JUDGMENT : Banerji, J. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent to the hearing of this appeal must prevail. The suit was one for arrears of rent brought in the Court of an Assistant Collector of the second class. From the decree of that Court an appeal was lodged in the Court of the Collector. The Collector was of opinion that the suit was not maintainable in a Court of revenue, and ordered the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court. From that order of the Collector an appeal was preferred to the District Judge. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that such an appeal did not lie. Section 175 of the N.W.P. Tenancy Act, No. II of 1901, provides that no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any Court under the Act except as provided therein. Sub-section 2 of section 180 allows an appeal to the District Judge from an appellate decree of a Collector in certain cases. 2. If the order from which the appeal to the District Judge was preferred, was an appellate decree, an appeal certainly lay to the Judge as a question of jurisdiction had been decided. The N.W.P. Tenancy Act does not define the word decree. Therefore, having regard to the provisions of section 193 of the Act, the definition of the word as given in section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure must apply. Under the definition an order directing the plaint to be returned is not a decree, being one of the orders specified in section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 588 is by the provisions of section 193 of Act II of 1901 declared to be inapplicable to suits and proceedings in the Revenue Court. Consequently if an appeal lay from an appellate decree of the Collector, it could only lie under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, and that Act, as we have already said, allows an appeal from an appellate decree of the Collector and not from an appellate order. Consequently no appeal lay to the Judge, and this appeal must fail. We accordingly dismiss it with costs.