JUDGMENT : Burkitt, J. The question raised in this appeal is not a novel one. It has been the subject of consideration by three Benches at least of this High Court. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen, was brought by the plaintiff for pre-emption. After the service of summons on the defendants the parties agreed to refer the matter to arbitration, and an arbitration agreement was drawn up and signed. Notwithstanding this agreement, the case came on for hearing before the court of first instance, when in the absence of evidence to establish the agreement, the court was not satisfied that any such agreement existed and proceeded to determine the suit on the merits. On appeal the lower appellate Court being dissatisfied with the refusal of the court of first instance to allow time to one of the parties to prove the agreement, remanded an issue under section 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the court of first instance for determination. The issue was whether or not a valid agreement to refer to arbitration had been executed. This issue was found in the affirmative. The learned District Judge, however, came to the conclusion that the agreement to refer the matter in dispute to arbitration was not a bar to the further prosecution of the suit. He therefore considered the evidence and decided the suit on the merits, giving a decree to the plaintiffs for pre-emption. On appeal to the High Court our brother, BLAIR, came to the conclusion that the agreement was a bar to the suit, and dismissed the suit with costs in all courts. From his decree the present appeal has been preferred under section 10 of the Letters Patent. 2. The contention of the appellants before us is that section 21 of the Specific Relief Act only applies to agreements entered into before suits, and does not apply to an agreement such as the present, which was entered into pending the suit. This argument advanced on behalf of the respondents is that section 523 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies as well to a case in which a reference to arbitration has been made pending the suit as to a reference made before any litigation has been instituted. The question has, as we have said, been the subject of consideration by this High Court. The question has, as we have said, been the subject of consideration by this High Court. In the case of Salig Ram v. Jhunna Kuar, [1882] I.L.R. 4 All., 546 Sir ROBERT STUART, C.J., and TYRRELL, J., held on appeal that where the parties to a suit had agreed to refer the matters in differ ence between them in such suit to arbitrators, the further hearing of the suit was rightly held to have been barred under section 21 of the Specific Relief Act. This decision was followed in the later case of Sheoambat v. Deodat, [1887] I.L.R., 9 All., 168, by Sir JOHN EDGE, C.J., and TYRRELL, J., and by the same Judges again in the case of Shib Lal v. Hira Lal, [1888] A.W.N., 133, We see no reason for differing from the decision at which they arrived. It appears to us that having regard to the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the subject of arbitration, section 523 was intended to have effect in a case such as the present. Section 506 and the following sections up to section 522 deal with cases in which the parties to a suit desire to leave the matters in difference between them to arbitration and apply to the Court for an order of reference. Those are not cases like the present. In such cases there are provisions for all the necessary steps following on an order of reference by the Court. But section 523 refers to cases in which persons, whether they be litigants or not, themselves agree independently of the Court to refer this matters in difference between them to arbitration and ask the Court to have the agreement filed. Then Section 525 enables parties who have agreed to refer their differences to arbitration and have obtained an award to have that award filed in Court, The course, which the appellants in present case ought to have taken is that provided by section 523. They omitted to follow that course, and dispute the fact that they had agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration, proceeded to carry on the litigation. We think it would be most inconvenient, if two simultaneous proceeding's in respect of disputes were allowed, namely, arbitration proceedings and proceedings before a court of justice. They omitted to follow that course, and dispute the fact that they had agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration, proceeded to carry on the litigation. We think it would be most inconvenient, if two simultaneous proceeding's in respect of disputes were allowed, namely, arbitration proceedings and proceedings before a court of justice. We think, therefore, the decision arrived at by our learned colleague was correct, and we dismiss the appeal with costs.