JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. 1. This appeal arises out of an application for the execution of a decree passed by the High Court of Calcutta on the 1st December, 1887, which was transmitted for execution, under section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the District of Aligarh. The present application for execution was made, in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh, to whom the certificate issued by the High Court of Calcutta, and the copy of the decree transmitted by it had been transferred by the District Judge of Aligarh in accordance with the provisions of section 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application was not made by all the decree-holders, but by some of them, one of the applicants being one Ramdin alias Ramji Dial. They stated that the decree had fallen into their share under a partition between them and the other decree-holders. The judgment-debtor, appellant here, raised various objections against the execution of the decree, which have been overruled by the Court below. Some of those objections have been repeated in the appeal before us and only two of them have been pressed in argument by the learned vakil for the appellant. The first contention which he raised was that the application for execution had not been made by all the original decree-holders that one of the applicants was a transferee of the decree, that such, an application ought to have been made to the, court which passed the decree and not to the court to which the decree had been transmitted for execution, and that consequently the court below had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for execution. 2. This contention is in our judgment without foundation. Four of the applicants are admittedly holders of the decree; the fifth Ram-din, alleges himself also to be one of the decree-holders. It appears that in the decree which was passed in the suit, his name was omitted, apparently by an oversight, but mention is made of “an infant under the age of 18 years, represented by his uncle and next friend, Gobind Ram.” Having regard to the plaint in the case, this description could only apply to Ramdin. 3. It appears that in the decree which was passed in the suit, his name was omitted, apparently by an oversight, but mention is made of “an infant under the age of 18 years, represented by his uncle and next friend, Gobind Ram.” Having regard to the plaint in the case, this description could only apply to Ramdin. 3. Further, it appears that in two applications for execution made to the High Court of Calcutta on the 8th February, 1888, and the 2nd June, 1892, respectively, Ramdin was one of the applicants for execution. Those applications were granted by the High Court as being applications by persons who were entitled to take out execution of the decree. The order on the last application was made after issue of notice to the judgment-debtors. It is, therefore, no longer open, to them to contend that Ramdin is not one of the holders of the decree We accordingly repel the first contention put forward by the appellant. 4. The next contention raises the plea of limitation. It is urged that the decree being a decree passed in 1887, the present application for execution made on the 15th January, 1903, was time barred under article 180 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act. That article prescribes in the case of a decree or order of a court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, a limitation of 12 years to be computed under certain circum-stances from the date on which the judgment, decree, or order was revived. We have therefore to consider whether there was a reviver of the, decree in this case within the meaning of that article. It appears that, on the 6th June, 1892, an application was made to the High Court of Calcutta for the transmission of the decree to the District Judge of Aligarh, Upon that application, a notice under section 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure was issued. On the 6th August, 1892, HILL, J., made the following order: “Let execution issue as prayed, no cause being shown.” This order was manifestly made in accordance with the provisions of section 249 of the Code of Civil Procedure, If this order has the effect of reviving the decree, the present application for execution is certainly within time. On the 6th August, 1892, HILL, J., made the following order: “Let execution issue as prayed, no cause being shown.” This order was manifestly made in accordance with the provisions of section 249 of the Code of Civil Procedure, If this order has the effect of reviving the decree, the present application for execution is certainly within time. Upon the question what constitutes a reviver within the meaning of article 180, we have a number of, rulings of the Calcutta High Court and other High Courts. The latest of them, having direct bearing upon this case is the ruling in Suja Hossen vs. Manohar Das, [1897] I.L.R. 24 Cal. 244. There it was held under circumstances very similar to those of the present case, that an order for execution made after such notice, as is required by section 248 had the effect of reviving the decree, within the meaning of that article. This ruling was approved by the same Court in the later case of Manohar Das vs. Futteh Chand, [1903] I.L.R. 30 Cal. 979. 5. A similar view was held by the Madras High Court in the case of Ganapathi vs. Balasundara, [1884] I.L.R. 7 Mad. 540 and the Bombay High Court also appears to be of the same opinion. 6. We see no reason to put upon the word ‘reviver’ in article 180 a different interpretation from that placed upon it by the other High Courts. So far as we are aware, there is no ruling of this Court upon this point, probably because this Court has no ordinary original civil jurisdiction. In our judgment the order of the court below is right. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.