JUDGMENT : BLAIR, J. 1. The suit out of which this second appeal arises is a suit brought by the respondent for pre-emption under the following circumstances: The village in which the property sold is situated was subject to a wajib-ul-arz in which the custom or contract, in our opinion it matters not which, was set forth. A partition took place and the village was formed into two mahals: one containing two-third of the whole undivided village, and the other one-third. The property sold was in a patti which may be briefly described as the two-third mahal. The vendee is a share-holder in the one-third mahal. The pre-emptor claims as being a co-sharer in the other mahal, namely, the two-third mahal. What happened on the partition in relation to the rights of pre-emption is this: a wajib-ul-atz was prepared for each mahal in which provision was made as to the right of pre-emption in words which it is needless to quote. Each mahal proposed to maintain and keep up the custom of preemption as set forth in the settlement wajib-ul-arz applicable to the whole village. Now such custom or contract, whichever it may be, must be held to be subject to such modifications as are rendered necessary by the partition. It seems to us that the substantial and central modification effected by that partition was that persons in each of the two mahals had ceased to be co-sharers in an unbroken village and had not became and never were co-sharers in the mahals created by the partition. 2. Therefore it happens that the pre-emptor is a co-sharer with the vendor, and that the vendee is not a co-sharer of the vendor. Having regard to the judgment in the Full Bench case of Dal-ganjan Singh vs. Kalka Singh, [1900] I.L.R. 22 All, 1 (F.B.) it seems to us that there is no escape from the conclusion that the pre-emptor's right is established. 3. The case seems to fall within the ruling in Dalganjan Singh's case and any amount of ingenuity to draw any substantial distinction between the two cases must fail. Following that case, there-fore as we are bound to do, we hold that the plaintiff in this suit was entitled to pre-empt, and we dismiss the appeal with costs.