JUDGMENT : BLAIR, J. 1. This is a reference under rule 17 of the Kumaon: rules of 1894, by the Local Government, asking for our report and opinion upon what is described as a final decree of the Commissioner of the Kumaon Division. A preliminary objection is taken to the effect that this is not a case upon which the Government was authorised by the Rules to make a reference to us. The ground of the preliminary objection is that the amount of the estate in suit; was such as to entitle the parties, if they chose, to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the decree of the Commissioner. It has been argued before us that the word final in rule 17 must mean a decree against which no appeal whatever could lie. In our opinion, that contention is not well-founded,. We see no reason for giving the word final any meaning other than that in which it is used in the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a decree final as far as the Court passing it is concerned. We therefore over-rule the preliminary objection. We have considered, with the assistance of the learned advocate, the facts laid before us. 2. It seems that the parties filed in Court under section 523 of the Code of Civil Procedure an agreement to refer certain differences between them to arbitration. As a matter of fact, two persons were appointed arbitrators upon each side and also a fifth, who is described as the head arbitrator, but who was that we take to be equivalent to an umpire. The Court made an order referring the matter to the specified arbitrators and umpire. Before the time limited for the filing of the award had expired, two of the arbitrators declined to act. No step was taken under the Code of Civil Procedure to replace these arbitrators. Under section 510 of the Code, the Court may, in its discretion, appoint new arbitrators or make an order superseding the arbitration. The Court took neither course. The umpire forwarded a document to the Court, which is of the nature of a compromise and which, he recommended, should become the subject of a decree. Under section 510 of the Code, the Court may, in its discretion, appoint new arbitrators or make an order superseding the arbitration. The Court took neither course. The umpire forwarded a document to the Court, which is of the nature of a compromise and which, he recommended, should become the subject of a decree. Now it is manifest to us, first of all, that this document was not an award by the umpire; secondly, that if he purported to make an award, he had no power to do so either under the agreement, between the parties or by virtue of the provisions of section 515 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There are only two cases provided for by that section in which the umpire is empowered to supersede the arbitrators and himself make the award, firstly, where the arbitrators have allowed the appointed time to expire without making an award and, secondly, where they have delivered to the Court or to the umpire a notice in writing stating that they cannot agree. That is not the case here. The umpire therefore had no power to make the award. The compromise and the recommendation came before the Deputy Commissioner sitting as he believed, in the proceedings which had been filed before him under section 523. The Deputy Commissioner refused to make the decree asked for on the ground (1) that there was no valid award upon which any decree could be passed and (2) that there was no proceeding before, him upon which the compromise presented by the umpire could be filed under section 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our opinion the Deputy Commissioner was perfectly right in that conclusion. An appeal was filed in the Court of the Commissioner of the Kumaon Division that appeal was admitted by the Court, and the order of the Deputy Commissioner was set aside, and a decree was made in accordance with the compromise. We think that the view taken by the Commissioner was wrong. We have examined the agreement to refer, and in that we find no power whatever given to the umpire to make an award. We think that the view taken by the Commissioner was wrong. We have examined the agreement to refer, and in that we find no power whatever given to the umpire to make an award. We therefore differ from the Commissioner's view that “the result was a settlement which must be regarded as combining in itself the double force of a compromise and an arbitration award.” We approve of the decision of the Deputy Commissioner which was set aside in appeal. This is our answer to the reference.