JUDGMENT : KNOX, J. 1. This case must go back. It appears that on the 28th August, 1891, the predecessors in interest of the present respondent sold certain property to the appellants. The sale deed recites that the vendor had put the vendees into possession like himself, that is, we understand, into such possession as he himself had. It further contains a covenant between the parties that if any one should come forward as co-sharers or partners, and claim the property sold, the vendor shall be liable for it, and the vendees would have nothing to do with it, and also, if for any reason the whole or part of the property sold should pass out of the possession of the vendees, the vendor should pay to the vendees the whole amount of the sale consideration. Certain co-sharers did bring a suit for possession of the property sold to the appellants and got a decree on the 1st October, 1894. The appellant's case is that the decree was put into execution, and that they were dispossessed from the property sold on the 18th April, 1898. They brought their suit within three years from that date and claim a refund of the consideration money under the covenant contained in the sale-deed. Both the Courts below have held article 97 of the Indian Limitation Act as the article which governs the suit, and have thrown out the suit as time barred on the ground that it was not brought within three years from the date of the decree. 2. This is what we understand the lower Court to mean when it says ‘that limitation begins to run from the date of the failure of consideration.’ The lower appellate Court considers that the case of Bul Chand v. Parmanand, [1901] A.W.N., 24 is a case of the same kind as the one which it was deciding. That case was a case of a very different nature. The vendees in that case had sued for possession of the property, which they admitted they never obtained. In the present case the suit is brought on the covenant contained in the sale-deed, whereby the vendor contracted, to recoup the vendees in the event of disturbance of possession The cause of action therefore did not arise until possession was disturbed. The vendees in that case had sued for possession of the property, which they admitted they never obtained. In the present case the suit is brought on the covenant contained in the sale-deed, whereby the vendor contracted, to recoup the vendees in the event of disturbance of possession The cause of action therefore did not arise until possession was disturbed. The lower appellate Court took upon itself to say that the appellant had never acquired actual possession of the property, which was joint: The Court thereby set up a case for the respondents which was entirely opposed to the pleadings. The case in the pleadings was that the plaintiffs were still in possession of the disputed land and had never been ousted therefrom. We decide no question as to whether possession has or has not been disturbed. All we decide is that the suit, as brought, was within time. We set aside the decree of the Courts below and remand the case through the lower appellate Court to the Court of first instance with direction that it be re-admitted in the register of pending suits and disposed of on the merits. Costs here and hitherto to abide the event.