JUDGMENT 1. The question raised in this case is one between two rival purchasers of a tenure, one of them being, a purchaser at a private sale, and the other a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree for rent obtained by the landlord. The matter seems to have been dealt with in a proceeding started by the Defendant under sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the Assistant Settlement Officer held that the Defendant was entitled to possession of the property in question, and he accordingly made an order to that effect. There was an appeal by the Plaintiff to the Special Judge, who affirmed the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer. In the course of the judgment that he then delivered, he observed; that a formal issue as to the true character of the Plaintiff's purchase ought to have been raised before the Settlement Officer, but the omission to frame such an issue did not or could not affect the decision of the case. And he also observed that, if the parties desired, they might litigate the same question in a Civil Court. Subsequently, the present suit was instituted by the Plaintiff, the purchaser at the private sale, to have his title under the sale determined as against the Defendant. The suit has been dismissed by the Courts below upon the ground that, having regard to sec. 9 of Act III (B. C.) of 1898 by which the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 was amended, the decision of the Settlement Officer was final and, therefore, the question of title raised by the Plaintiff could not be gone into. And the sole question that we have to determine in this appeal is whether the view of the law that has been adopted by the Courts below is right. Now, there can be, we think, no doubt that, under sec. 106 of the Act of 1885, as it stood upon the dates of the decisions of the Assistant Settlement Officer and the Special Judge in appeal, no question such as has been raised in this case or was raised between the parties in the proceeding restituted by the Defendant before the Settlement Officer, viz., a question of title between two rival purchasers, could be dealt with and determined. Sec. 106 as it then stood must be read by the light of, and with reference to, sec. Sec. 106 as it then stood must be read by the light of, and with reference to, sec. 102 of the Act of 1885; and the two sections, read together, clearly indicate that, in regard to such matters only as are mentioned in the latter section, the Settlement Officer was authorised to deal with and come to a decision, such as would be a decree within the meaning of sec. 107 of the Act. If authority upon this matter were needed, we would refer to the case of Pandit Sardar v. Mrajan Mirdha I. L. R. 21 Cal. 378 (1893). In that case, a question similar to the one that is raised here seems to have been raised and discussed and, in the course of the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Banerjee it was observed as follows:--"It was argued that the words of sec. 106 which authorise the Revenue Officer to hear and decide disputes as to the correctness of entries made by him are unlimited in their scope; and that the Revenue Officer in this case was, therefore, authorised to decide whether the Plaintiff or the Defendant was the person entitled to the land in dispute; and that if he was so authorized by sec. 106, his decision must have the force of a decree under sec. 107 of the Act, We cannot accede to this contention If we were to confine our attention to sec 106, possibly the words of that section might be taken to be unlimited in their scops; but we must regard it as one of a group of sections, the object of which is not to have questions of disputed right as between tenant and tenant conclusively determined, but only to enable the landlord to have a summary determination of the matters referred to in sec. 102. That sec. 106 must receive a limited construction is clear from the cases that have been decided by this Court with reference to what is the proper scope of an inquiry in a record of rights proceeding." That case seems to have been followed in the case of Hare Mohan Mop Churamoni v. Pran Nath Mitter I. L. R. 27 Cal. 364 (1900). So that we may take it that the question of title as is raised between the parties before us could not be determined by the Revenue Officer under sec. 364 (1900). So that we may take it that the question of title as is raised between the parties before us could not be determined by the Revenue Officer under sec. 106 of the Act of 1885, as it stood upon the date of the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer and that of the Special Judge. Let us then consider the effect of sec. 9 of the Amending Act (B. C. III of 1898), That section runs as follows:--" Every settlement of rent or decision of a dispute by a Revenue Officer under sec. 104or sec. 106of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, before the commencement of this Act, in respect of which no appeal has before the commencement of this Act, been preferred to the Special Judge appointed under sec. 108 of that Act, shall have the force and effect of a decree of a Civil Court in a suit between the parties and shall be final, provided that an appeal shall lie to the District Judge from any such settlement or decision which was made or given within thirty days before the commencement of this Act, if the appeal be presented within thirty days from the date of such settlement or decision." The contention raised on behalf of the Defendant which found favour with the Courts below was that this section was intended to make final any decision come to by a Revenue Officer under sec. 106 of Act VIII of 1885, if it was given before the commencement of the Amending Act, whatever might be the character of the question dealt with by that officer. We do not think that such was the intention of the Legislature, We are of opinion that the decision by a Revenue Officer under sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 contemplated by the section was meant to be a decision in regard to a dispute which could be decided by the Revenue Officer under the said sec. 106; otherwise we should have to hold that the Legislature meant to lay down that, whether the Revenue Officer was competent or not to make a decision under sec. 106, it would be final for all purposes. We are unable to attribute to the Legislature such an intention. 2. As to the words in sec. 106; otherwise we should have to hold that the Legislature meant to lay down that, whether the Revenue Officer was competent or not to make a decision under sec. 106, it would be final for all purposes. We are unable to attribute to the Legislature such an intention. 2. As to the words in sec. 9 "shall have the force of a decree of a Civil Court in a suit between the parties and shall be final," we need only say that, in sec. 107, as it stood in the old Act of 1885, the words were" the decision of the Revenue Officer in every such proceeding shall have the force of a decree;" and, in some cases, the question was raised whether, though the decision of a Revenue Officer would have the force of a decree, it was final for all purposes, and whether the same question could be litigated over again in the Civil Court; and it is likely that the Legislature meant to make the matter properly clear by providing that the decision of the Revenue Officer should not only have the force of a decree of a Civil Court, but should also be final. We need not examine sec. 9 any further, for, we do not think that there is any thing in the other portions of the section which detracts from the view that we have expressed as to the true intention of the Legislature in framing the first paragraph of the section, The conclusion we come to is that the Courts below were wrong in holding that the decision of the Settlement Officer and of the Special Judge in appeal is final, and that the question of title raised between the parties in this case cannot be gone into. We need hardly add that, so far as the Special Judge was concerned, he did not think that his decision would be final between the parties concerned, for, he distinctly said that the Plaintiff might, if he desired, litigate the matter over again in the Civil Court. The result is that the decisions of the lower Courts must be set aside, and the case sent back to the Court of first instance for trial on the merits. Costs will abide the result.