JUDGMENT : Burkitt, J. The sole question discussed in this appeal is a very narrow one. It is whether or not the payment by the mother and natural guardian of minors of interest due on a bond executed by the father of the minor, saves the bar of limitation as being a payment within the meaning of section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. The other ground of appeal stated in the memorandum of appeal has been abandoned. Section 20 of the Limitation Act runs as follows:— “When interest on a debt or legacy is before the expiration of the prescribed period paid as such by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf * * * a new period of limitation according to the nature of the original liability shall be computed from the time when payment was made.” This section contemplates a payment by the party liable to pay personally or by a duly authorised agent. The payment was not made in this case by the minor defendants, and the question therefore is whether or not payment by their mother, who is their natural guardian, is a payment by an agent within the meaning of the section. There appears to be no authority on this point in this High Court. In the case of Wajiban v. Kadir Bakshi, [1886] I.L.R., 13 Cal, 292 it was held that if person merely by reason of being the mother and guardian of a minor, has no authority to make an acknowledgment of a debt on behalf of the minor, so as to give a creditor a fresh start for the period of limitation, This was a ruling upon section XIX of the Act which makes an acknowledgment of liability in writing, signed by the party against whom any property or right is claimed, a fresh starting point for the period of limitation. 2. According to explanation 2 of that section “signed” means “signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf.” There is a close analogy between the two sections. In the one case the acknowledgment must be signed personally or by a duly authorised agent; in the other the payment must be made personally or by a duly authorised agent. In the one case the acknowledgment must be signed personally or by a duly authorised agent; in the other the payment must be made personally or by a duly authorised agent. In the case of Kailasa Padiachi v. Ponnakanun Achi, [1895] I.L.R, 18 Mad., 456 it was held in the case of a mother and guardian of an infant who borrowed money for the expenses of her infant son, and executed a bond to secure repayment and who had remained in the management of her infant son's affairs and paid interest on the debt after he had attained majority, that the payment so made gave a fresh start for the period of limitation. This case appears to have-been decided on the ground that the payment of interest on an existing debt being an ordinary incident of management, and the mother in that case having the management, of her son's affairs, the legal inference might be drawn that the authority given to her by her son to manage his property included an authority to make the payment of interest. Reference, however, is made in the judgment to several cafes from which the principle is deduced that a guardian is legally competent, in the ordinary course of management, either to acknowledge a debt due by his or her ward, or to make a part payment, or to pay interest. We are unable to agree in this. We think that the Calcutta High Court was right in holding in the case to which we have referred that a mother “in the absence of any special authority being proved to exist in her, cannot be regarded as an agent on the part of the minors duly authorised in that behalf within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation law and that a person merely by reason of her being the mother and natural guardian, has no authority to make an acknowledgment on behalf of the minors so as to give a creditor a fresh start for the period of limitation.” The decision of the Calcutta High Court was approved of by the Bombay High Court in the case of Maharana Shri Ran Mahittgji v. Vadilal Vadhat Chand, [1894] I.L.R., 20 Bom., 61. We therefore think that the decision, of the lower appellate Court on this point was correct, and we dismiss the appeal with costs. 3. We therefore think that the decision, of the lower appellate Court on this point was correct, and we dismiss the appeal with costs. 3. [A similar question was argued but not decided in Perisami v. Seetharama, [1903] 14 M.L.J.R., 85; c.f also Annapagauda v. Sangadigyapa, [1901] I.L.R., 26 Bom., 221 (234).—ED.]