JUDGMENT : Blair, J. This appeal arises out of an order passed in execution of a decree by an Assistant Collector of the first class. The sole point raised in the appeal before us is whether an appeal Jay from that order to the District Judge. The decree was passed in a suit falling under No. 16 of Group B, Schedule IV of Act II of 1901. We have examined seriatim the sections which provide for appeals against decisions of officers of different grades, and we find a marked distinction between the cases in which appeals are allowed against the orders of the Assistant Collectors of the Second Class and orders of Assistant Collectors of the First Class It is expressly laid : down in section 176 of Act II of 1901, that an appeal shall lie to the Collector from the decree or order of an Assistant Collector of the second class in cases which include applications mentioned in Group D of the schedule. By section 177 an appeal lies to the District Judge from the decree of an Assistant Collector of the First Class in the suits included in Groups A and B of schedule IV. In that section the word ‘order’ is omitted and no doubt intentionally. 2. By that section, therefore, an appeal is allowed exclusively in the case of a decree by an Assistant Collector. The contention on behalf of the respondent is that by necessary inference the provisions of section 193 provide for an appeal to the District Judge in those cases in which the order of an Assistant Collector of the first class amounts to a decree, There can be no question in the present case that the order passed by the Assistant Collector was an order within the meaning of section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure; an order under that section is by virtue of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure included in the term “decree”; so that though the section does not in itself deal with appeals at all, it seems to us that by applying to the provisions of the N.W.P. Tenancy Act of 1901, the procedure enacted in the Code of Civil Procedure, it confers upon such orders the status of decrees and consequently there is a right of appeal from such orders under section 177. Tin's conclusion is in harmony with that which has been arrived at in an unreported case, E.S.A. 275 of 1903, decided by one of us last year. As to the propriety of that decision we entertain no doubt. We are of opinion, therefore, that the Court below rightly exercised its jurisdiction of appeal. This appeal, therefore, must fail. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. BANERJI, J. The question in this case is whether the appeal which the present appellant preferred to the lower appellate Court from an order of the Assistant Collector, dated the 5th December, 1902, lay to that Court. The Court below has held that no appeal lay. In my judgment the contention of the appellant must prevail. The order appealed against was an order granting execution of a decree. An order granting execution is an order under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure which by reason of section 193 of the N.W.P. Tenancy Act of 1901 is applicable to proceedings in a Court of Revenue. It appears that the respondent obtained a decree for arrears of rent, and the arrears not having been paid, applied for ejectment of the appellant. For reasons, into which it is not necessary now to enter, the Court to which the application was made, dismissed it. Subsequently that Court made the order, dated the 5th December, 1902, directing that the decree be executed. It is from that order that the appeal to the Court below was brought. Section 177 of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie to the District Judge from the decree of an Assistant Collector of the First Class in any of the suits included in Group A in which the value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 100. This was a suit included in Group A, and the value of it exceeded Rs. 100. If the order from which the appeal to “the Court below was made is a decree, undoubtedly an appeal did lie to that Court under section 177. As I have already said, the order being one granting execution of the decree was an order under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and consequently came within the definition of the word “decree.” Whether or not the appeal would succeed upon the merits is a question with which I am not concerned. As I have already said, the order being one granting execution of the decree was an order under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and consequently came within the definition of the word “decree.” Whether or not the appeal would succeed upon the merits is a question with which I am not concerned. Having regard to the provisions of the law referred to above, I think an appeal lay to the lower appellate Court and the learned Judge was wrong in refusing to entertain it. I accordingly allow the appeal and remand the case under section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Court below for disposal according to law. Costs here and hitherto will abide the event.