JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. The only question in this second appeal is whether or not the suit instituted by the plaintiff for redemption of mortgaged property is premature, The court of first instance decreed the claim. But Upon appeal the lower appellate court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to redeem the mortgage before the expiration of the term of 15 years for which the mortgage was granted. By the mortgage, which is dated the 13th of March 1901 one Manghu Halwai, the predecessor in title of the plaintiff, mortgaged with possession for a term of 15 years two houses and shops situate in the city of Jaunpur. By it the mortgagee was empowered to remain in possession of the mortgaged property from the date of the execution of the mortgage, he either occupying the same himself or placing others in possession, and taking the profits in lieu of interest on the mortgage debt. The mortgagor agreed to pay the debt on the expiry of the term, whereupon the mortgage should be redeemed. The deed contained the following provision that if the property “be found to have been mortgaged of hypothecated or transferred to any one, or if there should arise any cause which might be considered likely to affect the total or partial loss of the principal mortgage money and, interest,” the mortgagee shall have power to realize the entire mortgage money with interest thereon at the rate of Rs. 3-2-0 per cent per mensem, from the mortgagor from his property without waiting for the expiration of the term. Immediately, after the execution of the mortgage, Manghu Halwai sold and transferred the property to the plaintiff who, on the 16th of July, 1901, instituted the suit, out of which this second appeal has arisen. 2. The learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant contends that the right of redemption and the right of foreclosure are always co-extensive, and that where there is an express provision in a mortgage giving the mortgagee the power to realize his debt at any time a stipulation postponding the mortgagor's right to redeem is void. As authority for tin's proposition, he has cited the cases of Sayad Abdul Hak Sardar vs. Ghulam Jilani, [1895] I.L.R. 20 Bom. 677 and Sari vs. Motiram, [1896] I.L.R. 22 Bom. 375. As authority for tin's proposition, he has cited the cases of Sayad Abdul Hak Sardar vs. Ghulam Jilani, [1895] I.L.R. 20 Bom. 677 and Sari vs. Motiram, [1896] I.L.R. 22 Bom. 375. The right of redemption may undoubtedly be postponed by a covenant that during a certain period the estate shall remain irredeemable. Arrangements of this nature are of common occurrence. It is advantageous to both parties—the mortgagee obtaining the advantage of a continuing security for his money, while the mortgagor is free from the expense and trouble of finding new lenders. Where a restraint upon redemption extends for a long period, of say 30 years or upwards, the contract may no doubt be regarded by a Court of Equity as unconscionable or oppressive, and it might also be considered unreasonable if the mortgage-deed enable the mortgagee at any time during the term arbitrarily to call into his debt, while the mortgagor was restrained from redeeming. This, however, is not the case before us. The term of the mortgage is 15 years and the provision in the deed, whereby the mortgagee is empowered to recover his mortgage debt during the term, does not appear to us to be unreasonable or oppressive. 3. Under that provision he has not, we think, power to require payment arbitrarily, but Only in the event of the discovery of a prior mortgage, or of anything arising which might in the view of a reasonable minded man be considered likely to cause total or partial loss of the debt. The words “if there should arise any cause which might be considered likely to effect the total or partial loss” of the debt must we think be interpreted not as giving a mortgagee a right from mere caprice or unreasonable apprehension of loss to call in his debt, but only as giving him this right if anything should arise which in the view of reasonably minded men might cause any such loss. The provision does not appear to us to be unreasonable or to give the mortgagee any undue advantage. The right of redemption and the right of foreclosure or sale do not appear to us to be always and under all circumstances co-extensive. The provision does not appear to us to be unreasonable or to give the mortgagee any undue advantage. The right of redemption and the right of foreclosure or sale do not appear to us to be always and under all circumstances co-extensive. The right of redemption may be postponed during a certain period, just as the right of the mortgagee to call in his debt may be limited, and in the latter case the limitation may be greater than that upon the right to redeem. As we understand the law, both the rights rest upon the terms of the document itself, and in this case the mortgagee has satisfied us from the nature of the mortgage and the language of the deed that the restriction on redemption is not unfair or unduly onerous, and that the claim for redemption is premature. The continued enjoyment by him of the mortgaged property for the prescribed period formed a material part of the contract, of the benefit of which it would be inequitable to deprive the mortgagee. 4. For the foregoing reasons we think that the view adopted by the lower appellate Court was correct, and we dismiss the appeal with costs.