JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— This is an appeal under Section 10 of the Letters Patent. 2. The facts of case are fully set out in the judgment of the learned District Judge. They are shortly as follows:— The appellant is the owner of a grave yard in the town of Gorakhpur. The original plaintiff, Mirza Hussain Beg, who has died since the institution of the suit, was an old Fakir who, for more than 20 years had been takiadar of the grave-yard and was permitted as such to take burial fees and also gratuities or fees from pedlars who, at the time of the Muharram, used to vend their wares in the grave-yard. He also was permitted to take the fruit of some trees which are growing in the grave-yard. At one Muharram, the appellant who was the proprietor of the grave-yard, himself collected fees from pedlars whereupon Mirza Hussain Beg brought a suit against him in the Munsif's Court alleging that he was entitled to the income arising from the grave-yard and claiming the fees which had been collected by the owner. 3. The Munsif decreed the plaintiff's claim. On appeal the District Judge held that the plaintiff's right was merely that of a licensee under sections 52—54 of the Easements Act, but he dismissed the appeal. A second appeal was preferred to the High Court when it was contended that sections 52—54 of the Easements Act had no application, and the relief which had been granted to the plaintiff was one which he did not ask for. The judgment of the High Court runs as follows:— ”It has been found that the respondent has been allowed by the zamindars without any question on their part for more than twenty years to collect dues and fruit arising out of a certain grave-yard. This is a case which, as the learned Judge points out, falls within a license as defined in section 52. I have read the plaint and understand that the plaintiff did not ask in express terms for the enjoyment of the license, though he did in effect ask for it. The appeal is dismissed.” 4. From this judgment we gather that the plaintiff was a licensee and under his license was entitled to the perquisites which he claimed as takiadar of the graveyard. This terminated the earlier litigation. 5. The appeal is dismissed.” 4. From this judgment we gather that the plaintiff was a licensee and under his license was entitled to the perquisites which he claimed as takiadar of the graveyard. This terminated the earlier litigation. 5. Afterwards, Mirza Hussain Beg Proceeded to build a permanent structure on the land, and thereupon Wajid Ali Shah brought a suit against him and obtained a decree for the demolition of the building under construction. The zamindar then gave a lease of a small bit of the land to defendant Jahangir, and again Mirza Hussain Beg instituted a suit and claimed in it possessions the land so let on the ground that the act of the zamindar amounted to an encroachment on his rights as takiadar. The words of the prayer are, “that by removal of the obstruction offered by defendant No. 1 and by dispossession of defendant, No. 2 (i.e., the defendant Jahangir), a decree for possession as before of the land bounded as below, and enjoyment of the entire emoluments of the aforesaid lands may be passed in the plaintiff's favour.” The lower Court granted a decree in the terms of the claim. On appeal the learned District Judge held in a well-considered judgment that the plaintiff was not entitled to decree for possession, and that he was a mere licensee, whose license was revoked by the zamindar. An appeal was preferred to this High Court, when the learned Judge before whom it was heard came to the conclusion that the appellate decree in the former suit operated as res judicata between the parties, and that the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to a decree for possession such as he enjoyed or to use the actual words, for possession badastur sabik, that is, to the interest which was granted to him in this land by the decree of 1893. “Accordingly the decree of the learned District Judge was set aside and the decree of the Court of first instance restored. From this decree the present appeal has been preferred. 6. We are wholly unable to agree in the conclusion arrived at by our learned colleague or in the reasons assigned for it by him in his judgment. “Accordingly the decree of the learned District Judge was set aside and the decree of the Court of first instance restored. From this decree the present appeal has been preferred. 6. We are wholly unable to agree in the conclusion arrived at by our learned colleague or in the reasons assigned for it by him in his judgment. We have already shown what was the nature of the decree in the earlier suit, and that all that was decided in that suit was that the plaintiff had for a number of years been allowed by the zamindars to collect fees from pedlars and also fruit growing on some trees in the grave-yard, and that as licensee, he was entitled to the fees and fruit but, as we understand the decree, only so long as the license was unrevoked. In the suit the plaintiff did not claim to be entitled to the land but merely alleged, as appears from the judgment of the Munsif, that he had acquired as takiadat certain rights in the land in the shape of appropriating the produce of the trees letting out land to Shop-keepers at a certain period of the year, that is, at the time of the Muharram festival, and receiving rents or levying fees for the burying of dead bodies. The privilege which the plaintiff enjoyed by the leave of the zamindar was nothing more than a license to squat in the grave-yard and look after it and take as his reward whatever gratuities or fees he could obtain from pedlars or others and also any fruit which he might find on the trees. 7. The result of the decision of our colleague is to magnify this privilege into as nearly as may be the proprietorship of the land, for the effect of it would be to preclude the owner from exercising his rights of ownership. We cannot agree with our colleague in thinking that the earlier suit determined the right to the possession of the property. We cannot agree with our colleague in thinking that the earlier suit determined the right to the possession of the property. We do not clearly understand the meaning of the following passage in his judgment in which he deals with, his earlier decision, namely, “the judgment in that case was a judgment passed by myself, and upon hearing the arguments addressed to me to-day, I am of opinion that the appellant's right in the property might well have been described as amounting to rights higher than those of a licensee.” 8. If he means by this that the plaintiff was entitled to the ownership of the property, we are unable, with all deference, to agree with him. In the former suit it was merely held that the plaintiff was a licensee and nothing was, so far as we can discover, determined as to the nature of the license which the plaintiff enjoyed. If the learned Judge means to suggest that the right which the plaintiff enjoyed was in the nature of a profit a prendre, we can find no basis for such a suggestion. As we understand a profit a prendre, it is a right to remove and appropriate any part of the soil belonging to another, or anything growing upon or attached to the soil for the purpose of the profit to be gained from the property thereby acquired, that is, for example, a right to take gravel, stone, trees and so forth; no such right ever existed or was claimed by the plaintiff. He merely claimed right to exact fees from pedlars and others' who come to sell their wares or to bury their dead. This was by way of remuneration for his services as takiadar, as was also the permission given to him to take any fruit which he could find on the trees. We further do not agree with the learned Judge in the view expressed in the following passage of his Judgment viz, “Now the decree which the appellant obtained from this Court in 1896 was in terms a decree which maintained his interest in the property of receiving all the income that accrued from it, and that decree and consequently that interest is still in force. The decree declared existent a transfer of property, and this being so the license, if it was a license, was one which could not be revoked. The decree declared existent a transfer of property, and this being so the license, if it was a license, was one which could not be revoked. This appears to us to be based upon an erroneous view of the facts. The decree did not declare existent a transfer of property, nor did it declare that the license was one which could not be revoked. A decree cannot effect a transfer of property, and no such transfer was ever alleged by the plaintiff, much less proved; all that the plaintiff had claimed was a right to the enjoyment of certain perquisites as takiadar. He did not lay claim to the ownership of the property. The view taken by the learned District Judge, namely, that the plaintiff enjoyed a privilege or license which was revokeable, and that that privilege or license was revoked is to our minds correct. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the decree of this Court and restore the decree of the learned District Judge with costs in all Courts to be realized from the estate of Mirza Hussain Beg.