JUDGMENT : Knox, J. (After stating the facts as above, his Lordship proceeded as follows:—) The language of this decree might at first sight appear inconsistent, for while it decreed the appeal which, as we have shown above related to mesne profits without any reservation, it refers later on to possession only of that portion of the property regarding which plaintiff's claim had been dismissed. After hearing the learned counsel on both sides and giving the words contained in the decree full consideration, we are of opinion that the decree of this Court must be interpreted as allowing the plaintiff's claim for mesne profits. To put any other interpretation would be to nullify the opening words of the decree. Where in the decree it is stated that in all other respects the decree of the Court below is confirmed, this imports an award of mesne profits on all property the possession of which was decreed to the plaintiffs. This we think is the reasonable, as it is undoubtedly the equitable, construction to be put on the decree. The learned counsel for the respondent endeavored to support the order of the Court below on the ground that had been decided against him in that Court, i.e., that the application was barred. The decree, which we have held, carried with it a right to have mesne profits assessed, was passed on the 12th June, 1894, and it is admitted that the plaintiffs got possession of the property in that year. The application to have mesne profits assessed was not made until the 26th September 1900. If either Article 178 or 179 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act could be held to apply, no doubt the application is beyond time. The learned vakil for the appellants relies on the Full Bench decision to be found in Puran Ckand v. Roy Radha Kishen, (1892) I.L.R., 19 Cal., 132 where it was held that neither of these articles was applicable, and that in fact the assessment of mesne profits which had been left for subsequent ascertainment was a matter which a Court was bound on the oral application of the decree-holder or without any such application to determine. This has been followed by this Court in Fatima Bibi v. Abdul Majid, (1892) I.L.R., 14 All., 531 at p. 537. We agree with these decisions. This has been followed by this Court in Fatima Bibi v. Abdul Majid, (1892) I.L.R., 14 All., 531 at p. 537. We agree with these decisions. A construction of the law which might “result in keeping such matters open for an indefinite time is at first sight somewhat startling, but it has to be remembered” that when a claim is made for possession of property and mesne profits, the Court may dispose of the whole of the claim at once. It may also, as a matter of convenience to itself, leave over the question of mesne profits for subsequent ascertainment. When a claim is made by a plaintiff for possession and for mesne profits, the plaintiff is entitled to have an adjudication on the whole of his claim, and until the question of mesne profits has been decided, the suit cannot be said to have been finally disposed of. This disposes of the appeal. 2. The result is that this appeal is decreed with costs, the order of the Court below so far as it refuses mesne profits referred to above, is set aside, and the case remanded to that Court with a view to the amount of such mesne profits being ascertained. 3. When the Court has ascertained the amount of mesne profits, it will deal with the rest of the decree-holder's application and will award costs to the decree-holders in proportion to the amount decreed in their favour.