JUDGMENT : Stanley, J. It appears to us that this appeal is concluded by authority. The facts are shortly as follows:— “On the 14th of December, 1896, the appellants, Karan Singh and others, obtained a decree under the Rent Act for the profits of their recorded share in ancestral property. The decree was put into execution, and property, which was the joint property of Tota Ram and his sons and grandsons, was attached. Thereupon the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, was instituted by the sons and grandsons of Tota Ram, to have it declared that their shares are not liable to sale in execution of that decree. There is no allegation and could not be, that the debt in respect of which the execution proceedings were had, was for immoral purposes or such a debt as the sons and grandsons are relieved from their pious obligation to satisfy. The lower Courts, however, have come to the conclusion that the debt was a personal debt of Tota Ram, and that his sons and grandsons were not liable in respect of it. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, upholding the decision of the Court of first instance, in his judgment says that “this was a personal decree. Tota Ram's sons cannot be held to be liable for the payment of this. This was not a debt which was contracted for the benefit of the joint family. The appellant contends that where there is no allegation as to the debt being tainted with immorality, the decree would bind the sons also. But in a recent ruling” the High Court has taken a contrary view, vide Manbahal Rai v. Gopal Misra, [1901] A.W.N., 57. The decree not being against the sons and there being no evidence of the money having been applied to their benefit, I think the sons' interest in the ancestral property cannot be taken to satisfy the personal decree against the father alone.” It appears to us that this view is entirely erroneous. It is not necessary in order to establish a son's liability for his father's debt that it should be shown that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the family. It is not necessary in order to establish a son's liability for his father's debt that it should be shown that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the family. It is sufficient in order to establish the liability of sons to pay a personal debt of their father if the debt be proved and the sons cannot show that it was contracted for immoral purposes of was such a “debt as does not fall within the pious duty of the sons to discharge.” From the decree of the Subordinate Judge the present appeal has been preferred. We may observe that the ruling upon which the learned Subordinate Judge relies has no bearing. Reliance has, however, been placed by the respondents upon another ruling of this Court in the case of Ram Dayal v. Durga Singh, [1890] I.L.R., 12 All., 209. In that case it was held that where in execution of a simple money decree obtained against the father only, a member of a joint Hindu family, in respect of a bond debt incurred by him personally, the decree-holders attached the whole of the joint family property, they were not entitled to sell the interest of the sons in that property, and the sons could impeach the attachment of their shares upon the ground that it affected interests which the decree could not touch and which therefore could not be attached under it and that they were in a position to ask to have those interests exempted from the threatened sale in execution. We are unable to follow this decision. It appears to us not only to be inconsistent with an earlier decision of this High Court, but also with the rulings of their Lordships of the Privy Council in later cases. We are unable to follow this decision. It appears to us not only to be inconsistent with an earlier decision of this High Court, but also with the rulings of their Lordships of the Privy Council in later cases. In the case of Beni Madho v. Basdeo Patak, [1889] I.L.R., 12 All., 99 reported in the same volume of the Law Reports at page 99, it was held that where a Hindu son comes into Court to assail either a mortgage made by his father or a decree passed against his father or a sale held or threatened in execution of such decree, where there is nothing to show any limitation of the extent of interest sold or threatened with sale, or charged in a security or dealt with by a decree, it rests upon him if he seeks to escape from having his interest affected by the sale, to establish that the debt he desires to be exempted from paying was of such a character that he, as a Hindu son, would not be under a pious obligation to discharge. In the judgment in that case a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Minakshi Nayudu v. Immudi Kanaka Ramaya Goundan, [1888] L.R. 161. A., ???. is quoted, the facts of which are very similar, if not entirely similar to those in the present case. 2. It is true that the learned Judges who decided the case of Ram Dayal and Durga Singh, endeavored to distinguish the case we have just cited by pointing out that in the one case the sale had actually taken place in execution of the decree whereas in the other no sale had taken place but was only threatened. We are unable to see that that circumstance is a matter which can be regarded as of any importance in the determination of the question before the Court. In the earlier case of Nanomi Babuasin v. Modhun Mohun, [1885] L.R., 13 I.A.; S.C.I.L.R., 13 Cal., 21 it was held that in a sale which took place in execution of a decree passed upon a debt incurred by the head of a joint Mithila family what passed by the sale depended upon the nature of the debt (i.e., whether or not it was tainted with immorality), and the intention of the parties. In that case the debt was similar to the debt in the present case as appears from the judgment at page 16 of the Report. The decree in respect of which the property was sold, was for mesne profits awarded to the decree-holder in respect of land from which he had been wrongfully ousted. In delivering the judgment of their Lordships Lord HOBHOUSE says:— “The circumstances of the present case do not call for any inquiry as to the exact extent to which sons are precluded by a decree and execution proceedings against their father from calling into question the validity of the sale, on the ground that the debt was incurred for immoral purposes or was merely illusory and fictitious. Their Lordships do not think that the authority of Deendyal's case, [1877] L.R., 4 I.A., 247; S.C.I.L.R., 3 Cal., 198 bound the Court to hold that nothing but Girdhari's (i.e., father's) co-parcenary interest passed by the sale. If his debt was of a nature to support a sale of the entirety, he might legally have sold it without suit, or the creditor might legally procure a sale of it by suit. All the sons can claim is that not being parties to the sale or execution proceedings, they ought not to be barred from trying the fact or the nature of the debt in a suit of their own. Assuming they have such a right, it will avail them nothing unless they can prove that the debt was not such as to justify the sale.” These authorities, it seems to us, conclude the question before us. We may also refer to an unreported decision of a Bench of this Court in the case of Kishen Lal v. Banarsi Das, First Appeal No. 80 of 1902, 1 A.L.J.R., 191 (Ed.), in which a similar question to that before the Court was decided, and sons were held responsible for a debt similar to that in the present case. For these reasons we must allow this appeal, set aside the decrees of the lower Courts, and direct that the suit stand dismissed with costs in all Courts.