JUDGMENT : Blair, J. The plaintiff in the case has sued for, and obtained in both the lower Courts an injunction, restraining the defendant from using certain brick-kilns recently built by him as such, upon the ground that substantial injury is certain to be done by the use of those kilns in proximity to a grove of fruit trees belonging to the plaintiff. As the kilns have not so far been lighted, it is manifest that no injury has so far been done. There is, however, evidence which has been accepted by the lower appellate Court to the effect that similar kilns worked, as the defendant proposes to work them, have done substantial injury to other groves in their neighbourhood. Upon the terms of the Specific Relief Act relief by way of injunction may be given under a number of circumstances therein specified. Among the illustrations the one most closely in point is illustration, which is as follows:— “A and B are in possession of contiguous lands and of the mines underneath them. A works his mine so as to extend under B's mine, and threatens to remove certain pillars which helped to support B's mine. B may sue for an injunction to restrain him from so doing. That is a case in which no injury has been done, because the act which the defendant was upon the point of doing had not yet been done. The Indian law, therefore, is in harmony with the following dictum in the judgment of Lord Justice MEL-LISH in the case of Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Company, (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. 705, set forth at page 713: “It is not correct to say, as a strict proposition of law, that if the plaintiff has not sustained, or cannot prove that he has sustained substantial damage, this Court will give no relief, because, of course, if it could be proved that the plaintiff was certainly about to sustain very substantial damage by what the defendant was doing, and there was no doubt about it, this Court would at once stop the defendant and would not wait until the substantial damage had been sustained. The learned Lord Justice continues with an observation bearing on the facts of the particular case before him. 2. The learned Lord Justice continues with an observation bearing on the facts of the particular case before him. 2. “But in the nuisance of this particular kind, it is known by experience that unless substantial damage has actually been sustained, it is impossible to be certain that substantial damage ever will be sustained, and therefore, with reference to this particular description of nuisance, it becomes practically correct to lay down the principle that, unless substantial damage is proved to have been sustained, this Court will not interfere.” But this does not in my opinion, apply to the facts disclosed in the appeal here. Now, in the case which was then before the Court, the cause from which damage was apprehended, had been in existence and operative for more than two years already and though a large mass of evidence was called, the Court considered that no substantial damage had been proved. In this appeal no such practical test exists, and the evidence, as believed by the Court, is to the effect that similar kilns in the neighbourhood have, as a matter of fact, done substantial injury to the fruit trees in their vicinity. Having regard, no doubt to the teaching of experience, a skilled witness, whose evidence commends itself to the Court, has stated that damage is certain, and in his opinion damage amounting to the total destruction of the fruit trees within ten years. In my opinion, therefore, the case cited. Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Company, (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. 705, is no help to the appellants here. Another point has been raised which is of the nature of an estoppel. It is said that the plaintiff should not be heard to apply for an injunction because he has not interfered with the erection of these kilns. This is not the case where a man has chosen to stand aside and allow another person to erect a building upon his land. In such a case the person who erected the building, might claim protection, only by showing that he believed he had a right to make such erection. That criterion does not apply here, for a person making an erection knowing it to be injurious as a kiln, must be taken also to know, as experience teaches, that injury is likely to arise from that which he has done. It seems to me that there is no estoppel. That criterion does not apply here, for a person making an erection knowing it to be injurious as a kiln, must be taken also to know, as experience teaches, that injury is likely to arise from that which he has done. It seems to me that there is no estoppel. In this case, however, one of the kilns had only been erected about a year and another within an exceedingly short period of the date of suit. It seems to me, therefore, that the Court below were substantially right in granting the injunction. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.