JUDGMENT : Stanley, J. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the plaintiff, Sheo Narain, to have it declared that a deed of sale, which was executed by Musammat Hardei, the widow of one Bhawani Dat, was not binding on the plaintiff; the same having been executed by her without legal necessity. In the suit the daughter of Bhawani and Musammat-Hardei, namily Musammat Nanhi, was impleaded. The allegation of the plaintiff is that he is the nearest reversionary heir to Bhawani Dat, expectant on the death of Musammat Hardei, and her daughter, Musammat Nanhi, without male issue and as such, he was entitled to maintain the suit. He alleged that the sale was made without legal necessity, and that Musammat Nanhi acted in collusion with her mother, and was not likely to take any steps to have the sale-deed set aside. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the same was made without legal necessity. In fact, in his Judgment, he states that it was frankly admitted by the learned pleader for the defendant that there was no evidence to show that it had been made to meet a legal necessity. He also found that Musammat Nanhi, who is aged about 45 years of age, and has no children, was acting in collusion with her mother, and that the plaintiff, as the nearest reversionary heir, was entitled to maintain the suit. He accordingly passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. From this decree an appeal was preferred to the learned District Judge. He was of opinion upon, the evidence that Musammat Nanhi was not proved to have been acting in collusion with her mother, and that this being so, having, regard to the authorities, the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain a suit for a declaratory decree. Accordingly he dismissed the suit, without determining the question whether or not the deed had been made to meet a legal necessity. Upon the question as to whether or not an heir other than the neatest reversionary heir can maintain a suit of this kind there is a conflict of authority. The authorities, in fact, of this High Court upon the question are not consistent. Upon the question as to whether or not an heir other than the neatest reversionary heir can maintain a suit of this kind there is a conflict of authority. The authorities, in fact, of this High Court upon the question are not consistent. We, however, have a clear rule to guide us in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Rani Anand Kunwar v. The Court of Wards, [1881] L.R., 8 I.A., 14; S.C.I.L.R., 6 Cal. 764. From that judgment we gather that ordinarily a suit of this kind must be brought by the presumptive reversionary heir and not by a more remote heir. 3. This, however, though it is a general rule, is not without exceptions. We also gather from the judgment that even a more distant reversioner than a contingent reversionary heir may bring such a suit if those nearer in succession are in collusion with the widow or have, precluded themselves from interfering. In the course of their judgment, their Lordships say at page 22, as follows:— “Their Lordships are of opinion that although a suit of this-nature may be brought by a contingent reversionary heir, yet that, as a general rule, it must be brought by the presumptive reversionary heir, that is to say, by the person who would succeed if the widow were to die at that moment” They are also of opinion that such suit may be brought by a more distant reversioner, if those nearer in succession are in collusion with the widow or have precluded themselves from interfering.” Now it is clear that ordinarily a suit of this description ought not to have been brought by the plaintiff, but the question is whether the circumstances were not such as to justify him in instituting the suit. It was stated in the plaint that Musammat Nanhi was not prepared to impeach the sale in question, and she was made a party to the suit. The Subordinate Judge was, as we take the law to be, bound to go into the question and ascertain whether or not the facts proved justified him in awarding the relief which the plaintiff sought. An investigation of the evidence satisfied him that Musammat Nanhi was colluding with her mother and had no intention, of impeaching the transaction. The Subordinate Judge was, as we take the law to be, bound to go into the question and ascertain whether or not the facts proved justified him in awarding the relief which the plaintiff sought. An investigation of the evidence satisfied him that Musammat Nanhi was colluding with her mother and had no intention, of impeaching the transaction. He was also satisfied that the deed was executed without any legal necessity, and it was also proved to his satisfaction that the plaintiff was the nearest reversionary heir, expectant on the death of Musammat Nanhi. 4. This being so, he passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the learned District Judge adopted a course which we cannot approve. It was a matter of discretion in the court of first instance to give relief to the plaintiff, having regard to the provisions of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The Subordinate Judge thought that the case was one in which he was justified in exercising that discretion, and passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff. The learned District Judge, however came to the conclusion that a case of collusion between the mother and daughter was not established, and that consequently the rulings of this court precluded the plaintiff absolutely from maintaining the suit by reason of the fact that he was not the presumptive reversionary heir. We do not think that the ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council justified him in dismissing the suit upon this ground, for as we have pointed out, their Lordships say that in some cases a more distant reversioner may institute and maintain a suit of the kind. We think that the learned District Judge was wrong in interfering with the discretion which had been exercised by the learned Subordinate Judge and ought not to have dismissed the suit on the sole ground that the plaintiff was not the presumptive reversionary heir. He ought to have determined the several issues which were dealt with by the court of first instance, and particularly the issues as to whether or not the sale deed was made to a legal necessity. He ought to have determined the several issues which were dealt with by the court of first instance, and particularly the issues as to whether or not the sale deed was made to a legal necessity. For these reasons we allow the appeal, we set aside the decree of the lower appellate court, and we remand the appeal under the, provisions of section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that court with directions that it be replaced in the register of pending appeals and be disposed of according to law. Costs here and hitherto will abide the event.