 244 (1896) and we have no reason to doubt that the application for the transfer of the decree under sec. 223 of the Code is an application which involves a question relating to the execution of decree. 3. We therefore think that an appeal lies from the order passed by the Court which passed the decree declining to transfer it. The Additional District Judge was within his power in dealing with the appeal and in deciding the case. We therefore see no reason to interfere with his order and the rule is accordingly discharged with costs. 4. The appeal itself, that is No. 244 of 1903, though set down for hearing under sec. 551 of the Code, has been heard in the presence of both sides and we have heard the Respondent's vakil and we think that the reasons given by the Additional District Judge for the order directing the transfer are quite sound. 4. The appeal itself, that is No. 244 of 1903, though set down for hearing under sec. 551 of the Code, has been heard in the presence of both sides and we have heard the Respondent's vakil and we think that the reasons given by the Additional District Judge for the order directing the transfer are quite sound. The decree-holder had, under the law as it now stands, a right to ask for personal execution against the judgment-debtor notwithstanding that he had also the power to sell the tenure in arrear. In the present case we are informed that there are three decrees against the same judgment-debtor for arrears of the same tenure. In the last two decrees there are distinct orders for the sale of the tenures in the first instance. But in the decree which is now directed to be transferred for execution there is no limitation to execution being taken out against the person of the judgment-debtor. Having two decrees for arrears which are realizable from the property itself, there is no reason why the decree-holder should not be allowed a transfer of the first decree to another Court for personal execution. 5. We therefore think that the District Judge exercised his discretion properly and we accordingly dismiss the appeal. We allow three gold mohurs as costs of the rule.