JUDGMENT Mitra, J. - This is an appeal in a suit for rent in kind. The land covered by the suit is included in a shikmi taluk. The Defendant was a dakhi or burgadar and the Subordinate Judge finds that he was thus a raiyat paying an ascertained quantity of crops instead of rent in specie. Afterwards the superior landlord created in favour of the Plaintiff a jotedari right. The Plaintiff instituted the present suit for recovery of the dakhi burga paddy which the Defendant was found to give as rent under the condition of his lease. The Munsif held that the Plaintiff as a jote lar had a superior right to that of the Defendant and as the malik did not object to his getting rent from the Defendant he was entitled by his settlement to get the burga paddy from the Defendant as rent. The Munsif accordingly decreed the suit. In appeal the Subordinate Judge has reversed the decree of the Munsif holding that the right which the Plaintiff obtained on settlement from the superior landlord was of the same description as that of the Defendant and therefore could there be no relationship of landlord and tenant between them and as there was no proof of an assignment of the lessor's right to collect rent from the Defendant, the Plaintiff was not entitled to a decree. 2. In the present appeal the first contention raised by the learned vakil for the Respondent is that under sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act no second appeal lies and he has relied upon a judgment of this Court in appeal from Appellate Decree No. 703 of 1901. It seems to me, however, that the question decided by the Subordinate Judge is one of conflicting interests as regards the land covered by the suit and therefore the proviso of sec. 153 applies. A similar question arose in appeal from Appellate Decree No. 2264 of 1898, Since reported, sec 8 C. W. N. 437 decided on the 5th January 1900, and it was held in that case under circumstances very similar to the present that appeal would lie under the proviso of sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In a judgment in appeal from Appellate Decree No. 320 of 1901, Since reported, sec 8 C. W. N. 434 decided by Mr. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In a judgment in appeal from Appellate Decree No. 320 of 1901, Since reported, sec 8 C. W. N. 434 decided by Mr. Justice Brett and myself, we said speaking of the last case: "In that case the Plaintiff as well as the Defendant claimed to be raiyats under the same landlord. The Plaintiff stated that the Defendant was a sub-raiyat. The Defendant stated that he is not a sub-raiyat but had the same status as the Plaintiff himself. There were thus in that case conflicting interests set up by the parties and decided." The present appeal is very similar to appeal No. 2264 of 1898 Since reported, sec 8 C. W. N. 434 and I think therefore that the second appeal lies. 3. The next point for consideration which is raised by the vakil for the Appellant is that the Subordinate Judge has erred in dismissing the suit on the ground that the status of the Plaintiff as created by the superior landlord was the same as that of the Defendant and therefore he was not entitled to claim rent from the Defendant. I failed to see how it can be said that simply because a landlord chose to call the Plaintiff a jotedar, that is a raiyat with a right of occupancy, therefore he is not entitled to get rent from the Defendant when, as a matter of fact, the right created by the landlord is one intermediate between the landlord himself and the Defendant. The Plaintiff by the lease which he obtained from the landlord became an intermediate holder and it does not matter whether he is called jotedar or tenure-holder. As between the superior landlord and the Defendant, the right of the one to receive rent has passed by the creation of the intermediate holding to the Plaintiff. 4. The Plaintiff is now in the position of a landlord to the Defendant. No formal assignment is necessary, specially as it has been found by the Munsif that the landlord does not object to the Plaintiff receiving rent from the Defendant. The Defendant also has nothing to loose as he pays to the Plaintiff what he was paying to the superior landlord and is exonerated from his liability to the superior landlord. It is quite immaterial whether the Plaintiff is designated a tenure-holder or raiyat. The Defendant also has nothing to loose as he pays to the Plaintiff what he was paying to the superior landlord and is exonerated from his liability to the superior landlord. It is quite immaterial whether the Plaintiff is designated a tenure-holder or raiyat. He is to all intents and purposes an intermediate holder with a right to receive rent from the Defendant. The decision as regards the status of the Plaintiff in relation to the Defendant is foreign to the object of the suit and quite irrelevant. The case of Kallum Sheik v. Panchoo Mundal 11 W. R. 128 (1869) is clearly distinguishable. That case was one for a kabuliyat at an enhanced rent and not an ordinary suit for rent and that was a case under Act X of 1859, and it was found that the Plaintiff there had not, having regard to the circumstances of the case, a right to enhance the rent. I do not therefore think that that case is applicable to the facts of the present case, I am of opinion therefore that the Plaintiff is entitled to the decree he prayed for and that the decision of the Subordinate Judge must be reversed and that of the Munsif restored with costs. Maclean, C.J. and Pargiter, J. 5. In this case the lower Appellate Court found that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist, for there was no proof of any assignment of the Plaintiff's lessor's right to collect rent from the Defendant. Upon that finding it is not open to the Plaintiff to sue the Defendant for rent. He cannot sue for rent, unless that relationship exists. This being a second appeal this Court is bound by that finding, and the more so as it is doubtful whether there is any lease granted by the superior landlord to the Plaintiff. There is nothing to show that there was any such lease, nor is there anything definite to show what the precise rights of the Plaintiff were as derived from the superior landlord. 6. I, however, base my decision on second appeal, upon this finding of the Court below. I, therefore, think that this appeal must be allowed and the decree of the Subordinate Judge upheld with costs.