JUDGMENT : Banerji, J. This appeal arises in a suit for pre-emption, and the only question to be determined is that of the interpretation to be placed upon the wajib-ul-arz upon which the plaintiffs had a right of pre-emption preferential to that of the vendee defendant and decreed the claim, The lower appellate court is of opinion that the right of pre-emption under the terms of the wajib-ul-arz arises only when the purchaser is a stranger to the village, and not when he happens to be, as in this case, a co-sharer in the village. It is admitted that the plaintiffs and the vendee are both co-sharers of the vendors in the same patti. The wajib-ul-arz, however, provides that the right of pre-emption exists (1) in a near co-sharer in the same patti; (2) in any other co-sharer in the patti; (3) in a near co-sharer in other pattis; and (4) in co-sharers in the mahal. The learned Judge holds that these persons can claim pre-emption only when the purchaser is a stranger to the village. I am unable to agree with the interpretation. In my judgment each class of pre-emptor has a preferential right of pre-emption as against persons belonging to the next following class, if the latter happen to be the purchasers. The words jo kimat dusron se milti ho (whatever price is obtained from another) do not in my judgment refer to strangers, but to persons who may purchase the property whether they belong to the four classes mentioned in the waiib-ul-arz or are outsiders. As I read the wajib-ul-arz, it confers upon the different classes of persons mentioned in it a right of pre-emption inter se. In this view the court below ought to have determined whether the plaintiffs are near co-sharers of the vendors than the vendee. 2. Having regard to the word karibi (near) as used in clause 3 of the wajib-ul-arz, it is manifest that it contemplates nearness by blood and not propinquity in space. Therefore the court below ought to have determined whether the plaintiffs are nearer co-sharers by blood of the vendors than the vendee. If the plaintiffs are such co-sharers they will have the right of pre emption as against the vendee. Therefore the court below ought to have determined whether the plaintiffs are nearer co-sharers by blood of the vendors than the vendee. If the plaintiffs are such co-sharers they will have the right of pre emption as against the vendee. A similar interpretation was placed upon the wajib-ul-arz which was the basis of the suit in which S.A. No. 103 of 1902, decided on the 7th July of 1903, arose. The terms of the wajib-ul-arz in that case and of the wajib-ul-arz in the present case are exactly the same. With reference to those terms it was held in S.A. No. 103 of 1902, [Sheobaran Rai v. Mahipat Rai, S.A. No. 103 of 1902] that the different classes of co-sharers mentioned in the wajib-ul-arz had a right of pre-emption inter se, This view was affirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 28 of 1903, decided on the 28th of July, 1903, [Mahipat Rae v. Sheobaran Rae, L.P.A. No. 28 of 1903]. As the lower appellate court disposed of the appeal before it upon a preliminary point, and its decision upon that point is erroneous, I allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the court below, and remand the case to that court under section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure for trial upon the merits. The appellants will have their costs of this appeal. Other costs will follow the event. BANERJI, J. This appeal arises in a suit for pre-emption based upon the luajib-ul-arz. The share sold is situate in patti Bechu Rai, in which the plaintiff, the vendor, and the vendee are co-sharers. The plaintiff alleges that he has a preferential right under the terms of the wajib-ul-arz, which provides that a co-sharer wishing to sell his share must do so, for such price as any other person may offer, first to a near co-sharer in his own patti, next to co-sharers in the same patti, after that to near co-sharers in another patti then to co-sharers in the mahal and then to a stranger.’ The plaintiff says that he comes under the first category; firstly, because he is descended from the same common ancestor as the vendor; and secondly, because he and the vendor jointly owned a share in the same patti which the vendee did not. The court of first instance decreed the claim. The court of first instance decreed the claim. The lower appellate court holds that under the terms of the wajib-ul-arz a right of pre-emption can only be exercised in case of sale to a stranger, and relying upon the ruling of this Court in All Baksh v. Ghulam Abbas and Sheobalak Singh v. Lachmi-Singh has dismissed the suit. I am unable to agree with the construction placed on the wajib-ul-arz by the court below. That document, unlike the documents relied on in the two cases referred to above, does not provide that a right of pre-emption shall arise only in the case of a sale to a stranger. But it says that a co-sharer wishing to sell his share must do so in the order mentioned in it. So that the intention clearly is that a co-sharer coming under the first class will, if he prefers to take the property, exclude, co-sharers coming under any other class. It is true the wajib-ul-ars says that the pre-emptor must pay the price which other persons may pay (jo dusron se milti ho). But from the use of this expression it cannot be inferred that by “other persons” are meant strangers only. To my mind it is clear that the wajib-id-arz confers a right of pre-emption upon the class of persons who have under it a right of purchase superior to that of persons belonging to another class, even if the co-sharers belonging to the class last-mentioned be the purchasers. The lower appellate court was therefore wrong in dismissing the suit upon the preliminary point. I allow the appeal, and, setting aside the decree of the appellate court, remand the case to that court under section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure for trial on the merits. The appellant will have the cost of this appeal. Other costs will follow the event. STANLEY and AIRMAN, JJ. We have no doubt as to the correctness of the view taken by our learned colleague of the wajib-ul-arz in this case. It appears to us clear upon the language of the document that the true construction of it is that which has been put upon it by the court of first instance and also by our learned brother. There are no grounds for this appeal. It is dismissed.