JUDGMENT : Blair, J. Ellen Eliza Armour petitions this Court for the dissolution of her marriage with George John Brightmore Armour, her husband, upon the grounds of his adultery and cruelty. The petition which apparently was filed on the 22nd February, 1904, alleges that on or about September, 1903, the respondent visited the house of one Mrs. Clements in Lucknow at about. 9 p.m. and retired with her alone into a private room and there committed adultery with the said Mrs. Clements. This allegation is proved. (His Lordship after discussing the evidence proceeded as follows:— *** 2. The remaining question which requires consideration is whether the charges of cruelty made by the petitioner against her husband have been established. I accept and act upon the definition of cruelty approved of in the case of Russell v. Russell, [1897] L.R.A.C., 395 decided by the House of Lords. Cruelty must be such a course of conduct as either to cause or to raise a reasonable apprehension of severe physical injury. The question I have to decide is whether such fear of physical injury could be reasonably inferred from the proved facts in the present case. It must be remembered that cruelty is not necessarily one act. It may be and often is a course of conduct from which a reasonable person would infer that the victim from it could not with due regard to her health and safety, continue cohabitation with her husband. The first act committed by the respondent and proved beyond doubt by his letters, is that at the end of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife a letter charging her with incestuous adultery with her own uncle and threatening a divorce. A few days later a letter was sent by him in which he admits that the charge was wholly false and groundless. It is not necessary to say whether such a charge, if persisted in, might or might not of itself amount to legal cruelty. It was retracted, but all the same it had been made. There was only one occasion on which the petitioner alleges that her husband had struck her, Her narrative is in the highest degree probable. It is not necessary to say whether such a charge, if persisted in, might or might not of itself amount to legal cruelty. It was retracted, but all the same it had been made. There was only one occasion on which the petitioner alleges that her husband had struck her, Her narrative is in the highest degree probable. She says that he addressed her in foul and filthy language, that he was not sober at the time, but that she in her anger and contempt spit towards him, he alleges that she spit in his face. He thereupon struck her on both sides of her face, boxing her ears, severely enough to leave a mark behind He was obviously well aware that a blow struck by him might become the subject of a charge of cruelty in a divorce suit, because he forced her, so she says, to sign a paper promising him not to spit at him again as a condition before he signed a paper promising not again to strike her. Though this is the only instance of personal violence, his threats are repeated and serious. On one occasion she says, he fastened her in the bedroom and threatened to flog her, and on several other occasions also threatened to flog her. There are other expressions throughout the evidence that point only to vulgar tyranny, such as “I will settle you too,” “I have had enough of your damned rot,” language of mere abuse by a vulgar fellow like this, of which little account need be taken, but the threats though not inflicted against her person did amount on occasions to physical violence of another kind. On one occasion, she says, when he returned home, she had dined and he took the things which had been in use for dining and threw them about and broke them. Upon another occasion, and this be it observed was towards the end of their cohabitation, when his wife had returned” from the hills only a few days, he striped the house of its furniture, leaving her only some trifling articles, and even told a coolie to take away the bed on which she was lying. She refused to allow him, and the bed was not taken away, but the animus is dearly manifest. He went away with the furniture, and did not return to her. She refused to allow him, and the bed was not taken away, but the animus is dearly manifest. He went away with the furniture, and did not return to her. This was followed by a charge against her of stealing which upon enquiry by the police authorities was found to be a false charge, for which he was first dismissed the service and then by way of commutation his dismissal was withdrawn and he was allowed to retire. He was represented here by a learned Vakil to whom it was open on re-examination to give him an opportunity of explaining and perhaps to some extent alleviate the false charge. 3. No question was put for that purpose. Indeed there is hardly anything in the evidence for the respondent except bare and vague denials. Enough has already been said without having recourse to his character in the police force to show he is a person whose evidence on any point it is impossible to believe. One thing to be said in his favour is that apparently he was not short of natural affection for his children. No violence towards them is even suggested, nor can it be said that he failed to fulfil his duty of providing for them a decent maintenance. No allegation to that effect is made by Mrs. Armour whom for that, as well as for other reasons, I think it safe implicitly to believe. I believe also that he was something more than an occasional drunkard. The question is accepting as I do the facts I have set forth, is it reasonable to apprehend injury to her life and health if she continues to cohabit with him? I think it is. Both she and her respectable looking mother speak of health feeble from natural causes being aggravated by shattered nerves and continual distress. On one occasion the mother who had been staying with her, left the house, because she could not bear to see her daughter treated as she was. From the whole of these facts I conclude that further cohabitation would only take place with serious risk to the life or health of the petitioner. The action of the respondent seem to me characterized not merely by heartlessness but by calculated cruelty. From the whole of these facts I conclude that further cohabitation would only take place with serious risk to the life or health of the petitioner. The action of the respondent seem to me characterized not merely by heartlessness but by calculated cruelty. Under these circumstances I have no hesitation in granting the dissolution of marriage which is prayed for, and I grant the petitioner the custody of the three children. If the respondent is again in profitable employment, an application for alimony may be made to this Court. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of these proceedings. The order for dissolution will not take effect for six months.