JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen, was brought by the plaintiffs-respondents to recover the amount alleged to be due to them on foot of two mortgage-bonds, dated respectively the 18th of March, 1885, and the 19th of February, 1889, by sale of the mortgaged property. The mortgage of the 18th of March, 1885, is a usufructuary mortgage. The learned Vakil for the respondents has ingeniously contended before us that this mortgage is not to be regarded as a usufructuary mortgage but one which is called in the Transfer Property Act an “anomalous mortgage.” We cannot accede to his argument, for it appears to us upon a perusal of the instrument to be a usufructuary mortgage and nothing else. In it there is a clause that if the possession of the mortgagee is interfered with in violation of the contract of the mortgagor, the mortgagee may bring a suit and realize the amount due to him together with interest from the mortgagor and her property. Possession was not given to the mortgagees in accordance with the terms of the agreement, and in consequence of this, the plaintiffs brought a suit in February, 1887, for possession of the property and also for two years' arrears of interest. On the 17th of May, 1887, a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs in that suit and formal possession was given to the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding this the defendant, mortgagor, continued to demand and receive the rents of the mortgaged property from the tenants. In consequence of this action on her part, the present suit was instituted after an unsuccessful demand for possession, and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs, which was subsequently set aside on the ground that one of the defendants was absent on a pilgrimage at the time when the suit was instituted and had never been served with the summons. The case was reheard and a decree was again passed in favour of the plaintiffs. That decree is now under appeal. 2. The case was reheard and a decree was again passed in favour of the plaintiffs. That decree is now under appeal. 2. The learned Counsel on behalf of the appellants has contended before us that inasmuch as in the suit of 1887, the plaintiffs claimed merely possession of the mortgaged property, and two years' arrears of interest and did not claim payment of the mortgage debt, they are now under the provision of section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, debarred from recovering the mortgage-debt in this suit. 3. We may observe that the learned Vakil for the respondents felt bound to admit that if the mortgage of 1885 was a usufructuary mortgage, the decree, so far as that mortgage is concerned, for sale of the mortgaged property cannot be maintained. As we are clearly of opinion that it Is a usufructuary mortgage, the appeal must succeed to that extent, and a money decree for the mortgage-debt in respect of that mortgage alone be granted. 4. As regards the contention raised under section 43, we are of: opinion that the cause of action in the suit of 1887 was not the same cause of action as that advanced in the present suit, and therefore that section has no application. When possession was given under the decree of 1887, the defendants are precluded from alleging that possession was not so given. The formal possession by the Court must be treated, as between the mortgagor and the mortgagees, as completely satisfying the, order of the Court and so passing possession to the mortgagees. Consequently, when the mortgagors persisted in recovering rents from the tenants after that decree and after that possession had been given to the mortgagees under it, there was a new cause of action and not the same cause of action in respect of which the other suit was brought. This being our view, we are of opinion that the contention so ingeniously advanced on behalf of the appellants must fail. 5. As regards the mortgage of 19th of February, 1889, that is admittedly a simple hypothecation of the property, and it is not denied, but that the plaintiffs-respondents are, entitled to hold their decree so far as regards it, save in respect of the matter of interest. The interest fixed by the mortgage is 12 annas per cent per mensem. 5. As regards the mortgage of 19th of February, 1889, that is admittedly a simple hypothecation of the property, and it is not denied, but that the plaintiffs-respondents are, entitled to hold their decree so far as regards it, save in respect of the matter of interest. The interest fixed by the mortgage is 12 annas per cent per mensem. The rate of interest awarded by the decree is Re per cent per mensem. So far therefore as the excess given, by the decree is concerned, it must be modified, The result then will be that the appeal will be allowed in part, the order for sale on the mortgage of the 18th of March, 1885, discharged, and in respect of that mortgage a simple decree for the amount due thereon only awarded. It appears that the mortgagor is dead and that the appellants are her representatives. They are clearly only liable to the extent of assets received by them from the mortgagor; and accordingly it will be provided in the decree that the amount due on foot on the mortgage of the 18th of March, 1885, shall be satisfied out of the assets of the mortgagor alone. As regards the mortgage of the 19th of February, 1889, the decree for sale will stand, but interest will be allowed only at the rate of 12 annas per cent per mensem. The amount due on foot of the mortgage of the 18th of March, 1885, has been calculated and is admitted, to be the sum of Rs. 18,374-9-7, and the amount due on foot of the mortgage of the 19th of February, 1889, has likewise been ascertained to be Rs. 5,751-0-0. For the former amount we give a simple money decree, to be realized out of the assets of the mortgagor, and in respect of the latter sum the decree for sale of the mortgaged property will stand. The time for payment by the representatives of the mortgagor of the amount so ascertained to be due with interest at the rate of 12 annas per cent per mensem up to the date of payment will be on or before the first day of June next. Each party will pay and receive half their costs from the other side, and will bear the remainder themselves.